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Abstract 
 
Chapter One focuses on the movement of quote prices and the role of 
asymmetric information. Standard methods of estimating the impact of order flow 
shocks are made inappropriate by the existence of runs in trade initiation, which are 
theoretically impossible. We find runs that exist in trade initiation persist even after 
accounting for standard explanations. The chapter modifies the methodology of (Huang 
& Stoll, 1997) to use runs in trade initiation to account for the phenomena and 
estimates effects using ASX data.  
Chapter Two introduces a new experimental environment in which the market is 
continuously shocked by new traders’ incentives. The new environment joins two 
branches of theory. Classical economic theory has prices determined by the preferences 
of agents, but says little about the price formation process. The second theory is derived 
from finance in which prices are determined by the order flow coming to the market, 
but there is no connection between order flow and preferences.  
 We show that in such markets, two competing generalizations of the Walrasian 
equilibria exist corresponding to these competing literatures, each with an independent 
pull on market prices. Prices and efficiencies reveal a strong roll of expectations in price 
discovery and reject the idea that convergence is due to random or zero-intelligence 
trading strategies alone. 
Chapter Three continues the analysis of Chapter Two by asking how the process 
of equilibration occurs in random arrival markets. We find that prices move proportional 
to the distance to the temporal equilibrium and show that this model’s predictive power 
v 
 
is due to Marshallian features of the trading process as opposed the classical Walrasian 
adjustment model.  
Chapter Four studies an RA environment in which some traders have asymmetric 
information regarding the distribution of latent incentives and arrival rates. We find that 
much of insiders’ information is diffused as theory suggests and that much of the 
information is incorporated in outsiders’ market actions. This diffusion of information is 
not a result of cumulative signed order flow, but is instead related to the observable 
rate of aggregate speculation. The ultimate implications of this phenomenon remain 
unknown. 
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Introduction 
 
In continuous double auction markets, three fundamental forces are responsible 
for the movement of prices, immediate incentives, expectations, and information. This 
thesis explores each of those three forces. Many theories in the market microstructure 
literature have tended to focus on common value and/or informational aspects of the 
double auction market rather than its ability to find supply and demand equilibria. This 
is due to the continuous double auctions’ application in financial markets, as well as the 
belief that supply and demand parameters can create an “induced common value,” 
making the specification of supply and demand itself relatively unimportant.  
 Despite this theoretical focus in the literature, this thesis shows that commonly 
applied models of information diffusion fail to capture key aspects of price movement in 
the Australian Stock Market and in experimental continuous double auction markets. 
Moreover, the amount of variance in intraday price movements explained by 
asymmetric information is remarkably small.  
Consequently, this thesis takes a different approach to the study of continuous 
double auctions. We apply an exploratory approach to a new kind of experimental 
environment. The environment of  (Garman, 1976) and  (Warren, 1975), in which limit 
order flow is modeled as a continuous Poisson process, is generalized to a full general 
equilibrium model in which supply and demand forming incentives to trade arrive to the 
market according to a Poisson process. The environment is termed “random arrivals” 
because it is as though new traders with their own preferences are randomly arriving to 
trade in the market. The new environment brings together two branches of theory. 
xiii 
 
Classical economics theory has prices determined by the preferences of agents 
assuming that the information revealed in market responses accurately reflects both the 
agent’s preferences and information. This theory says very little about the details of the 
actual price formation process. The second theory is derived from finance in which 
prices are determined by the order flow coming to the market but the connection 
between this order flow and the underlying preferences is left abstract.  Thus, this 
theory is not so much about equilibrium price discovery as it is the dynamics of the price 
making process.  The role of the background incentives plays no role in this theory.  
The new experimental environment lends itself to the study and integration of 
these two different bodies of theory. We show that in such markets, two competing 
generalizations of the Walrasian equilibria exist, each with an independent pull on 
market prices. One, which we call the flow competitive equilibrium, is similar to the 
classical law of supply and demand as found in economics. The other, which we call the 
temporal equilibrium, is similar to the price placing strategies and market 
microstructure found in finance.  
By modeling supply and demand as a flow of short-lived incentives, we are able 
to demonstrate that multiple generalizations of the Walrasian equilibrium exist in 
continuous random arrival markets, and show differences in levels of market efficiency 
between those equilibria. Prices and efficiencies reveal a strong roll of expectations in 
price discovery. We reject the idea that convergence is due to random or zero-
intelligence trading strategies alone.  
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The random arrival environment differs from traditional experimental 
environments in which incentives to trade are provided at the beginning of a number of 
(possibly overlapping) periods. The final chapter of the thesis also explores the role of 
asymmetric information in this environment.  
 The thesis asks fundamental questions such as, Do continuously evolving 
markets converge to supply and demand equilibria? How does this process happen? 
Which classical models best explain price dynamics? And how does information become 
incorporated into prices and efficiencies? 
Key findings include: 
 Multiple generalizations of the Walrasian equilibria exist in random arrival 
markets. 
 Convergence to supply-demand equilibria is possible in continually evolving 
markets without the need for repetition. 
 Prices in continuous double auctions are highly influenced by local or temporary 
imbalances in supply and demand. This is in contrast to predictions made by 
rational expectations with risk neutral agents. 
 The ability of continuous double auctions to converge, as well as their tendency 
for prices to be influenced by local factors, is best explained by a kind of 
Marshallian dynamic. The speed with which traders enter the market, place bids 
and asks, and ultimately transact is a linear function of the amount of available 
profit on their immediate incentives at current market prices. 
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 On the other hand, expectations about future order flow do form and help to 
smooth prices and raise efficiency to levels that would be impossible with zero-
intelligence agents. 
 Measures of informational efficiency based on price convergence and measures 
based on efficiency levels can differ widely when applied to flow environments.  
 The impact of asymmetric Information, when measured using the Ho/Stoll 
model, in both the Australian stock market and experimental random arrival 
markets with competing insiders is either small or non-existent. The proportion 
of variance in price changes explained by signed order flow is typically less than 
10%. 
 Experimental evidence from random arrival markets suggests that one possible 
explanation for this is that insiders hide their identities by placing both market 
and limit orders.  
 If uninformed traders have well defined supply and demand functions, 
information held by insiders about the level of future prices is partially 
transmitted to uninformed traders through the rate of trade. This allows 
uninformed traders to speculate in the direction of insiders’ information, but 
does not actually allow them to fully learn what insiders information is. 
 Chapter One: Inventory and Adverse Selection Effects in a Limit Order Market 
focuses on the role of asymmetric information in the Australian stock market. Theory 
predicts that, in markets where there is the possibility that some trades are motivated 
by asymmetric information, market makers will revise prices after each trade to account 
xvi 
 
for the informational content of signed order flow, making the prior probability of a 
reversal in trade initiation greater than or equal to .5. This however, is not the case. 
Empirically, trade initiation in the Australian stock market is positively correlated, even 
after accounting for standard explanations of this phenomenon. Consequently, standard 
methods of estimating the effects of asymmetric information and inventory 
management on asset prices fail to yield interpretable results. In this chapter, we 
estimate the impact of adverse selection and dealer inventory effects by looking at runs 
in trade initiation. We conclude that inventory effects are significant even in non-dealer 
markets, although their effect is limited to the level of the bid-ask spread. Asymmetric 
information has a smaller impact on the level of the bid-ask spread, but does affects the 
depth of the market, and the slopes of the limit order books. 
 Inventory effects are significant even in non-dealer markets. 
 Asymmetric information has a smaller effect on prices than inventory effects, but 
does affect the curvature of the limit order book. 
Chapter Two: Principles of Continuous Price Determination in an Experimental 
Environment with Flows of Random Arrivals and Departures studies an experimental 
continuous double auction environment with no asymmetric information. The period 
structure of classical experimental markets, which is known to play an important role in 
the equilibration process, is replaced by an environment in which incentives arrive 
randomly and continuously throughout. We show that in such markets, the focus on a 
single law of supply and demand is incomplete. There exist two competing 
generalizations of the Walrasian equilibria, each with an independent pull on market 
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prices. The first we call the “Temporal Equilibrium,” which is based on the parameters 
that exist in the market at a moment in time and the second is the “Flow Competitive 
Equilibrium,” which reflects the underlying probabilistic structure of the parameters. 
 Human subjects are also able to achieve much higher levels of surplus extraction 
than would be possible from naïve trading strategies alone, though far less than 100% of 
the additional surplus due to expectations is realized. In particular, the amount of 
surplus due to expectations that traders are able to extract seems to be related to the 
strength of public signals regarding price changes. When shifts in the FCE price are due 
to changes in the distribution of latent incentives, subjects tend to extract more 
additional surplus due to expectations than when shifts are due to changes in the 
relative rates of arrivals. 
The distance to the FCE and TE prices are the most important variables 
predicting both the location of new bids and asks as well as the probability of a bid or 
ask improvement. Large under pricings relative to either equilibrium concept are likely 
to result in a faster rate of market orders on the buy side, higher bid prices, and a 
greater chance of bid improvement. Similarly large over pricings relative to either 
equilibrium are likely to result in a faster rate of market orders on the sell side, lower 
ask prices, and a high chance of ask price improvement. 
Additionally, market convergence also appears to be aided by the way in which 
subjects position new bids and asks over time. Over the course of an experiment, if the 
Flow Competitive Equilibrium is held constant, new bids and asks are influenced in the 
direction of the FCE price. The entire distribution of bids and asks, as measured by 
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informational entropy, becomes more concentrated around the FCE price. Such changes 
in the distribution of bids and asks may be viewed as evidence of the formation of 
expectations. 
 Trading in experimental RA markets generates high levels of efficiency relative to 
the maximum amount of surplus available. Realized surplus extraction is typically 
higher than the amount that could be obtained without speculation.  
 Waiting times between trades are uncorrelated, and have a mean rate of 
transaction larger than the rate of transaction predicted by the FCE. 
 The law of one price, in the sense of a constant price over time, does not emerge 
under conditions of a constant FCE price. 
 Traded prices are distributed around both FCE and TE prices.  
 When trade prices deviate from the FCE price, they tend to deviate in the 
direction of the TE price. 
 Both the direction of temporal equilibrium prices and the direction of the FCE 
price influence price movement.  
 Over time, human subjects place bids and asks closer to the FCE price. This 
process likely aids convergence. 
Chapter Three: The Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experimental Random 
Arrival and Departure Environments continues the analysis of Chapter Two by asking 
how the process of equilibration occurs. In this chapter, we test six competing classical 
models of price movement. We find that all models of price dynamics, when considered 
on their own, do equally well in explaining observed experimental data. However, when 
xix 
 
we nest all six models into a single equation, a clear winner emerges. Prices appear to 
move in direct proportion to the distance between the current price and the Temporal 
Equilibrium Price. 
The distance to the temporal equilibrium appears to be the most important 
classical variable for several reasons. First, price dynamics are influenced only by the 
inframarginal portion of excess demand. Second, the speed with which individuals act 
on private incentives, and transact in the market is sensitive to the amount of profit 
available on each incentive at the current market prices. Incentives with higher rents at 
current offer prices were accepted faster in traders’ private markets, traded quicker in 
the public market, and had higher probability of being acted on in general. 
Such findings support the hypothesis that market convergence is in part aided by 
the “probabilistic Marshallian Path,” that is, the idea that trades will form along the 
Marshallian path with greater probability than would occur by randomness alone.  
The chapter also finds a significant role of price friction in price adjustments 
caused by the limit order book. The size and existence of the limit order book and the 
bid-ask spread also contribute to the occurrence of conditional heteroskedasticity in 
traded price time series. 
 Price changes are relatively insensitive to excess demand between individual 
trades due to limit order book friction. 
 The naïve OLS approach concludes that the best single predictor of per-trade 
price changes, in terms of the proportion of explained variation in dP, is the 
distance between the TE price and the current price. Distance to the FCE price 
xx 
 
performs comparably well, followed by Excess Rent a distant third. (2) All of the 
non-fundamental models, including the classical Walrasian model individually 
explain less than 1% of the total variation in price changes.  
 After adjusting for order book friction, auto correlation, and heteroskedasticity, 
there is little difference between models in terms of log likelihood.  
 Significant levels of order book friction are observed for every single-variable 
model.  
 A significant portion of heteroskedasticity is explainable by the size of the limit 
order books and the bid-ask spread. 
 When all of the theoretically important variables are included in a single nested 
model, only the distance to the temporal equilibrium and potential gains from 
trade are statistically significant in predicting price adjustment. 2) Of the two 
significant variables, only the distance to the temporal equilibrium price is found 
to be significantly positive. 
 Price dynamics are influenced only by inframarginal excess demand. 
 The speed of transaction for units at the bid and ask price is influenced by the 
amount of rent available to the opposite side of the market at that price. The 
higher (lower) a bid (ask) is, the faster a transaction will occur at that price. 
 Incentives with higher temporal equilibrium rents were 1) accepted faster in 
traders’ private markets 2) had higher probability of being transacted in traders’ 
private markets, and 3) transacted faster in the public market than lower rent 
incentives. 
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Chapter Four: Experimental Random Arrival Markets with Competing Insiders 
studies an RA environment in which some traders have asymmetric information 
regarding the distribution of latent incentives and arrival rates. Theory suggests that 
when more than one insider has identical information, insiders will price compete, 
eliminating all informational rent. We find instead, that insiders do not perfectly 
compete and that much of the information held by insiders is incorporated in non-
informed traders’ market actions. This diffusion of information is not a result of 
cumulative signed order flow, as predicted by theories of pure common value double 
auctions. 
 Informational efficiency in random arrival market experiments with competing 
insiders is high, though typically below 100%. Approximately one third of 
information surplus accrued to insiders. 
 Traded prices typically did not stabilize to the full information price. Hypothesis 2 
is correct. Prices were slightly more likely to be found between the full 
information price and the FCE price. 
 The inventory buildup of uninformed traders mirrors the inventory buildup of 
insiders.  
 Uninformed traders use the observed rate of trade to speculate on the direction 
of the Full Information Price, but never learn either the identities of the insiders 
or the true location of the Full Information Price. 
xxii 
 
 The only significant determinant of inventory accumulation for uninformed 
subjects is the lagged total rate of speculation. 
 The aggregate rate of insiders depends on location of the FCE price relative to 
the FIP. When the FCE is below the FIP, insider have a positive rate of inventory 
accumulation. When it is above the FIP, insiders have a negative, rate of 
inventory accumulation. 
 Insiders are also affected by competition, accelerating their rate of inventory 
accumulation in direct response to past rates of accumulation. 
 Informed subjects submitted both market and limit orders in the same 
proportion as uninformed traders. 
 Asymmetric information in Random Arrival Markets is not transmitted through 
signed order flow. The direction of order flow however, does impact prices. 
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Chapter 1 Inventory and Adverse Selection Effects in a 
Limit Order Market 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 This chapter looks at market microstructure data for a random sample of 10 
Australian stocks from the S&P/ASX 200 from Jan 2006 to Mar 2006. We find that 
existing models of the bid-ask spread, when applied to microstructure data, fail to 
identify inventory holding cost and adverse selection components of the spreads, as 
well as misestimate effective spreads. We modify the basic methods of (Huang & Stoll, 
1997) and apply our model to runs in trade initiation in order to decompose order 
processing, inventory, and adverse selection effects on the level and size of the bid-ask 
spread as well as determine how the depth and slope of the limit order books relate to 
these factors.  
 We find evidence that dealer inventory effects on the level of the spread exist 
even in limit order markets and that these effects are larger than those of adverse 
selection. Inventory effects do not appear to persist beyond the level of the spread, 
while adverse selection effects tend to affect the thickness of the limit order book, 
decreasing the depth of the market. Because bid and ask prices are revised separately in 
dealer markets, asymmetries in the effects of adverse selection can be seen between 
bid and ask prices. Quote prices respond more strongly to unexpected order flow shocks 
on the same side of the market, while changes in the inventory of limit order placers 
effects both quotes symmetrically. 
 This chapter attempts to connect two separate veins of financial literature: the 
literature related to the components of the bid-ask spread, and the newly emerging 
literature on limit order market microstructure. Its goal is two-fold, first to contribute to 
the bid-ask spread literature by showing how inventory, adverse selection and market 
making uncertainty affect not only the size and level of the spread, but also the depth 
and liquidity of the market. Second, to contribute to the limit order book microstructure 
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literature by highlighting the importance of runs in trade initiations and the 
asymmetries in the behavior of the bid and ask order books.  
 Most of the empirical microstructure literature related to limit order markets has 
focused on predictable patterns in order flow and the interactions between volume, 
market depth, liquidity, and volatility (Bias, Hillion, & Spatt, 1995), (Danielson & Payne, 
2001), (Ahn, Bae, & Chan, Limit Orders, Depth and Volatility: Evidence from the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong, 2001), (Bollerslev & Melvin, 1994). While these studies shed 
valuable light on the formation of limit order books and their impact on price 
movements and volatility, the literature has largely ignored issues such as the role of 
inventory holding costs, or to what extent components of the bid-ask spread influence 
the shape of the limit order book.  
 In part, inventory effects have been ignored in limit market order books because 
economists have questioned the relevancy of models of dealer inventory in non-dealer 
markets. Instead, theories of the spread specific to limit order markets have focused on 
the role of heterogeneity in traders’ demand for immediacy, and the relative arrival 
rates of limit and market orders (Foucault, 1999), (Foucault, Kadan, & Kandel, 2003). 
Empirical works have tended to attribute order flow effects on price movement as 
stemming entirely from asymmetric information (Bias, Hillion, & Spatt, 1995), (Chan, 
2005).  
 (Bias, Hillion, & Spatt, 1995) study the patterns of order flow in the Paris Bourse. 
They find that order flow is mainly concentrated at or near the best bid and best ask 
price, and that rates of limit order submission are negatively correlated with market 
thickness. Biais, Hillion, and Spatt also note that large trades on one side of the market 
are likely to cause changes in the level of the bid-ask spread, a result that they attribute 
to asymmetric information.  
 (Danielson & Payne, 2001) on the other hand, provide motivation for the 
existence of inventory effects and evidence of the importance of runs in trade initiation. 
They note that liquidity supply temporally clusters on one side of the market and 
removal of liquidity at the front of one side of the book implies increased probability of 
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seeing fresh liquidity at the front of the other side of the book and lower chances of 
seeing subsidiary liquidity supply on that side of the book. 
 Section 1.2 of the chapter discusses the background theory of the bid-ask spread 
and the decomposition of its components. In Section 1.3, we discuss the characteristics 
of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) data and argue for the applicability of theories 
discussed in Section 1.2. In Section 1.4, we show how existing models of the effective 
and quoted spread fail to fit the data. We point out problems related to the tendency 
for trade initiation to remain on the same side of the market, and sketch the 
relationship between accumulated order flow and the probability of a reversal in trade 
initiation. Section 1.5 modifies the basic trade indicator model for spread decomposition 
into a VAR model of trade initiation runs. The results of this modified model are 
presented in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter. 
1.2 The Theory of the Bid-Ask Spread 
1.2.1 Effective Spreads and Quoted Spreads 
 Two types of transaction costs exist in financial markets, quoted spreads and 
effective, or realized spreads. Quoted spreads are defined as the difference between the 
best asking price and the best bidding price. Today, quoted spreads can be observed in 
many different markets with reasonable amounts of accuracy. On the other hand, an 
effective spread is only realized when initiation of trade switches sides of the market 
and is defined as the amount that prices move due to the spread, at the times at which 
initiation changes. 
 While quoted spreads do represent real economic costs in terms of barriers to 
trade, the transactions costs that financial scholars are most interested in are the 
amounts that market makers have to be paid to compensate them for the cost and risks 
involved in making markets. The effective spread reflects the gross profit that market 
makers earn, while the remainder of the quoted spread is believed to exist in order to 
shield market makers from the risk of trading with better-informed traders (the 
information/adverse selection component) or the risk associated with large swings in 
inventory, which inevitably occur. 
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 A simple example of the difference between quoted and effective spreads is the 
following. Suppose a market maker sets bid and ask prices of $2 and $3 respectively. 
During the first half of a day, ten people each sell one unit at the bid price. Afterward, 
the market maker sets new bid and ask prices at $1 and $2 respectively. Ten more 
people now buy one unit each at the ask price. Although the quoted spread was 
constant throughout the day, the $1 quoted spread was never realized since everyone 
bought and sold at the same price; hence, the average effective spread was zero. 
1.2.2 The Roll Model of the Effective Spread 
 (Roll, 1984) provides a model for estimating the effective spread using the auto 
covariance of price changes, which is commonly applied in markets where the sequence 
of trade initiations is unknown. Roll assumes that in an efficient market, the probability 
of a trade occurring at the bid price is .5 and independent of past transactions. He 
argues that in such a market with only an order processing component of the spread, 
the movement of transaction prices between the bid and the ask creates negative first 
order auto covariance of transaction price changes. Using this relationship, Roll derives 
a simple estimator of the effective bid-ask spread: 
)1.1(),cov(*2 1
^
 ttRoll PPS  
 (Choi, Salandro, & Shastri, 1988) generalized the Roll model by allowing for the 
possibility of serial covariance in the sequence of trade initiations—that is, the 
probability of the next trade being initiated at the bid (ask) price given that the last 
trade occurred at the bid (ask) price may differ from .5. Choi, Salandro, and Shastri 
reasoned that the conditional probability of a continuation might be larger than .5 
because large market orders often initiate trades with more than one participant on the 
other side of the market. This causes single trades to be recorded as multiple sequential 
trades in ticker tape output. Choi, Salandro, and Shastri, derive a modified Roll 
estimator:  
)2.1(
),cov( 1^

 ttCSS
PP
S  
Where π is the probability of a trade reversal.  
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1.2.3 Glosten/Milgrom and Ho/Stoll 
 (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985) suggested a model in which some traders have inside 
information regarding the common value of an asset. In their model, the bid-ask spread 
reflects the amount that market makers must be compensated for constantly trading 
against informed traders. In Glosten and Milgrom, market makers adjust price levels to 
reflect information contained in order flow. If the last transaction occurred at the ask 
price, the market maker revises his or her expectation of the asset’s value upward, 
moving bid and ask quotes up accordingly. 
 (Glosten, 1987), and (Glosten & Harris, 1988) consider the possibility that the 
bid-ask spread reflects a combination of an order processing cost, as discussed by Roll, 
and an adverse selection component, as discussed by Golsten and Milgrom. Glosten and 
Glosten and Harris claim that the Roll estimator reflects a “gross profit” condition—the 
profit made by market markers above and beyond the losses they receive from trading 
with informed traders. Because of the way information contained in order flow causes 
market makers to revise prices, Glosten and Glosten and Harris show that even though 
the adverse selection component inflates spreads, it does not contribute negative auto 
covariance. Therefore, they claim that the difference between observed quoted spreads 
and the effective spread estimated using Roll is due to adverse selection. 
 (Ho & Stoll, 1981) provide an alternative explanation for why quoted spreads 
might be larger than effective spreads. They present a model in which dealers have an 
ideal level of inventory holdings, which they try to maintain. After a dealer sale 
(purchase), the dealer will adjust prices upward (downward) to induce a dealer purchase 
(sale). Unlike adjustments due to information in Glosten and Milgrom, these 
adjustments do contribute negative serial covariance. 
 If quoted spreads reflect a combination of all three transactions costs: order 
processing, adverse selection and inventory holding costs, then the difference between 
observed and effective spreads reflects both adverse selection and inventory 
components of the spread.  
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1.2.4 The Stoll Decomposition of the Quoted Spread 
 (Stoll, 1989) shows that five parameters summarize the differences between the 
order processing, adverse selection, and inventory holding cost models of the bid-ask 
spread: 
1. δr: the amount traded prices move when there is a reversal in trade initiation 
2. δc: the amount traded prices move when trade continues on the same side of 
the market.  
3. π: the probability of a change in trade initiation 
4. Covt: the first order covariance of transaction price changes 
5. Covq: the first order covariance of quote price changes, which Stoll claimed could 
be estimated from either the bid or ask time series1 
The values for each of these parameters under the competing theories are listed in 
Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1: Parameter Values under Competing Theories 
Determination of Quoted Spread δc δr π Covt Covq 
Only Order Processing 
      (Roll 1984) 
0 S 0.5 -0.25S
2
 0.0 
Only Adverse Selection 
      (Copeland, Galai 1983, Glosten,    
      Milgrom 1985) 
0.5S 0.5S 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Only Inventory Holding Cost 
     (Ho, Stoll 1981) 
0.5S 0.5S 1>π>0.5 -0.25S
2
<  
S2(1-2π)- π2(1-S) 
<0.0 
-0.25S
2
< 
 S2(1-2π) 
 <0.0 
 
 Stoll’s major contribution to the bid-ask spread literature was to notice that if 
the quoted spread was composed of a linear combination of an order processing cost, 
an adverse selection component and an inventory holding cost: 
)3.1()1(sin oldingInventoryHectionAdverseSelgsorderproce SSSS    
then Equation (1.3) and Table 1.1 define a system of equations that can be solved for 
the relative proportions of each component of the quoted spread. Stoll estimates the 
                                                     
1
 Stoll (1989) used the covariance of bid prices. As Table 3 shows, the assumption that the covariances of 
bid and ask prices are the same is clearly wrong. In transactions data, the covariance of ask price changes is 
always greater than the covariance of bid price changes.  
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parameters from daily NASDAQ data and concludes that about 47% of the bid-ask 
spread is comprised of order processing costs, 43% adverse selection cost and 10% 
inventory holding costs.  
 (Huang & Stoll, 1997) generalized the methodology of (Stoll, 1989) using trade 
indicator models to estimate the components of the bid-ask spread for NYSE data. In 
their model, the “true” public information price of a stock evolves according to: 
 
  )4.1(                        ,]|[
2
innovationn informatio public  inventoryin  change Unexpected
2
2111
1
ttttt
tt
IIEI
S
V
S
VV






 
Where It is an indicator function equal to 1, if a trade is designated as being buyer 
initiated, and -1 if seller initiated. This specification follows from the assumption that all 
trades are of unitary size. The expected change in inventory is simply: 
(1.5)reversal a ofy probabilit  theis  where,)21(]|[ 221    ttt IIIE  
 The midpoint of the spread Mt, is assumed to be linearly related to the order 
flow imbalance experienced by market makers, which is simply the sum of the indicator 
functions. This comes from the model of (Ho & Stoll, 1981). In that model, the dealer’s 
response to a change in inventory is given as the solution to a stochastic differential 
equation. Ho and Stoll do not solve this equation in the general case, or even show that 
there exists a solution to the general case. Instead, the conclusion that market makers 
will adjust prices linearly with changes in inventory is the result of several simplifying 
assumptions. Later, we will test this linearity assumption in evaluating the model. 
(1.6) 
1
1




t
i
itt IVM   
Combining Equations (1.4) and (1.6), Huang and Stoll derive the basic trade indicator 
model in which changes in the midpoint of the bid-ask spread are modeled as a function 
of lagged order flow, and expected order flow.  
(1.7))21(
22
)( 21 tttt I
S
I
S
M     
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 In this model, α reflects the percentage of the half spread attributed to adverse 
selection, and β reflects the percentage of the half spread due to inventory holding 
costs. (1-α-β) is interpreted as the order processing, or gross profit component of the 
half spread. In order to identify all of the parameters of this model, Huang and Stoll 
estimate the probability of a reversal separately and provide alternative specifications of 
the model depending on whether the quoted spread must also be estimated from the 
data. 
 Huang and Stoll note the potential for serious problems with their model. As in 
(Stoll, 1989), the probability of a reversal is a crucial parameter in the trade indicator 
model. Huang and Stoll observe the probability of a reversal to be significantly lower 
than .5 in NYSE data. As a result, when the model is first estimated, Huang and Stoll find 
the proportion of the half spread due to adverse selection to be negative—an 
impossible result.  
 Like (Choi, Salandro, & Shastri, 1988), Huang and Stoll assume that the problem 
stems from large market orders being incorrectly recorded as multiple consecutive 
trades. As a result, Huang and Stoll overcorrect for the problem of large trades by 
repeating their analysis combining all consecutive trades that occurred on the same side 
of the market less than 5 seconds apart. After doing this, they estimate that adverse 
selection accounts for about 9.6% of the spreads of NYSE stocks while the  inventory 
component accounts for about 28.7%. 
1.3 The ASX and Limit Order Markets 
1.3.1 Quality and Characteristics of ASX Data 
 The ASX is a limit order market with a publicly visible order book. There is no 
institutionalized dealer or specialist, although there is a small collection of brokerage 
firms that routinely make up the inside of the order book. Trading on the exchange is 
conducted anonymously. According to the rules of the exchange, traders may place 
either market or limit orders. Although in practice, market orders are extremely rare, 
and almost all transactions occur due to overlapping limit orders with most overlapping 
orders hitting either the best ask or best bid depending on the side of the market. For 
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our purposes, limit orders that transact immediately are effectively market orders, and 
will be referred to as such. The tendency for transacting limit order to hit the best bid 
(ask) rather than under (over) shoot, as well as the tendency for new limit orders to 
appear at the current best bid or ask price suggests that traders monitor orders closely. 
 The data used in this study come from a proprietary dataset compiled by Capital 
Markets Surveillance Services Pty Limited (CMSS), which consists of every bid, ask, 
amend, cancellation and trade on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Unlike data from 
US dealer markets, our data is remarkably clean. Every bid, ask, cancellation and amend 
is recorded and labeled according to a unique bid or ask ID number. Each trade is 
accompanied by a bid and ask ID and a set of flags indicating whether the transaction 
was initiated by the buyer (transaction occurring at the ask price) or the seller 
(transaction occurring at the bid price) of the transaction and whether the trade 
occurred on market, off market, during the opening or closing auction, etc.  
 As a result, the potential problem noted by (Choi, Salandro, & Shastri, 1988), that 
large trades being broken up into multiple consecutive trades can result in biased 
estimates of the probability of a reversal, is non-existent in the data considered in this 
study. All consecutive trades that are initiated at the bid (ask) price and are associated 
with the same bid (ask) ID number are considered a part of the same trade.  
1.3.2 Applicability of Inventory and Adverse Selection Models 
 A common objection to the methodology of this chapter is likely to be that the 
models of Roll, Glosten and Milgrom and Ho and Stoll, which we are applying to ASX 
data, are not specifically theories regarding limit order markets. While this is true, these 
theories are not specifically models of dealer or specialist markets either. Instead, all of 
the theories discussed above are models of stylized fictitious worlds in which a market 
makers (in this case, any trader who posts a limit price not for immediate execution) 
post fixed prices and individuals trade in unitary quantities with zero transaction risk.  
 While the market markers of theory are often referred to as “monopolist market 
makers,” their pricing does not depend on their monopoly power. (Glosten, 1987) 
argues that the presence of adverse selection exists in markets regardless of whether 
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the market maker is a single monopolist or a group of competing market makers. 
Moreover, in Stoll’s seminal paper on decomposing the effects of inventory and adverse 
selection, he uses data from the NASDAQ, which is a multiple dealer market. Even 
specialists are not monopolists. On average, NYSE specialists are involved in only 26% of 
all trades by volume (Hasbrouck & Sofianos, 1993).  
 The main substantive difference between limit order markets and dealer 
markets is not the monopoly power of the specialist but is the degree of market 
transparency and transaction risk. While some microstructure theories, such as (O'Hara 
& Oldfield, 1986), explicitly model the lack of transparency in dealer markets, the 
theories of Roll, Glosten and Milgrom, and Ho and Stoll are general enough that they do 
not account for order book transparency at all. 
 Whether market transparency is an important factor in determining bid-ask 
spreads is addressed in (Bortoli, Frino, Jarnecic, & Johnstone, 2006). Bortoli et al 
examine a natural experiment in which the Australian Futures Exchange made an 
institutional change toward greater order book transparency. The exchange increased 
the number of visible levels of quantity on the order book from the quantity available at 
the best bid and ask price to the quantities available up to three ticks away from the 
best offers in both directions. Measuring the average sizes of the bid-ask spread before 
and after the change, Bortoli et al.  concluded that transaction risk does not affect 
quoted spreads, although it did reduce the depth of the market available at the best bid 
and ask. 
1.4 Empirical Inconsistencies of the Roll and Stoll/Huang Stoll 
Models   
1.4.1 Quoted and Effective Spreads in ASX Data 
 Using the time series of bid, asks, cancellations, amends and trades, we can 
reconstruct the evolution of the limit order book throughout the trading day. Since we 
also observe the sequence of trade initiations, we can compute the average quoted and 
effective spreads using Equations (1.8) and (1.9) below. We could alternatively calculate 
the average quoted spread weighting by the length of time that the size of the quoted 
11 
 
spread persisted, or use inter-trade quotes as well. Weighting by time does not appear 
to affect our estimate of the average quoted spread in any significant way. The use of 
inter-trade quotes in the calculation as well tends to result in higher spread estimates 
since there is typically a time delay between when an order is lifted off the book and the 
time that quantity is replaced by another limit order. Using inter-trade quotes will 
produce positive bias in estimates of average quoted spreads related to the frequency 
with which limit order placers monitor a particular stock.  
(1.8)                                                     
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 For each stock, Table 1.2 lists the average quoted spread, the effective spread and two 
estimates of the effective spread obtained using the methods of (Roll, 1984) and (Choi, 
Salandro, & Shastri, 1988) . Table 1.2 also shows the price level of each stock at the 
beginning of the study and its average daily volume.  
 The actual and effective bid-ask spreads for all stocks tend to remain close to the 
minimum tick size of $0.01. Spreads exhibit some relationship to price levels, and 
possibly vary with trading volume as well; however, there is simply not enough data to 
make definite conclusions regarding either statement. The spread calculations in Table 
1.2 also point out why expressing spreads in terms of returns may be problematic. If 
quoted and effective spreads remain close to the minimum tick size for all stocks, 
expressing them as fractions of a stock’s share price artificially inflates the difference 
between the spreads of high and low priced stocks. 
 The effective bid-ask spread appears to be merely a fixed fraction of the 
observed quoted spread. Figures 1.1-1.3 plot the relationship between the effective 
spread, the quoted spread and the estimators listed in Table 1.2. Both the Roll and CSS 
models overestimate the true effective spread and, in terms of fit, perform almost as 
well as a fixed fraction of the quoted spread, about 2/3. 
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Table 1.2: Quoted and Effective Spreads 
Stock Average 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Effective/ 
(Average  
Quoted  
Spread) 
Roll 
Estimate of 
Effective 
Spread  
Choi, 
Salandro, 
Shastri  
Price 
(on 
01/03/06) 
Daily Vol 
MBL $0.0284 $0.0179 0.630 $0.0250 $0.0191 $68.00  145,679 
NWS $0.0156 $0.0086 0.551 $0.0098 $0.0073 $22.69  475,942 
ANZ $0.0152 $0.0080 0.526 $0.0101 $0.0077 $23.90  1,083,877 
BBG $0.0200 $0.0112 0.560 $0.0124 $0.0100 $14.50  321,130 
AWC $0.0117 $0.0065 0.556 $0.0072 $0.0057 $7.44  2,488,957 
IVC $0.0158 $0.0103 0.652 $0.0087 $0.0082 $4.11  53,389 
QAN $0.0106 $0.0075 0.708 $0.0069 $0.0058 $4.04  3,564,751 
WPL $0.0239 $0.0156 0.653 $0.0214 $0.0161 $39.25  854,692 
ZFX $0.0139 $0.0072 0.518 $0.0089 $0.0069 $7.00  3,126,523 
GWT $0.0142 $0.0082 0.577 $0.0078 $0.0066 $3.00  123,676 
 
 When Roll’s estimator is computed using per-trade transactions data, Roll tends 
to underestimate quoted spreads while overestimating effective spreads. On average, 
Roll overestimates effective spreads by about 60% using transaction data. This improves 
when using the modification suggested by Choi, Salandro, and Shastri. Their estimator, 
however, still overestimates effective spreads by about 20%. 
  
Figure 1.1: Quoted and Effective Spreads 
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Figure 1.2: Effective Spreads and Roll Estimator Using Transactions Data 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Effective Spreads and CSS Estimator Using Transactions Data 
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1.4.2 Explaining Differences Between Quoted and Effective Spreads 
 In order to explain the difference between quoted and effective spreads, we first 
try to adopt Stoll’s (Stoll, 1989) methodology to estimate the size of the relative 
components of the quoted spread. For each stock, we use bid, ask, and transaction 
prices along with the observed sequence of trade initiations to estimate the parameters 
given in Table 1.1. We allow δc, δr and π to differ depending on whether the last trade 
was initiated at the bid (δcb, δrb, πb) or ask price (δca, δra, πa), and estimate the 
covariance of quote prices for bid and ask price time series separately. 
 We see major discrepancies between observed and theoretical values, 
particularly for πb and πa. Each of the theories discussed in (Stoll, 1989) held that the 
probability of a reversal is at least .5. The observed probability of a reversal for all stocks 
is closer to .4 and for some stocks, such as IVC, significantly less. The probability of a 
reversal being smaller than .5 reveals that no combination of inventory holding costs 
and adverse selection components, at least as previous researchers have envisioned 
them, can adequately explain the difference between quoted and effective spreads. 
 Table 1.3 also reveals that the covariance of quote prices depends on whether 
covariances are computed using the time series of bids or asks. In all ten stocks, the 
covariances of ask quotes are higher than the covariances of bid prices. Bid covariances 
are negative in all stocks, while ask covariances are positive in four stocks. 
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Table 1.3: Estimated Parameters for ASX Stocks 
Stock δcb δca δrb δra πb πa Covt Covb Cova 
MBL -$0.0078 $0.0064 $0.0152 -$0.0166 0.4681 0.3891 -1.56E-04 -1.22E-04 1.39E-04 
NWS -$0.0024 $0.0033 $0.008 -$0.0072 0.4046 0.5086 -2.42E-05 -7.39E-06 -2.91E-06 
ANZ -$0.0028 $0.0026 $0.0071 -$0.0075 0.4679 0.4001 -2.57E-05 -5.53E-06 -1.52E-06 
BBG -$0.0041 $0.0045 $0.0084 -$0.0086 0.3788 0.3873 -3.84E-05 -1.99E-05 6.75E-07 
AWC -$0.0016 $0.0015 $0.006 -$0.0059 0.4061 0.3934 -1.30E-05 -3.14E-06 2.75E-04 
IVC -$0.0014 $0.0019 $0.0093 -$0.0092 0.2625 0.3091 -1.90E-05 -1.25E-05 -8.61E-06 
QAN -$5.45E-04 $5.26E-04 $0.0076 -$0.0073 0.3129 0.4054 -1.20E-05 -4.97E-04 -1.41E-05 
WPL -$0.0062 $0.0057 $0.0131 -$0.0139 0.4725 0.4103 -1.14E-04 -0.0296 0.0013 
ZFX -$0.0021 $0.0019 $0.0067 -$0.0066 0.4387 0.3885 -1.97E-05 -2.28E-06 -7.24E-07 
GWT -$0.001 $0.0019 $0.0084 -$0.008 0.2648 0.4193 -1.50E-05 -2.71E-06 -1.66E-06 
 
 Ask covariances tend to be higher than bid covariances because of the way stock 
prices adjust. Contrary to theory, quote prices do not adjust simultaneously. One price 
often undergoes multiple sequential revisions in one direction before the other price 
adjusts once. Because stock prices tend to move upwards, ask price changes are more 
likely to accumulate positive auto covariance than bid prices. 
 Figure 1.4 illustrates a sequence of trades for MBL during a period of price 
adjustment. Stock prices adjust upward when a large number of trades initiated by 
buyers erode limit orders on the other side of the market. This erosion of ask orders 
pushes the ask quote upward, but more importantly, it causes ask prices to rise at a 
faster rate than bid prices, increasing the quoted spread.  
 Nearly all transactions during the illustrated period of price change occur at the 
ask price. To the perspective of potential sellers, as ask prices increase, bid prices 
becomes less attractive, and seller initiated transactions do not occur until after bid 
prices have begun to catch up with the ask price.  
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Figure 1.4: Upward Price Adjustment in MBL 
 
1.4.3 The Tendency for Reversals 
 A natural question to ask given the low probability of a reversal is whether the 
probability of a reversal is increasing with the accumulated size of a continuation. It may 
be that markets have an “order flow threshold.” That is, small trades, even groups of 
small trades on the same side of the market are unlikely to induce any revision of prices. 
Only if a large enough order arrives or if a run of small trades accumulates enough one-
sided order flow, will markets undergo a price adjustment. 
 To answer this question, we consider the hazard rate of reversals. The hazard of 
a reversal at a quantity Q is defined to be the probability that a run experiences a 
reversal immediately after accumulating a size of Q shares conditional on having not 
experienced a reversal up to quantity Q. This can be estimated by dividing the empirical 
probability density function of run sizes by the one minus the empirical cumulative 
probability distribution.   
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 Figure 1.5 below shows the typical shape of the relationship between the current 
size of a run and the instantaneous probability of a reversal. The estimated hazard rate 
functions of the stocks in this sample reveal that there is indeed a relationship between 
how long a continuation has already lasted and its instantaneous probability of ending. 
In general, the longer a run has continued, the more likely it is to end, although this 
relationship appears weak for a broad range of run sizes at the beginning of the 
distribution of run sizes.  
 Essentially, many small trades can accumulate on one side of the market before 
affecting the probability of a reversal in a meaningful way. As orders build up on one 
side, however, the probability of a reversal increases at a faster rate as orders in a run 
arrive. 
 
Figure 1.5: Estimated Hazard Rates for Reversals in IVC 
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1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Predicting Changes in the Level and Slope of the Order Book 
 Given the problems associated with the tendency for continuations in trade 
initiations, we propose a modification of the Huang and Stoll trade indicator model in 
which the probability of a reversal is set to one. Specifically, consider the sequence of 
trade initiations and quantities: 
Trade 
Indicator 
1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 
Quantity 
of Shares 
100 300 200 500 100 300 200 100 
 
 Instead of looking at individual trades, we look at the alternating sequence of 
runs, measuring the size of the spread, the change in the level of the spread, and the 
depth of the market at and around the best ask and best bid on the limit order book 
between every run. The sequence of individual trades represented above then becomes 
the sequence of runs below: 
Trade 
Indicator 
1 -1 1 -1 
Quantity 
of Shares 
600 600 500 200 
  
 We then make similar assumptions regarding the effect of order flow on the true 
value of the stock and the relation between order imbalance and the “true” value of the 
stock. We assume that the change in the true price of a stock is a linear function of the 
size of the previous run, measured in shares, and the unexpected shock in order flow, 
also measured in shares. Similarly, we assume that the level of prices is a linear function 
of the true value and the size of the previous run. While Huang and Stoll focus on the 
mid point, we model changes in bid and ask prices separately in order to explore 
potential asymmetric effects on the spread. 
  We also relax the above mentioned linearity assumptions by testing possible 
non-linear forms, and include other covariates and autoregressive terms in our 
regressions. 
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 We estimate the system of equations below where 1
ˆ
tQ  is an estimate of the 
size of the run at time t-1, based upon information available at time t-2, and the V’s are 
vectors of autoregressive terms and the predicted variance of tQˆ . The vector of error 
terms of the system of equations is assumed contemporaneously cross-correlated while 
all other cross correlations are assumed zero. 
 Notice that in the equations below we have dropped the term S/2 from the 
original model. This is because we are no longer considering a fixed, point spread. By 
grouping all trades in a single run together, we are considering an “order flow” spread, 
which reflects how the interaction of market order flow and the arrival of new limit 
orders have changed the level of prices over the length of a trade run. 
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1.5.2 A Graphical Interpretation 
 On average, bid and ask prices tend to go up after a trade run at the ask price, 
and tend to go down after a run at the bid price. Because the probability of a reversal at 
the end of a run is one, the amount by which the ask price increases after a run at the 
ask price reflects the unrealized part of the flow spread after an ask run. Similarly, the 
amount that the bid price decreases after a run at the bid price is the unrealized part of 
the flow spread after a bid run. 
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 After each run, we measure the amount that the price on the same side of the 
market as the previous trade changed. This is denoted either Att YY  if the previous 
trade was at the ask price or Btt YY   if the previous run was at the bid price in Figure 
1.6 below. Between each run, just prior to the start of the new run, we also measure the 
size of the previous run, denoted as INV in Figure 1.6, and the amount that its size 
differed from its predicted size, denoted AS below. Measurements of the components 
of the spread are obtained by regressing Y on run size and the size of the shock to 
determine the relative importance of the two components of the unrealized spread. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order Processing Component 
 
Adverse 
Selection YAt=a
A+bA1ASt+b
A
2INVt+et 
Inventory 
Costs 
Ask Price 
Bid Price 
Unrealized Spread 
Unrealized Spread 
Unrealized Spread 
YBt=a
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B
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Trades 
Figure 1.6: Graphical Interpretation of Spread Component Estimation 
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1.5.3 Predicting Expected Order Flow 
 In order to accurately measure the effects of adverse selection on stock prices, 
we must predict the size of future order flows given the information available just prior 
to the time of a reversal. The size of consecutive runs can be correlated for many 
different reasons. According to the theory we are interested in evaluating, order flows 
at consecutive runs are correlated because of market making activities that adjust the 
level of bid and ask prices in order to induce changes in inventory.  
 We also know from other micro market studies of order flow and liquidity that 
the volume of trade obeys certain predictable time patterns. For example, order flow 
tends to start high following the opening auction, fall off towards the middle of the day 
and picks back up near the close of the market. Volume is also known to differ 
depending on the day of the week or month. Volume tends to be different on Mondays 
and Fridays as well as the first and last days of the month. The relation between volume 
and time of day found in this study is similar to typical U-shaped pattern of volume 
found in (Ahn & Cheung, 1999) and (Bias, Hillion, & Spatt, 1995). 
 When forecasting future order flow, it is important to distinguish between the 
amount of correlation in run sizes caused by market making activities, and the amount 
that is merely because consecutive runs are jointly influenced by the same latent 
variables affecting the level of volume in general. If Ho and Stoll are correct that market 
makers affect future order flow in response to past inventory changes, we should expect 
past order flow to forecast future order flow even in the presence of variables 
controlling for time. Moreover, we should expect the predictive power of past inventory 
to be robust to the presence of time variables.  
 For every stock, both time and lagged run sizes were significant in predicting 
future run sizes. While we do not interpret any of the estimated relationships as being 
causal, the influence of lagged run size variables on predictions of future run size were 
consistent with theory. Large trades at the bid price tended to predict large future 
volume at the ask price and visa versa. 
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 We also explore the possibility that future inventory depends on past runs 
deeper than the first lag. We find past lags significant in predicting run size, although the 
length of lagged dependence appears to extend only to the second lag.  
 Presumably, market makers are aware of predictable time patterns of volume, 
and anticipate them in their pricing. Thus, we use both sources of correlation to predict 
the unexpected shocks to market makers’ inventory. 
 We will also forecast the expected variance of future run sizes as a linear 
function of the same variables used in forecasting the mean of future run size. We place 
no restrictions on the parameters of the variance equation to assure that the variances 
are positive, but verify after estimation that each observation in the sample has positive 
expected variance. Generally, the number of negative variance predictions is small, less 
than 1% of the sample size. These observations are then set to zero. 
t
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1.6 Results 
1.6.1 The Level of the Bid-Ask Spread 
 The analysis of our data indicate that the size and level of the bid-ask spread is 
determined by three components: an order processing cost, which constitutes the 
majority of the quoted spread, an inventory cost, and adverse selection cost. The effect 
of inventory and adverse selection costs, as predicted by theory, are similar, both 
tending to move prices in the direction of the previous trade run.  
 Table 1.4 summarizes the effects of inventory and adverse selection on the 
movement of bid prices, ask prices and the size of the quoted spread. We summarize 
the effect of the variables of interest in Table 1.4 by presenting the mean of the effects 
averaged across stocks, as well as the standard deviation of estimates and the minimum 
and maximum estimated values. We also provide counts of how many times out of ten, 
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the estimated effect of the variable was positive and negative, regardless of the 
significance of that result. 
 As a simple non-parametric test of the inventory and adverse selection 
hypotheses, we compare the number of times an effect was estimated to be positive 
(negative) to the probability of obtaining the same or greater number of positives 
(negatives) under the null hypothesis that positive and negative results are equally 
likely. 
 Theory predicts that large volume and unexpected volume at the ask price will 
cause prices to go up and that large volume and unexpected volume at the bid price will 
cause prices to go down. Ten out of ten times the effect of quantity traded at the bid 
price was found to have a negative effect on the bid price, and ten out of ten times the 
effect of quantity traded at the ask price was found to have a positive effect on the ask 
price. The probability of this happening by chance alone is only about 1%. We also find 
that quantity at the ask (bid) price had a positive (negative) effect on bid (ask) prices 
nine (nine) out of ten times as well, an event with about 2% probability. 
 Less significant results are obtained for the effects of adverse selection. Adverse 
selection also appears to have asymmetric effects on bid and ask prices with bid prices 
responding more strongly to run size shocks at both the bid and ask prices. This 
asymmetry may be related to the tendency for the bid order book to exhibit a higher 
degree of curvature than the ask order book as the slope and curvature of the book is 
essentially a measure of prices’ sensitivity to volume. Unexpected shocks at the ask 
price had a positive effect on bid and ask prices in 7 stocks each, while unexpected 
shocks at the bid price had a negative effect on bid and ask prices in 8 and 10 stocks 
respectively.   
 In the cases in which estimated effects of shocks were in the opposite direction 
as that predicted by theory, they also tended to be insignificant. For example, the 
smallest effect of unexpected shocks at the ask price on the level of the ask price was a 
whole order of magnitude smaller than the mean effect across stocks. The one 
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exception to this was the effect of shocks at the ask price on the level of the bid price, 
for which one stock had a significantly negative estimate.  
 Overall, a trade run at the ask price one standard deviation larger than the mean 
can expect to increase bid and ask prices by slightly more than half a cent. On the other 
hand, a run at the bid price one standard deviation larger than the mean can expect to 
lower bid and ask prices by slightly less than half a cent. Because of a large amount of 
skewness in the distribution of run sizes, most run sizes lie somewhere between +/-1 
standard deviation from the mean, but runs +5, +6, even +13 standard deviations or 
more away from the mean are not uncommon, certainly much more probable than they 
would be under a normal distribution. 
 The effect of observing an unexpected shock in run size one standard deviation 
large than the mean at the ask price tends to raise the ask price by about .3 cents, while 
having little impact on the immediate movement of the bid price. Similarly, a one 
standard deviation shock at the bid price will decrease the bid price by about .3 cents as 
well, and will have an effect about half that size on the ask price. 
 The asymmetry between how bid and ask prices respond to information 
contained in order flow is particularly theoretically important. Typically, theory has 
assumed that the bid-ask spread is either constant, or that when bid and ask prices are 
revised, that they are revised simultaneously. In a dealer market, where bid and ask 
prices are periodically announced by a specialist such as on the NYSE, this is not a bad 
assumption. However, in a limit order market, prices changes occur one at a time when 
orders at the front of the book are lifted, cancelled or improved.  
 In theory, inventory effects are caused by dealers’ desire to rebalance 
inventory— induce dealer sales after dealer purchases, and visa versa—hence, in a 
market where prices are revised separately, the inventory effect is an effect that betters 
prices on the side of the market opposite the previous trade run2. Conversely, 
                                                     
2
 Prices cannot always be improved on the opposite side of the market as the previous trade run because of 
the minimum tick size. If the bid-ask spread is currently at the minimum tick size, the only way to improve 
prices at the opposite side of the market is to move both bid and ask prices together. This may explain why 
inventory has a significant effect on both sides of the market regardless of the side of the previous run—
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information effects are caused by dealers adjusting prices in ways that reduce order 
flow from informed traders, hence when prices adjust separately, adverse selection is 
primarily an effect that worsens prices on the same side of the market as the previous 
run. In light of how the two effects of information and inventory are likely to affect bid 
and ask prices differently, it is not surprising that we find inventory effects have a larger 
impact on prices on the opposite side of the market than do adverse selection effects.  
 
Table 1.4: Summary of Effects: Bid, Ask and Spread Equations 
 
 
Figure 1.7: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Trade Size (at Ask Price) on Bid Price 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
because when the spread is small same-side price movement is a prerequisite for adjusting opposite-side 
prices in ways that correct inventory imbalance. 
Last Run 
at Ask 
Price
Quantity 
Traded at 
Ask Price in 
Previous Run
Quantity 
Traded at Bid 
Price in 
Previous 
Run
(Quantity 
Traded at 
Ask Price in 
Previous 
Run)^2
(Quantity 
Traded at 
Bid Price in 
Previous 
Run)^2
Unexpect
ed Shock 
at Ask 
Price
Unexpect
ed Shock 
at Bid 
Price
Variance 
of Run 
Size Constant
dbestbid x P(X>=x|p=.5)
average 0.0050 0.0077 -0.0041 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0031 0.0000 -0.0015 1 0.999
std dev 0.0027 0.0088 0.0031 0.0005 0.0004 0.0064 0.0026 0.0004 0.0024 2 0.990
min 0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0120 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0145 -0.0084 -0.0004 -0.0047 3 0.947
max 0.0102 0.0258 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0009 0.0069 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0038 4 0.831
# Positive 10 9 0 2 8 7 0 4 2 5 0.627
#Negative 0 1 10 8 2 3 10 6 8 6 0.382
dbestask 7 0.178
average 0.0040 0.0051 -0.0045 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0026 -0.0017 0.0001 -0.0014 8 0.062
std dev 0.0026 0.0053 0.0049 0.0007 0.0006 0.0039 0.0034 0.0006 0.0020 9 0.019
min 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0156 -0.0024 -0.0013 -0.0026 -0.0075 -0.0005 -0.0055 10 0.010
max 0.0094 0.0156 0.0000 0.0002 0.0009 0.0110 0.0049 0.0016 0.0025
# Positive 10 10 1 2 8 7 2 4 1
#Negative 0 0 9 8 2 3 8 6 9
spread
average -0.0012 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0019 0.0008 0.0001 0.0263
std dev 0.0011 0.0025 0.0012 0.0002 0.0002 0.0025 0.0018 0.0002 0.0760
min -0.0040 -0.0077 -0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0006
max 0.0002 0.0005 0.0021 0.0001 0.0001 0.0077 0.0044 0.0007 0.2426
# Positive 1 3 7 3 1 8 6 8 10
#Negative 9 7 3 7 9 2 4 2 0
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Figure 1.8: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Trade Size (at Ask Price) on Ask Price 
 
Figure 1.9: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Trade Size (at Bid Price) on Bid Price 
 
 
Figure 1.10: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Trade Size (at Bid Price) on Ask Price 
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Figure 1.11: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Shocks (at Ask Price) on Bid Price 
 
 
Figure 1.12: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Shocks (at Ask Price) on Ask Price 
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Figure 1.13: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Shocks (at Bid Price) on Ask Price 
 
 
Figure 1.14: 95% Confidence Intervals for Effect of Shocks (at Bid Price) on Ask Price 
 
 
 In addition to looking at the effects of trade size, we also explore possible non-
linear relationships between trade size and price movement, by including non-linear 
transforms of trade size in the price change equations. Table 1.4 includes a summary of 
the estimated effect of trade size squared as an example. While these effects are 
significant in some individual stocks, their effects are not consistently in the same 
direction across stocks.  
 This suggests that runs of extreme sizes are fundamentally different from runs of 
moderate size, but their effect on price movement may depend on other unobservable 
factors. For example, the effect of a large trade may depend on whether it follows an 
announcement of public information.  
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 A notable feature of exceptionally large runs is that, in some stocks, they do not 
generate any price movement at all, while in others, prices tend to move in the direction 
of the trade, as one would intuitively expect. Eliminating large trade runs, those thirteen 
standard deviations or more from the mean run size, as outliers often does change the 
estimated effect of squared run size, but the estimated effect of run size and 
unexpected shocks in run size appear robust to their elimination. Inventory and adverse 
selection shocks are also robust to the presence of squared run size, log(run size) and 
lagged price change variables. 
 As expected, the error vectors of the change in ask price and change in bid price 
equations are highly correlated with correlations ranging from .85 to .95. This means 
that bid and ask prices tend to be moved in the same direction by the arrival of public 
information shocks, which are independent of order flow. At the same time, the errors 
of the price change equations are not as nearly as highly correlated with the errors of 
the spread equation, suggesting that the arrival of public information affects the size 
and level of the bid-ask spread differently.  
 The spread equation is the only place that we tend to see a significant effect of 
run size variance. The idea that large variance in run sizes tend to increase the bid-ask 
spread seems vaguely consistent with past research which has found positive 
relationships between the size of the bid-ask spread and price volatility (Ahn, Bae, & 
Chan, 2001) and (Bollerslev & Melvin, 1994). 
1.6.2 The Slope of the Bid-ask Spread 
 The effect of inventory costs, adverse selection and uncertainty are more 
complicated with respect to the depth and slopes of the order book. The slopes of the 
order book are significantly affected by inventory and adverse selection, but not in the 
ways one would intuitively expect from theory. In theory, large trades and/or large 
unexpected shocks in dealer inventory at the ask price should increase prices. Since the 
depth and slope of a book reflect the price of quantity, one might intuitively expect a 
decrease in depth and an increase in the slope of the ask order book following a large 
trade at the ask price.  
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 In practice, the order books appear to be more affected by demand for liquidity 
than anything else. High transaction volumes at both bid and ask prices appear to 
increase the depth and liquidity of the market. Essentially, market makers observe trade 
sizes and respond to increased demand for liquidity by placing additional limit orders at 
or around the best bid and ask. Large volumes of trading at either price tend to result in 
deeper markets and decreasing slopes of the order book. This result is consistent with 
(Danielson & Payne, 2001), which finds significant feedback effects between the rates at 
which market and limit orders enter the market for the Reuters D2000-2 USD/DEM 
foreign exchange market. 
 Table 1.5 below reports the same statistics as Table 1.4 for the depth of the 
market at the ask price (Q1) and the next four levels closest to the best ask (Q2-Q5), as 
well as the depth at the best bid (QD1) and the four closest levels of the bid offer curve 
(QD2-QD5). In all of the regressions Q1-Q5 and QD1-QD5 have been standardized by 
their mean and standard deviation, so that all effects are interpreted relative to the 
average quantity available at that price level. This is to make results comparable across 
stocks with different levels of liquidity. 
 The amount that a trade size increases the level of the quantity available at the 
first five price ticks on both sides of the market varies widely between stock, and 
between price levels. This variation between levels may be related to gaps in the order 
book, prices at which little if any quantity is offered. In general, a trade on either side of 
the market one standard deviation larger than the mean will result in an improvement 
in depth at a given price level between 1% and 10 % of the standard deviation in the 
level of quantity available at that price. 
 In contrast, large unexpected shocks in volume at either price tend to slow limit 
order flow relative to market order flow and increase order book slopes. The expected 
variance of run sizes appears to have minimal, if any, significant relationship to either 
the bid or ask order book. Just as unexpected shocks had an asymmetric effect on the 
level of spreads, they also appear to have an asymmetric effect on liquidity. Shocks at 
the bid price tend to affect both the bid and ask order books out to the fifth price level, 
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while the effect of ask shocks on the bid order book appears to lose significance after 
only one level. 
 Unexpected shocks in order flow at the bid price appear to have a more 
significant impact on market liquidity than shocks at the ask price. A shock at the bid 
price one standard deviation above the mean will result in a decrease in quantity 
offered at every level of both order books between 5% and 20% of the standard 
deviation of quantity at those levels. Comparatively, ask price shocks will decrease the 
quantity offered at the best bid price by about 3% of a standard deviation with little or 
no effect on other price levels of the bid order book. The effect of ask price shocks on 
the ask order book does appear to extend further than the depth at the best ask price, 
however. A one standard deviation shock will result in about a 5% to 30% standard 
deviation reduction in the quantity offered at each level of the ask book. 
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Table 1.5: Summary of Effects: Quantities Offered at First Five Levels of Bid Order Book (QD1-QD5), Quantities 
Offered at First Five Levels of Ask Order Book (Q1-Q5) 
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1.7 Conclusions 
 Previous models of the bid-ask spread that have focused on the probability of a 
reversal as a key parameter in decomposing spreads cannot reliably be used in markets 
where there is a large tendency for trade continuations. Even simple modes such as the 
Roll model, which do not distinguish between inventory and adverse selection 
components cannot be accurately used to measure the difference between effective 
and quoted spreads in markets with large runs in trade initiation. 
 By considering runs as fundamental elements of limit order markets, a clearer 
picture of the role of inventory management and asymmetric information emerges. 
Dealer inventory effects on spreads are not unique to dealer or specialist markets. They 
exist even in limit order markets and their effect on the level of bid-ask spreads is larger 
than that of adverse selection. 
 Decomposition of the spread also allows one to focus on changes in the order 
book specifically due to adverse selection. Asymmetric information plays a smaller role 
in the level of the spread, but has wide-ranging effects on the depth and shape of the 
order book. Unexpected shocks in the size of run volume decrease the flow of limit 
orders relative to market orders resulting in lower liquidity and steeper order books. 
Inventory effects, on the other hand, have little if any influence on market liquidity.  
 The relationship between unexpected shocks in order flow and the order book is 
also asymmetric. Shocks due to asymmetric information have a greater impact on the 
level and slope of the order book on the same side of the market as the shock. Shocks 
arriving at the bid price also have a greater influence on liquidity than do shocks at the 
ask price.  
 These differences between inventory and adverse selection effects raise new 
questions regarding the causality of the observed relationship between order book 
steepness and price volatility, and are likely to be a fruitful area of further research. 
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Chapter 2 Principles of Continuous Price Determination in 
an Experimental Environment with Flows of Random 
Arrivals and Departures 
2.1 Introduction 
 The period structure of experimental double auction markets, developed by 
(Chamberlin, 1948) and refined by (Smith V. , 1962), is known to play an important role 
in Market equilibration. But is the repetition of trading days a necessity for convergence, 
and in what ways do continuous markets differ from period-style experiments? In this 
chapter, we show that 1) periods are not necessary for price equilibration, 2) multiple 
generalizations of the Walrasian equilibrium exist in a continuous environment, with 
each equilibria exerting a unique “pull” on prices, and 3) that expectations play an 
important role in the convergence of continuous markets. 
In the experimental markets we study, incentives arrive at random times, are 
short lived, and come from stochastic processes which change over time. The first 
generalization of the Walrasian equilibrium is simply the price that would clear the 
incentives currently in the market irrespective of expected future arrivals. We call this 
the Temporal Equilibrium (TE). The second generalization of the Walrasian equilibrium 
to the continuous random arrival environment we call the Flow Competitive Equilibrium 
(FCE), which represents the price at which the expected flow of buy and sell incentives 
are equalized.  
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The environment we consider is similar to the environment examined 
theoretically in the finance literature by (Garman, 1976) and (Amihud & Mendelson, 
1980). The works of Garman and Amihud and Mendelson, however, neglect the 
existence of Temporal Equilibrium prices, focusing exclusively on Flow Competitive 
Equilibrium and the effects of dealer inventories on prices fluctuations around the FCE 
price. Both works essentially take it for granted that expectations about the flow of 
supply and demand drive convergence. Other researchers, outside the realm of finance, 
such as (Gode & Sunder, 1993) and (Brewer, Jiang, & Plott, 2003) show that price 
convergence to the Walrasian equilibrium can be attained with “zero-intelligence” 
traders, raising the possibility that market convergence may have little if anything to do 
with human expectations.  
While the temporal equilibrium can be thought of as a naïve or myopic 
equilibrium model that could be attained by purely random behavior alone, the FCE is a 
model of expectations, which would require real human intelligence. We discover that, 
with human subjects, both equilibria exert independent influences on prices.  
Continuous markets with random arrivals and departures have the unique 
feature that speculation is necessary for obtaining high levels of efficiency. Speculation 
becomes a necessity because appropriate trading partners do not always exist in the 
market at the same point in time. Buyers and sellers may arrive in random “lumps,” 
causing temporary imbalances in supply and demand. To obtain levels close to one 
hundred percent efficiency, markets makers or speculators must be willing to smooth 
temporary supply imbalances over time. The markets we study here do demonstrate 
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levels of efficiency significantly larger than those attainable from random or naïve 
trading strategies alone. Despite a lack of direct coordination of market timing, nearly all 
of the potential gains from trade are realized.  
 The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section is this introduction. 
The second outlines the random arrival and departure environment that we explore. 
The third section is a discussion of the market institutions. The fourth section develops 
principles that are natural generalizations of classical principles and illustrates how they 
apply to the complex random arrival and departure environment. The fifth section 
details the experimental procedures and design and outlines the experiments 
conducted. The sixth section contains the results, and the final section contains 
concluding remarks. 
2.2 The Random Arrival and Departure Environment 
2.2.1 Preference Inducement Methodology 
 Classical experimental market environments, as introduced by (Chamberlin, 
1948) and (Smith V. , 1962), consist of a set of redemption values, costs, and a period 
structure. Before the start of a period, buyers receive redemption values from the 
experimenters and sellers receive costs. Buyers make money in an experiment by buying 
units in a public market, in which all subjects can participate, and reselling them to the 
experimenters at the redemption values the experimenters privately quote each buyer. 
Similarly, sellers buy units from the experimenters, at costs the experimenters quote, 
and resell them to other subjects for a profit. Redemption values and costs can be 
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modeled as limit prices and used as parameters in a model of competitive supply and 
demand equilibrium. When a period opens, subjects choose what incentives they will 
act on and form trades in the public market. Each period typically lasts for a fixed length 
of time. After each period, subjects receive additional redemption values and costs 
while old redemption values and costs do not carry forward to new periods. 
Additionally, units that exist in one period typically are not carried over to the next 
period; inventories and cash typically refresh each period. 
 Thus, in the classical environment, each period is like a day in which 
commodities are traded and completely depreciate over night. The day starts with a 
stock of costs and redemption values. During the day, the gains from exchange explicit 
in the stock are exhausted. All actions are coordinated by the beginning and ending of 
the period. 
 By contrast, the random arrival environment has no period structure. The market 
opens for a fixed length of time, typically about two hours. Incentives arrive in the form 
of private orders to buy from the experimenters (i.e., costs for potential sellers) or 
private orders to sell to the experimenters (i.e. redemption values for potential buyers) 
in a market accessible only by the agent for whom the orders are intended (i.e., the 
agent’s private market)3. Buyers have an opportunity to buy in the public market from 
other agents and resell for a profit in their private market by accepting an order to sell 
to the experimenters found there. Similarly, sellers accept private orders to buy from 
                                                     
3
 This method of implementing the random arrival of incentives is made possible by the Caltech Marketscape 
technology that will be explained in greater detail in later sections. 
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the experimenters found in their private markets and resell units to other agents in the 
public market. 
 Private orders to buy and sell appear in agents’ private markets at random arrival 
times and each order expires after a short period if not acted on. This expiration feature 
is important because it forces the individual to decide whether or not to act on an order 
during a specific interval of time. The incentives can appear at any time for any subject 
and last as long as the experimenters choose. Thus, at any instant, a subject can have 
many orders for different amounts that appeared in the subject’s private order book at 
different times and have different expiration times. 
2.2.2 Incentive Parameter Structure (Latent Incentives and Realized 
Incentives) 
 The basic parameters will be called “latent buyer incentives” and “latent seller 
incentives.” The latent buyer incentives consist of a probability density function gb(x), 
where x is a price. Latent seller incentives consist of a probability density function gs(y), 
where y is a price. For individual agents, draws are made from the distribution of buyer 
values and the distribution of seller costs according to two independent Poisson 
processes with intensities s  and b  respectively. 
 Realized incentives, as opposed to latent incentives, are the draws that are 
actually sent to buyers’ and sellers’ private order books and serve as “redemption 
values” and “costs.” In designing experiments, s  is the arrival rate of private orders for 
each of the ns sellers, and b  is the arrival rate of private orders for each of the nb 
39 
 
buyers. An order sent to a private order book has a life b and s for buyers and sellers 
respectively. In these experiments, b and s are fixed lengths of time (6 minutes), but 
this need not be true in general. The environment could easily be modified to include 
random expiration according to some waiting time distribution. 
 One can think of nature randomly choosing buyers at a rate nb b  from a 
distribution gb of latent buyer types with each type being a person’s willingness to pay. 
Similarly for sellers, one can think of nature randomly choosing sellers at a rate ssn   
from a distribution gs of latent seller types with each type representing a cost or a 
reservation selling price. Thus, we will sometimes say loosely that the buyers and sellers 
are randomly arriving at the market with randomly distributed incentives and a fixed 
life.  
 Figure 2.1 provides an impression of the environment from the point of view of a 
subject. Shown there are realized incentives (the private orders received) by a subject 
over the course of an experiment. The horizontal axis is the time of arrival and the 
vertical axis is the price of the private offer (the analog of a “redemption value”). A 
parameter shift to a lower arrival rate took place about the middle of the experiment. 
As can be seen from the pattern, the subject faces a wide range of randomly arriving 
incentives. When all signals are viewed at once, as is the case in the figure, the 
difference in the pattern of incentives is apparent. The implications of parameters are 
more subtle from the subject’s point of view. Only the arrivals themselves are observed 
by the subject without aggregation or frequency measurements. In Figure 2.1, the 
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subject is only exposed to a change in the arrival rate and this change is not signaled by 
other features of the environment.  
 
Figure 2.1: Example Arrival of Private Orders (Incentives) for a Single Subject Before and After a Parameter Shift 
That Reduces the Flow of Orders to the Subject 
 
 
 While the environment introduced here is new, the experimental literature 
contains suggestive departures from the classical environment. The literature is much 
too large for a complete review here. We do not attempt to review all of the 
modifications of the classical environment that exist in the experimental literature. 
Instead, we reference seminal departures in the direction of the environment 
developed here.  
 In (Jamison & Plott, 1997) and (Kagel, 2004), the incentives differed each period 
in a random fashion. In (Brewer, Jiang, & Plott, 2003), incentives were instantaneously 
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refreshed after a trade took place, demonstrating that the price adjustment process was 
not due to the Marshallian path.4  Many experiments involve incentives with multi-
period longevities following the original study by (Miller, Plott, & Smith, 1977): notable 
examples being experiments with financial assets (Forsythe, Palfrey, & Plott, 1982), 
(Smith, Suchanek, & Williams, 1988) and many other experiments involving goods with 
“asset-like” properties (Peng & Plott, 1998).5  
 A flow environment with simulated buyers was created by (Millner, Pratt, & 
Reilly, 1990) for the study of contestable markets characterized by duopolists with 
falling average costs, but they studied only a solution from contestable market theory as 
opposed to a general concept of competitive market equilibrium. (Aliprantis & Plott, 
1992), introduced the idea of “overlapping orders” similar to the idea of “overlapping 
generations” which have features similar to the random arrival markets we introduce 
here. 6 In the overlapping orders environment, each agent-type had a fixed period 
structure, say every 20 minutes, the beginning of which orders arrived that could be 
executed during the personal period and expired at the end of the personal period. 
Identical agent types operated on the same schedule with essentially identical 
preferences while different agent types operated on different (overlapping) period 
schedules. For example, in a two generation world, the periods for generation 2 started 
10 minutes after the period for generation 1 started. The market never closed so at each 
                                                     
4 Interestingly, because the units that could trade would be refreshed, the “arrival” rate of such units began to 
increase relative to units that could not trade. In order to accommodate this feature, Brewer, et al (2002) 
invented a “velocity adjusted” concept of demand and supply that can be viewed as a special case of the 
theoretical concepts developed here.  
5
 (Cliff & Preist, 1998) allowed the accumulation of inventories and orders that were distributed to subjects at 
scheduled periods. 
6
 In a much different environment, overlapping generations have been studied by (Marimon & Sunder, 1993). 
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instant there was a “young generation” that just received incentives and an old 
generation, with incentives that were getting ready to expire. Thus, the classical period 
structure was removed. One can think of the random arrival environment as an 
“overlapping order” environment only with random schedules that differ across 
individuals and many generations. 
2.3 Market Institutions 
 The market organization implemented here is the multiple unit double auction 
with an order book invented for experimental applications by (Plott & Gray, 1990). At 
any instant, a buyer or a seller can submit an order consisting of a quantity, a per-unit 
price and an expiration time and send it to the market. Buy orders obligate the bidder to 
buy up to the stated quantity at the per unit price if accepted. Sell orders obligates the 
asker to sell up to the stated quantity at the per unit price if accepted. Orders are sent 
to a public order book that can be viewed by all agents and are listed in order of price 
from best to worst from the point of view of counterparties.  
 If trade is possible when an order arrives at the market, the trade is immediately 
executed at the existing price in the order book. That is, if a buy order arrives at a price 
that is higher than the lowest sell order price, the trade is executed at the sell order 
price. If the quantity of either side is not exhausted, the remaining amount is entered 
into the book. 
 The market exchange system was Caltech’s Marketscape program. This market 
system operates over the web; agents can be located at different institutions or at 
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home. The exchange system has a public market in which exchanges can take place. 
Each agent also has a private market in which orders are placed by the experimenters. 
These private markets provide the technology through which the random arrival 
environment is implemented. 
2.4 Models and Theory 
2.4.1 Temporal Equilibrium 
 At any given time, temporal competitive supply (TS) and temporal competitive 
demand (TD) curves are based on orders that exist in private order books (private 
incentives) at time t. These are the orders received by subjects that have not been acted 
upon or expired.  For subjects i and j let Ri(t, xi) be the revenue that is produced by 
exercising the best xi orders that buyer i finds in the private order book at time t and let 
Cj(t, yj) be the cost of buying the best yj order found in seller j's order book at time t.  Let 
P be the market price. The temporal competitive model holds that xi is chosen to Max 
[Ri(t, xi)- Pxi] and yj is chosen to  Max [Pyj - C
j(t, yj)].  From the optimization model, the 
TD and TS are always well defined for the individuals and the TD and TS are well defined 
at the market level as the sum of the functions for the individuals at a given market 
price. 
 From the construction above, we know that the temporal demand curve at time 
t is a downward sloping step function, TD(P,t), equal to the number of buyers (sell 
orders in private markets) in the market at time t—those that have arrived before t and 
have not yet either traded or were cancelled —with reservation prices above P.  
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Similarly, TS(P,t) is an upward sloping step function equal to the number of sellers (buy 
orders received in private markets) with reservation prices below P at time t. We can 
define a temporal equilibrium price as a P such that: TD(P,t) = TS(P,t). 
 One reason that prices might follow the temporal equilibrium is if traders 
followed zero, or limited intelligence bidding/asking strategies. Examples of such 
theories include (Gode & Sunder, 1993) and (Easley & Ledyard, 1993), in which traders 
submit multiple improving bids/asks over the longevity of an incentive, eventually 
revealing their true reservation price on each incentive before it expires. In (Easley & 
Ledyard, 1993), traders also submit limit offers based on recent trade prices market, 
which aides convergence. Likewise, zero intelligence robots programmed to simply 
reveal their reservation prices upon arriving to the market would generate traded prices 
that coincided perfectly with the temporal equilibrium.  
2.4.2 Flow Competitive Equilibrium 
 Flow competitive demand (FCD) and flow competitive supply (FCS) curves, on 
the other hand, specify the arrival rates of buyers (sellers) with reserves above (below) a 
given price. Flow competitive supply and flow competitive demand reflect two 
components: 1) the distribution of latent reservation prices for buyers and sellers, and 
2) the relative arrival rates of buyers and sellers. For a given price P, the levels of the 
flow competitive supply and demand curves are given by: 
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 Where s  is the arrival rate of individual sellers, b  the arrival rate of individual 
buyers, ns and nb are the number of seller-participants and buyer-participants, and gs 
and gb are the latent preferences, the distributions of reserve prices for sellers and 
buyers respectively. 
 A Flow Competitive Equilibrium (FCE) is defined by 1) a price PFCE at which the 
arrival rate of buyers with reservation prices at or above PFCE is equal to the arrival rate 
of sellers with reserve prices at or below PFCE, and 2) a rate of trade associated with PFCE.  
That is, the FCE is a price, PFCE, and flow competitive equilibrium transaction rate VFCE 
defined by: 
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The FCE price is the price such that the flow of supply equals the flow of demand.7 The 
equilibrium flow or volume is simply the FCD evaluated at the FCE price.8  
                                                     
7
 Note that the longevities of incentives do not affect FCE price. 
8 The FCE can be viewed from the perspective of theoretical ideas in finance. Close relationships exist between 
the environment introduced here and the theoretical financial market explored by (Goettler, Parlou, & Uajan, 
2005). In a sense, their environment can be viewed as a special case of ours. The prominent features of their 
environment are:  (i) private values that “reflect the idiosyncratic motives for trade (wealth shocks, tax 
exposure, hedging, or portfolio rebalancing needs);” (ii) the independent arrivals of traders drawn from known 
distributions; (iii) a publicly known “consensus value” of an asset, perhaps dictated by the present value of a 
dividend stream; and (iv) upon arrival in the market, the trader makes a decision about the type of order to 
place in an open order book and implicitly, the timing of the placement.  
 The essence of (i), (ii), and (iv) are in both our environment and in the GPR’s environment. A concept 
of a “consensus value” as found in (iii), can be found in both, but in the environment introduced here, it 
emerges as a candidate equilibrium concept, the FCE, as opposed to an imposed parameter as done in GPR.  
While the FCE carries much of the intuition carried by the “consensus value” of GPR, it is not public information 
and there are both conceptual and technical differences. For example, when buyers and sellers have a common 
distribution of latent preferences and the arrival rates are the same, the FCE is the median of that distribution 
while the consensus value of GPR would be the mean.  In addition, the FCE generalizes to the cases where the 
latent preferences of potential buyers and sellers do not arise from a common distribution and, since the FCE is 
closely associated with the classical competitive model, information or common knowledge about underlying 
parameters play no particular role.  
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 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate graphs of FCS and FCD produced from uniform 
distributions of reserve prices on 0 to 1000. Figure 2.3, shows how the curves in 2 
change when the rate of arrival for buyers is cut in half, while Figure 2.4 shows how FCS 
and FCD change when the distribution of buyers’ valuations is shifted upward. Figure 2.5 
illustrates how the FCS and FCD curves generalize to different distributions of incentives 
by using truncated normal distributions with a mean of 500f and a variance of 200f to 
generate the curves.  
Different “types” can be captured by different latent preferences together with 
other attributes of private orders, such as arrival rates, private order longevities, etc., 
and restrictions on trading activities such as costly or limited inventory holdings, 
restrictions on limit/market order placement, etc. Those who need immediate cash, and 
thus might tender market orders, could be represented by a  latent preference with 
probability mass at, say, zero on the latent supply together with a very short longevity 
for the agent receiving the associated private order.  While we have not implemented 
this particular feature in this chapter, we call it to the attention of readers interested in 
the generality of the environment. We also note that the flows are additive and each 
type would have its own, independent distribution of latent parameters so the FCD and 
FCS would simply be the sum of the flows from the different types.   
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Figure 2.2: Flow Competitive Supply and Demand Arrival Curves with 1000 Buyer and Seller Arrivals Per Hour 
 
 
  
Figure 2.3: Flow Competitive Supply and Demand Arrival Curves with 500 Buyer and 1000 Seller Arrivals Per Hour 
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Figure 2.4: Flow Competitive Supply and Demand Arrival Curves with 1000 Buyer and Seller Arrivals per Hour and Shifted 
Latent Demand 
 
  
Figure 2.5: Flow Competitive Supply and Demand Arrival Curves with 1000 Buyer and Seller Arrivals per Hour and 
Normally Distributed Latent Incentives 
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2.4.3 Trader Behavior 
 
Table 2.1 lists three different theories of how traders might behave in our 
environment. These theories are by no means exhaustive of the set of behaviors that 
subjects might exhibit, but they do represent a continuum of “trader sophistication.” At 
one extreme are zero-intelligence models such as those presented in (Gode & Sunder, 
1993) and (Brewer, Jiang, & Plott, 2003). In zero intelligence models, traders submit bids 
and asks at random within their budget sets, traders have no memory of past prices, 
incentives, and their actions are not a product of explicit utility maximization. In both of 
these models, traders act on each private offer individually, realizing a reservation price, 
then submitting a (possibly marketable) limit order between their reservation price and 
a price floor or ceiling, and possibly submitting additional random bids based on the 
same incentive at a future time. 
In the middle are “limited intelligence models,” like that of (Easley & Ledyard, 
1993). Limited intelligence models are similar to their zero intelligence counterparts, but 
may include features such as memory of past prices or learning based on past offers and 
trades. Learning and memory causes limited intelligence traders to behave at random at 
first, and gradually alter their behavior over time. In (Easley & Ledyard, 1993), for 
example, traders submit limit offers within a price band determined by past trade 
prices, causing the distribution of bids and asks to become tighter over time.  
Zero and limited intelligence traders only respond to realized incentives. That is, 
unsophisticated traders submit limit orders according to private offers they received in 
their private markets. Because of this, unsophisticated traders do not realize any 
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additional surplus due to smoothing temporal imbalances in supply and demand. 
Moreover, prices in markets with zero intelligence traders tend not to converge (Gode & 
Sunder, 1993), unless they are aided by additional market institutions such as a limit 
order book (Aliprantis & Plott, 1992), or limited intelligence such as memory (Easley & 
Ledyard, 1993). 
At the other extreme are theories of sophisticated or full intelligence traders. 
These theories come from the financial literature and deal with “dealers” or “maker 
makers,” who must make the market in the presence of randomly arriving market 
orders rather deal with “traders,” who submit both market and limit orders and have 
randomly arriving incentives. Full intelligence models diverge from less sophisticated 
models in that full intelligence traders, as in (Garman, 1976) and (Amihud & Mendelson, 
1980), form (correct) beliefs about their expected future order flows and  beliefs about 
the location of FCE prices and submit limit and market orders based on those beliefs. 
Neither (Garman, 1976) nor (Amihud & Mendelson, 1980) are explicit about how these 
beliefs are formed, merely stating that the stochastic structure of supply and demand 
arrivals is known to market makers. (Amihud & Mendelson, 1980) also derives that 
market makers’ offer prices depend on the level of dealer inventory.  
Table 2.1 also compares each theory qualitatively with the observed 
experimental data using checks or X’s. We discuss these comparisons in greater depth in 
Section 6. 
 
51 
 
Table 2.1: Theories of Trader Behavior 
Theory Author(s) Behavior Theory Predictions Result 
Zero 
Intelligence 
(Gode & Sunder, 
1993), (Brewer, 
Jiang, & Plott, 
2003) 
Traders’ bid/ask is a 
random function of 
reservation price and is 
independent of past 
prices or other 
incentives.  
 
Prices closely follow 
the temporal 
equilibrium 
No additional 
surplus due to 
expectations is 
realized 
Efficiency depends 
on the number of 
offers made per 
incentive and how 
fast traders reveal 
their reservation 
prices 

 

 
NA 
Limited 
Intelligence 
(Easley & 
Ledyard, 1993) 
Traders submit limit 
offers within the range 
of recent trade prices. 
Limit orders are 
improved over time until 
reservation prices are 
revealed by the end of 
the incentive’s longevity. 
Prices follow the 
temporal 
equilibrium 
No additional 
surplus due to 
expectations 
realized 
Distribution of offer 
prices becomes less 
dispersed over time 




Sophisticated 
Expectations 
(Garman, 1976), 
(Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1980) 
Risk neutral traders 
understand the random 
arrival structure and 
speculate to profit off 
temporal imbalances in 
supply and demand. 
All trades occur near 
or at the FCE price 
Close to 100% of 
additional surplus 
due to expectations 
is realized 
Level of quote price 
negatively 
correlated with 
dealer inventory  

 

 

Hybrid 
Theories 
 Traders may exhibit 
features of multiple 
theories. For example, if 
traders are risk averse, 
they may speculate but 
not to the extent 
predicted by 
Sophisticated 
Expectations. 
Prices will tend to 
be between and 
influenced by both 
the FCE and TE 
Some additional 
surplus due to 
expectations will be 
realized 


 
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2.5 Experimental Procedures and Design 
2.5.1 Experimental Procedures 
 Subjects were students recruited from Claremont McKenna College, Occidental 
College, and Caltech by a general request for people to put themselves in a database if 
they were interested in participating in experiments. The day before an experiment, 
invitations were sent via e-mail recruiting subjects from that database. Typically, these 
experiments recruited subjects from more than one school. 
 Subjects who reserved a spot in an experiment were sent the web location of a 
training program that allowed them to participate as buyers and sellers using market 
software typical of the market mechanism used in the experiment. Several of the 
students, especially those from Caltech, had prior experience with economics 
experiments in general. A few subjects had prior experience with market experiments in 
particular. Subjects were asked not to reserve a spot in experiments unless they were 
able to show up and participate in the whole experiment, but nearly every experiment 
had either subjects that were “no-shows,” or subjects that dropped out before the end 
of the experiment. Experiments were conducted either in the evening, (around 7:00PM) 
or on weekends. 
 Subjects were given the web address of the experiment and told that they could 
go to the web address to get an identification number and password. Instructions were 
also posted at the experiment location. 
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 Each experiment was preceded by a ten minute practice period for which 
subjects did not receive payment. The practice parameters were unrelated to those 
used in the experiment. Subjects’ trading activity was monitored remotely to determine 
whether subjects were confused about whether they were a buyer or seller, or were 
confused regarding how to use their private markets. Subjects were additionally 
provided a phone number that they could call with any questions they had about the 
experiment. 
 The experiments started on time. At the end of the experiment subjects were 
told to check their mailing addresses in the database and to check our calculation of 
how much they earned. They were sent a check for their earnings. Subjects earned 
between $10 and $78 for a two hour experiment depending on performance, with most 
subjects earning close to an average of $40.  
2.5.2 Experimental Design 
 A total of six experiments were conducted.9 Each experiment featured one shift 
in either the distribution of buyers’ redemption values/sellers’ costs or a shift in the 
rates of arrivals. The times of these shifts occurred near the middle of each experiment 
and are recorded in Table 2.2. Also recorded in Table 2.2 is the length of the 
experiment, the number of buyers and sellers, the total number of incentives sent to 
buyers and sellers before and after the shift, as well as the distributions of incentives 
and the FCE before and after the shift. The table includes the total number of arrivals for 
                                                     
9
 An additional four experiments were run as pilots but were not included in this study due to the choice of 
parameters, computer problems during the experiment, or small sample sizes. 
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each side of the market and the parameterized arrival rates per person, per second. The 
parameterized arrival rates are the rates intended by the experimenters. Due to the 
random nature of the environment and computer slow downs however, the actual rates 
of arrivals realized in the market were typically slower than the parameterized rates. 
The realized rates are also listed in Table 2.2 in parenthesis. The total arrival rates per 
minute are the per-person arrival rates given in the table times the number of 
participants. 
 In designing the experiments, order-flow parameter files were constructed on a 
per person basis according to a Poisson process with redemption values/costs drawn 
independently from distributions known to the experimenters but not to subjects. 
Because of this, the experimenters did not know the actual numbers of incentives that 
would arrive on the buy and sell sides of the market in advance. For each buyer and 
seller, the experimenters recorded the time of their first and last action in their private 
market. The number of incentives sent to the market listed in Table 2.2 includes only 
those incentives that were in the market, or arrived to the market during the interval 
that the trader for whom they were intended was active. 
 Since the experiments were conducted with remote subjects, tight control over 
participation was impossible. Typical of internet market experiments, parametric 
adjustments to models were required when subjects quit the experiment after having 
started. In such cases, the models were recalibrated for a different number of subjects 
beginning from the time that the subject stopped participating. For most experiments, 
the adjustment made for when traders were present in the market was not important. 
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Only in experiment market 070414, were there drop-outs and late entrants which 
affected the calculation of FCE. These all occurred before the parameter shift and are 
illustrated in Figure 2.7, which plots the FCE price path for this experiment. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Experiments 
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2.6 Results 
 The results section is divided into four parts. The first section merely provides a 
graphical overview of the results of trading. In the second section, we demonstrate that 
two distinct equilibria do exist in our markets and that both affect the motion of traded 
prices. Result 1 shows that both the Temporal and Flow Competitive Equilibria closely 
approximate traded prices. Result 2 illustrates how the two laws interact, with each 
equilibrium having a distinct pull on traded prices. 
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 The third and fourth sections of the results discusses the role of expectations in 
price adjustment. Since the TE and the FCE differ in the role of expectations, we are able 
to quantity the role of expectations, which manifests itself in improved efficiency, the 
formation of bids and asks and price levels. 
2.6.1 Overview 
Figures 6 through 10 provide an overview of the parameters and price data. Each 
figure plots the supply and demand curves before and after the parameter shift 
alongside the price, FCE, and TE price time series. Below the price time series is plotted 
the volume transacted over the last 30 seconds. 
 Figure 2.6: Flow Competetive Supply and Demand Parameters and Results for Market 070208 
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Figure 2.7: Flow Competetive Supply and Demand Parameters and Results for Market 070414 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Flow Competetive Supply and Demand Parameters and Results for Market 070420 
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Figure 2.9: Flow Competetive Supply and Demand Parameters and Results for Market 070425 
 
Figure 2.10: Flow Competetive Supply and Demand Parameters and Results for Market 070606 
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2.6.2 Price Levels 
 In random arrival markets, temporary imbalances in the flow of buy and sell 
incentives create “wandering” temporal equilibrium prices and opportunities for 
rational traders to profit by buying during periods of excess supply relative to the FCE 
and selling during periods of excess demand relative to the FCE. But are price 
movements affected by both equilibria? In this section we demonstrate that both laws 
of supply and demand do play a role in determining trade prices during an auction.  
 We begin with Result 1, which says that trade prices tend to form between FCE 
and TE prices. In Result 2, we empirically, measure the relative impact of the flow 
competitive and temporal equilibria on trade prices. While the FCE provides a unique 
pull on trade prices, trade prices are predominantly determined by TE prices.  
Result 1: (i) Traded prices are distributed around both FCE and TE prices. (ii) When 
trade prices deviate from the FCE price, they tend to deviate in the direction of 
the TE price. 
Support (i): The relationships among trade prices, FCE and TE are illustrated in Figures 
11, 12, and 13, which also provide general impressions of the data. Figure 2.11 shows 
the marginal distribution of trade prices around the FCE. Figure 2.12 shows the marginal 
distribution of trade prices around the TE. Figure 2.13 shows the marginal distribution of 
deviations in the TE from the FCE.  
 Similarities exist among the distributions in Figures 11 and 12. Notice that the 
trade prices have “fat tails.” Trade prices appear to be T-distributed around the FCE and 
the TE. There is a statistically significant tendency for goods to be under priced relative 
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to both the FCE and TE prices. Simple t-tests reject the null hypothesis that the mean of 
trade prices is equal to the FCE price at virtually any confidence level, but the economic 
significance, as well as the size of the under pricing in dollar terms is slight. Given a 
typical exchange rate of 500 francs (the currency of the experiment) =$1, a 15-20 franc 
price deviation represents only about 3-4 cents. 
  Turning to Figure 2.13, the distribution of TE prices around the FCE, has 
properties similar to the distribution of trade prices around the FCE. Trade prices have a 
higher variance than TE prices. TE prices have an estimated variance of 3654, while the 
estimated variance of trade prices is 8997, well over twice as high. The nature of this 
property is explored more closely by Result 2. 
Figure 2.11: Distribution of Trade Prices Around FCE Price 
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Figure 2.12: Distribution of Trade Prices Around the TE Price 
 
 
  
Figure 2.13: Distribution of TE Prices Around the FCE Price 
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Figure 2.14: Scatter Plot of Trade Price Deviations vs. TE Price Deviations from FCE 
 
 
Support (ii):  Figure 2.14 illustrates the positive relationship between trade price 
deviations from the FCE and TE price deviations from the FCE. Across all experiments 
the contemporaneous correlation between these deviations is 0.6167. Notice that the 
relationship between temporal deviations and trade price deviations is weak when the 
TE is close to the FCE. This relationship becomes stronger when the TE deviations from 
the FCE are large in either direction 
Result 2: Both the direction of temporal equilibrium prices and the direction of the 
FCE price influence future price movement.  
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Support: We use a simple least squares regression to predict future price movement 
based on how far away the current price is away from both the long run and the 
temporal equilibrium price for five different forecast horizons. Using only sections of 
data over which the FCE remains constant, we estimate the model:  
tttttjt PFCEPTEPP   )()( 210   (2.3)
 
where t, indexes the trade number.  
 In this model, a slope coefficient of one is interpretable as “complete 
adjustment,” while a slope coefficient between zero and one indicates that prices are 
moving toward the equilibrium price, although not perfectly equilibrating.  
 Table 2.3 shows the results of these regressions for price changes after 1, 50, 
100, 300, and 500 trades. The results indicate that prices move in the direction of both 
equilibria since all of the estimated coefficients are between zero and one. The 
magnitude of these coefficients tends to grow with the forecast horizon, suggesting that 
prices, at least in the short run, are “sticky” and tend to under adjust over short time 
periods.  
 A different story emerges with an examination of price changes over much 
longer periods of time, 300 and 500 trades in the future. At these forecast horizons, the 
coefficients on the distance to the temporal equilibrium price and the distance to the 
FCE price sum to one, but both coefficients are statistically different from one. Neither 
equilibrium concept appears to dominate the other. Rather, each of the two equilibria 
appears to have its own distinct pull on prices.  
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Table 2.3: FCE and TE in Forecasting Price Movement 
Dependent 
Variable 
Explanatory Variables   
Price Change 
After: 
Constant TE Price-
Current 
Price 
FCE Price 
–Current 
Price 
R 2 Root 
MSE 
1 Trade -2.28 
(0.38) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.07 29.72 
50 Trades -9.7 
(0.65) 
0.34 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(0.03) 
0.31 48.97 
100 Trades -10.93 
(0.75) 
0.16 
(0.03) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
0.36 53.43 
300 Trades -13.09 
(0.91) 
0.14 
(0.04) 
0.87 
(0.04) 
0.62 50.21 
500 Trades -18.88 
(1.68) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.61 
(0.05) 
0.72 49.14 
 
  
The fact that both the TE and FCE are significant predictors of price movement 
shows that both equilibria have independent pulls on traded prices. Moreover, since the 
FCE is an equilibrium concept which obtains only if rational agents form expectations 
about future order flow and the TE is a concept which does not involve expectations, 
one can take the relative coefficients on each variable as a measure of the relative 
importance of expectations and temporal supply and demand imbalances in price 
determination. According to Table 2.4, in the short run, temporal imbalances in supply 
and demand are equally, if not more important in determining traded prices than is 
expectations. 
Result 3: Prices in Random Arrival markets do not converge to a single price. 
Support: As support, we refer only to the Figures 6-10, which plot traded prices against 
TE and FCE. 
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 Result 3 is important to note because it says that our results are not based on 
disequilibrium phenomenon. It is not the case that prices follow the temporal 
equilibrium at the beginning of the experiment and eventually level off to a constant 
FCE price after a period of learning and market adjustment. Nor are prices less volatile in 
experiments involving experienced traders. Instead, the influence of both equilibria 
appears to be constant throughout the entirety of an experiment.  
2.6.3 Efficiency 
 In an environment with incentives arriving at different times, there can be 
multiple definitions of efficiency. Of course, each efficiency concept is closely related to 
the concept of experimental market efficiency first developed by (Plott & Smith, 1978). 
Table 2.3 reports the efficiency of each experiment relative to three different measures. 
The first two of these measures are directly related to expectations and hence the FCE 
and TE equilibriums.  
 The first level of efficiency reported is the local incentive efficiency level. This 
measure compares actual surplus with the amount that would be obtained if traders 
submitted bids and asks equal to their reservation prices immediately upon receiving an 
incentive. We call this value the Maximum Local Surplus (MLS) because the market is 
always being cleared at a “local Walrasian” price. Under this trading strategy, there is no 
trade due to price smoothing or speculation, which would allow gains from trade to be 
realized between two traders who are not in the market at the same time.   
Our second efficiency concept, the flow competitive rational efficiency level, 
compares actual trading surplus to the level that would be obtained if all trades 
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involving incentives that arrived prior to the shift occurred at the initial FCE price, and all 
of the trades involving incentives which arrived after the shift occurred at the second 
FCE price. We call this value the Maximum Flow Surplus (MFS).  
The MLS reflects the maximum amount of surplus that would be obtained by 
zero-intelligence price taking agents, while the MFS reflects the amount of surplus that 
would be obtained by perfectly rational agents with correct expectations about future 
order flow. As such, we use the MLS, MFS, and actual surplus obtained in each 
experiment to devise a rough measure of how large a role is played by expectations in 
each experiment. For each experiment we compute: 
% 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 =
 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 −𝑀𝐿𝑆 
 𝑀𝐹𝑆−𝑀𝐿𝑆 
 (4) 
Because the local incentive efficiency and the flow competitive rational 
efficiency levels are not necessarily between 0 and 1, we also devise a third measure of 
efficiency that does satisfy this familiar feature. This measure of efficiency compares the 
total gains from trade to the maximum possible gains from trade. In essence, this is the 
surplus that would be obtained if all the incentives, before and after the shift were 
aggregated as a stock, a single Walrasian price solved for, and all trades occurred at that 
price. We will refer to this fraction of the maximum surplus attainable as the clairvoyant 
efficiency level, because in order for a trading mechanism to attain the maximum 
possible surplus, it would require a foreknowledge of future incentives flow and 
parameter shifts. 
Hypothesis 1:  The market will not realize any additional surplus due to 
expectations, as predicted by limited intelligence trader models. 
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Hypothesis 2:  The market will realize close to 100% of additional surplus 
due to expectations, as predicted by full intelligence trader models. 
Result 4: We reject both hypotheses 1 and 2. While realized surplus extraction is 
typically higher than the maximum local surplus that could be obtained without 
smoothing/speculation, not all of the available surplus from expectations is 
realized.  
Support: As shown in Table 2.4, all experiments had levels of local incentive efficiency 
close to or above 100%, meaning that human subjects performed about as well or 
better than robots programmed to simply reveal their incentives through limit orders 
immediately upon entering the market would have performed.   
The amount of additional surplus due to expectations that subjects were able to 
realize, however, differed widely across experiments. While some experiments, such as 
experiment 070606, were able to realize the entire surplus due to expectations, other 
experiments, such as experiment 070425, did not realize any. On average, human 
subjects were able to extract about 44% of the additional surplus available from rational 
speculation over all experiments.  
Result 5: Experiments involving changes in arrival rates had much lower levels of 
surplus extraction and were characterized by incomplete convergence. 
Support: Two of the three experiments involving changes in the relative rates of 
incentive arrivals extracted less surplus than the MLS. In one case, experiment 070425, 
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human subjects actually managed to accumulate less rent than could have been 
obtained by zero-intelligence robots.  
 When looking at the price time series of experiments 070424 and 070425 in 
Figures 8 and 9 respectively, we see that prices tended to be biased away from the FCE 
price toward the middle of the distribution of latent incentives. Because of this, we say 
that the price time series of these experiments was characterized by incomplete 
convergence. Coincidently, the two changing rate experiments were the only 
experiments in which the FCE price was not equal to the mean of the distribution of 
latent incentives.  
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Table 2.4: Efficiency 
Experiment 
Date 
Type of Shift 
in FCE 
Local 
Incentive 
Efficiency 
Flow 
Competitive 
Rational 
Efficiency  
Clairvoyant 
Efficiency 
Percentage of 
Additional 
Surplus due 
to 
Expectations 
Realized 
(Actual 
Volume)/ 
(Predicted 
Volume)* 
070208 Shift in 
distribution 
136% 92% 76% 75% 1878/1582 
070414 Shift in 
relative 
arrival rates 
125% 87% 87% 57% 4908/3596 
070420 Shift in 
relative 
arrival rates 
100% 96% 64% 0% 1713/1281 
070425 Shift in 
relative 
arrival rates 
99% 94% 61% -18% 1824/1407 
070606 Shift in 
distribution 
136% 102% 91% 108% 1458/1114 
Average NA 119% 94% 76% 44% 130% 
* Ratio reflects speculative trades 
2.6.4 Bid and Ask Placement/Improvement: Evidence of Expectations 
Formation 
 Our final area of analysis is the placement of bids and asks. Evidence of 
expectations formation can be seen in the distribution of new bids and asks. At the 
beginning of an experiment, and just after a parameter change, the distribution of bids 
and asks is diffuse around the FCE price. As the experiment continues, with the FCE 
remaining constant, the distribution of bids and asks becomes more centrally 
concentrated around the FCE.  
If subjects acted solely on the basis of their current incentives, changes in the 
distribution of offer price would occur only when there was a shift in the distribution of 
latent incentives. The fact that there  are changes in biding/asking behavior during 
periods of constant equilibria and the fact that new bids and asks are influenced in the 
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direction of the FCE price suggests that expectations influence price convergence and 
efficiency through the supply of liquidity. 
Result 6: The positioning of new bids and asks is influenced in the direction of the 
FCE price.  
Support: As trading evolves over periods of constant FCE, a strong mode tends to 
appear in the distribution of offer prices accompanied by decreasing informational 
entropy. Figure 2.15 shows the distribution of bids and asks relative to the FCE price, 
divided up into non-overlapping six-minute intervals before the parameter shift. Figure 
2.16 shows similar distributions of bids and asks for each 6-minute interval after the 
parameter shift. In both figures, we observe the formation of a large mode located close 
to, if not exactly on, the FCE price. The modes of the distributions in Figures 15 and 16 
tend to be slightly below the FCE price. This under bidding/asking is small in dollar 
terms, no more than a few cents, and appears to be more prevalent during the first 
thirty minutes after a parameter shift than either before the parameter shift of after the 
first thirty minutes following the parameter shift.  
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Figure 2.15: Distribution of Bids/Asks from FCE Before Parameter Shift 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 excluding 070414 
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Figure 2.16: Distribution of Bids/Asks from FCE after Parameter Shift 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 excluding 070414 
 
 Figure 2.17 summarizes the informational content of the offer price distributions 
found in Figures 15 and 16. It plots the entropy of the distribution defined as: 
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Similar to variance, entropy is often interpreted as a measure of the uncertainty 
associated with an outcome. While variance is a measure of spread, entropy is a 
measure of concentration. If all of the probability of an outcome were associated with 
one outcome, the probability would be perfectly concentrated on that value and the 
entropy of the distribution would be 0. As probability becomes less highly concentrated 
on a single value, entropy increases. Entropy, unlike variance, does not take into 
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and all asks occurred at another, the variance of the distribution of bids and asks would 
depend on the size of the bid-ask spread, while the entropy of the distribution would be 
invariant to the size of the spread. Given both these properties, entropy is a natural 
measure for measuring in the “focal concentration” of the distribution of offer prices. 
 What we observe is that, as long as the FCE remains constant, the entropy of the 
distribution decreases. After the shift, there is a large increase in entropy, likely caused 
by divergent expectations. About thirty minutes after the shift, the level of entropy 
stabilizes and again begins to decrease. 
Figure 2.17: The Informational Entropy of Offer Price Distributions 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 excluding 070414 
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2.7 Conclusions 
  Prices in continuous experimental double auctions are affected in the direction 
of two competing generalizations of the Walrasian equilibria. Human subjects are also 
able to achieve much higher levels of surplus extraction than would be possible from 
naïve trading strategies alone, though far less than 100% of the additional surplus due 
to expectations is realized. In particular, the amount of surplus due to expectations that 
traders are able to extract seems to be related to the strength of public signals 
regarding price changes. When shifts in the FCE price are due to changes in the 
distribution of latent incentives, subjects tend to extract more additional surplus due to 
expectations than when shifts are due to changes in the relative rates of arrivals. 
 Moreover, this chapter provides valuable tools for the further study of 
continuous markets experimentally.  
 
  
76 
 
Chapter 3 The Dynamics of Price Adjustment in 
Experimental Random Arrival and Departure 
Environments 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In (Alton & Plott, Working Paper1) (AP1), the multiple unit continuous double 
auction is generalized to an environment in which incentives to trade evolve over time. 
AP1 identifies two distinct competitive equilibrium concepts and demonstrates that 
prices in these experimental markets approach and are influenced in the direction of 
both equilibrium concepts. This chapter continues the analysis of AP1 by asking how this 
process occurs. 
 In this chapter, we test six competing classical models of price movement. We 
find that all models of price dynamics, when considered on their own, do equally well in 
explaining observed experimental data. However, when we nest all six models into a 
single equation, a clear winner emerges. Prices appear to move in direct proportion to 
the distance between the current price and what we will define as the “Temporal 
Equilibrium Price.” 
 Further investigation at the individual level also reveals that this price behavior 
stems from Marshallian features of the random arrival market. Specifically, we show 
that the speed with which an individual acts on an incentive is proportional to the 
amount of available profit from that incentive at current market prices. 
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 The amount of profit from incentives at the current market prices is also a major 
predictor of bid/ask improvement and placement. Over time, bids and asks are placed 
closer to competitive equilibrium prices, suggesting that expectations formation may 
play a major role in price equilibration. 
We also show that productive improvements in theory can be made by 
incorporating price friction, heteroskedasticity and auto correlation, and that these 
statistical properties of the data can be related to fundamental features of the double 
market auction micro-structure. 
 While there have been many theoretical advances in our understanding of price 
dynamics and stability, only recently have theories regarding price movements begun to 
be tested experimentally. Experimental research on price dynamics in continuous 
double auctions began with (Smith V. , 1962) and (Smith V. , 1965), which examined the 
Walrasian theory that the speed of price movement was driven by the level of excess 
demand. In these papers, Smith also tested the Walrasian hypothesis against his own 
theories of price movement, which we discuss in Section 5.2. 
(Asparouhova, Bossaerts, & Plott, 2003) also study the process of price discovery 
in experimental double auction markets. They test modifications of the Walrasian 
hypothesis and find support that both the level and the derivatives of excess demand 
may play a role in price adjustment. 
 (Cason & Friedman, 1993) examine bid-ask sequences and price change 
autocorrelations in 30 different experimental markets and compare observations with 
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the theoretical predictions of three non-classical models, those of:  (Wilson, 1987),  
(Friedman, 1991) and  (Gode & Sunder, 1993). 
 In each of the papers discussed above, double auction experiments were 
conducted using a “stock” of supply and demand incentives and a period structure. 
 Section 2 briefly summarizes the environment, equilibrium concepts and the 
results of AP1. Section 3 provides a summary of the experiments conducted. In Section 
4, we describe some stylized facts about the time series of traded prices and point out 
similarities with financial micro-structure data. Section 5 we present our finding on price 
dynamics. We begin with a discussion of the important, albeit theoretically neglected, 
role of price friction, which we relate to micro-structural features of the continuous 
double auction market. We then examine univariate and multivariate classical theories 
of price dynamics using time series models. Finally, we conclude Section 5 with results 
supporting the Marshallian nature of our environment, and show evidence in favor of a 
role of expectations. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
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3.2 Trading Environment and Known Results 
3.2.1 Incentive Parameter Structure (Latent Incentives and Realized 
Incentives) 
 The experiments studied here involve Random Arrival and departure (RA) 
environments first introduced in AP1. In a RA environment, preferences are induced 
though the use of private offers to buy or sell units of a good, “X,” to or from the 
experimenter. These offers are sent to participants according to a Poisson process and 
last for a length of time before they expire, b and s for buyers’ and sellers’ incentives 
respectively. In these experiments, b and s are fixed lengths of time (6 minutes). The 
price associated with each private offer is drawn from a distribution of potential values, 
which we call the distribution of latent incentives. 
Latent buyer incentives consist of a probability density function gb(x), where x is 
a price, while latent seller incentives consist of a (potentially different) probability 
density function gs(y). For individual agents, draws are made from the distribution of 
buyer values and the distribution of seller costs according to two independent Poisson 
processes with intensities s  and b  respectively. 
 Realized incentives, as opposed to latent incentives, are the draws that are 
actually sent to buyers’ and sellers’ private order books and serve as “redemption 
values” and “costs.” In designing experiments, s  is the arrival rate of private orders for 
each of the ns sellers, and b  is the arrival rate of private orders for each of the nb 
buyers. 
80 
 
 More detailed information regarding RA environments and their relationship to 
traditional experimental market environments can be found in AP1, and the references 
cited therein. 
3.2.2 Types of Equilibrium 
 
 AP1, identifies two different concepts of competitive equilibrium. While these 
two concepts are by no means exhaustive of the types of equilibrium that could exist, 
they reflect the dichotomy between supply and demand curves based on latent and 
realized distributions of incentives. AP1 shows that both of these equilibrium concepts 
have predictive power in forecasting future price movements. We briefly define and 
explain both types of equilibrium below. 
3.2.2a Temporal Equilibrium 
 The Temporal Equilibrium is defined as the intersection of temporal supply (TS) 
and temporal demand (TD) curves, which are constructed from orders that exist, 
unexpired in trades’ private order books at a given instant in time. The temporal 
demand curve at time t is a downward sloping step function, TD(P,t), equal to the 
number of buyers (sell orders in private markets) in the market at time t—those that 
have arrived before t and have not yet either traded or were cancelled —with 
reservation prices above P. Similarly TS(P,t) is an upward sloping step function equal to 
the number of sellers (buy orders received in private markets) with reservation prices 
below P at time t. The temporal equilibrium is then defined as a P such that TD(P,t) = 
TS(P,t). 
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3.2.2b Flow Competitive Equilibrium 
 Flow competitive demand (FCD) and flow competitive supply (FCS) curves, on the 
other hand, specify the arrival rates of buyers (sellers) with reserves above (below) a 
given price. Flow competitive supply and flow competitive demand reflect two 
components: 1) the distribution of latent reservation prices for buyers and sellers, and 
2) the relative arrival rates of buyers and sellers. For a given price P, the levels of the 
flow competitive supply and demand curves are given by: 
 )(1)()(
)()()(
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 (3.1) 
 Where s  is the arrival rate of individual sellers, b  the arrival rate of individual 
buyers, ns and nb are the number of seller-participants and buyer-participants, and gs 
and gb are the latent preferences, the distributions of reserve prices for sellers and 
buyers respectively. 
 A flow competitive equilibrium (FCE) is defined by 1) a price P at which the arrival 
rate of buyers with reservation prices at or above P is equal to the arrival rate of sellers 
with reserve prices at or below P, and 2) a rate of trade associated with P. That is, the 
FCE is a price, Pe, and flow competitive equilibrium transaction rate FCE defined by: 
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The FCE price is the price such that the flow of supply equals the flow of demand. The 
equilibrium flow is simply the FCD evaluated at the FCE price. 
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3.2.3 Known Results 
 In AP1, we study the predictive power of equilibrium concepts discussed above 
and report the following results: 
AP1 Result 1:  Trading in experimental RA markets generates high levels of efficiency 
relative to the maximum amount of surplus available. Realized surplus extraction is 
typically higher than the amount that could be obtained without speculation.  
AP1 Result 2: Waiting times between trades are uncorrelated, and have a mean rate of 
transaction larger than the rate of transaction predicted by the FCE. 
AP1 Result 3: The law of one price, in the sense of a constant price over time, does not 
emerge under conditions of a constant FCE price. 
AP1 Result 4: (i) Traded prices are distributed around both FCE and TE prices. (ii) When 
trade prices deviate from the FCE price, they tend to deviate in the direction of the TE 
price. 
AP1 Result 5: Both the direction of temporal equilibrium prices and the direction of the 
FCE price influence price movement.  
AP1 Result 6: The mean squared error for price change forecasts based on the distance 
of current trade prices from the temporal equilibrium price and the FCE price decreases 
for long forecast horizons. 
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3.3 Experiments Studied 
 We use data from nine RA experiments conducted over the internet using 
Caltech’s Marketscape software. The majority of the results in this chapter come from 
the first five of these experiments, reported in AP1. As a result of the original five 
experiments, new questions were raised and an additional four experiments were 
devised to answer these questions. We summarize these experiments for the purposes 
of this chapter below. The first five of these experiments are also described in greater 
depth in AP1, to which we refer interested readers.  
 Experiments were conducted in the evenings and on the weekends. Participants 
were students recruited from Caltech, CMC and Occidental College. Each experiment 
lasted for between one and a half and two and a half hours, and contained at least one 
parameter shift at some point in the experiment. Parameter shifts involved either a 
change in the distribution of latent incentives, or a change in the relative rates of arrival. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the setup of each experiment. 
 Most of the results and analysis presented in the following sections will focus on 
the first six experiments listed in Table 3.1. These experiments, involved only a single 
parameter shift. The remaining three experiments were designed to answer slightly 
different questions than the original six, and involved multiple shifts in both the FCE 
price and/or the distributions of latent buyer and seller preferences. 
Experiments 071205 and 071208 each contain six alternating periods in which 
the Flow Competitive Supply and Demand functions are either both “kinked,” at the 
equilibrium price or both “unkinked.” These kinks changed the slopes of the supply and 
84 
 
demand functions to the right of the equilibrium, but left the slopes to the left of the 
equilibrium constant throughout each experiment.  
 Additionally, experiments 071205, 071208 and 080201 contain ten 
approximately equally spaced intervals during which the FCE price remains constant.  At 
the end of each constant-FCE interval, the FCE price is shifted up or down according to a 
discrete random walk by a fix amount. One realization of this process is shown in Figure 
3.1, which shows the time paths of the FCE, TE and traded prices. 
 In the case of all experiments presented here, subjects were told that incentives 
in their private markets would arrive at random according to some rate and from some 
distribution, both of which may change over time. No other information was given to 
subjects regarding the stochastic processes generating incentives. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Experiments 
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Figure 3.1: Market-071208 
  
 
3.4 Description of Data 
 A stationary process is a stochastic process in which the joint distribution of Yt 
and Yt+n is identical to the joint distribution of Yt+m and Yt+m+n for every m. That is, the 
joint distribution of n-step changes is independent of the current time or level of Y. A 
price process which is “converging” to predefined equilibrium, in the sense that prices 
are becoming closer (on average) to an equilibrium price over time, is a prime example 
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different joint distribution of n-trade-ahead price changes for every level of the current 
price and time since the open of the market. 
 Because the time series of price changes for a converging process is, by its very 
nature, subject to such conditional heteroskedasticity, accurately measuring the effect 
of a variable or set of variables on dP requires specifying not only a mean equation for 
prices, but a volatility equation as well. The hope here is that we can model the time 
series of prices as a random function of a time series of price innovations which are 
themselves stationary and mean zero. That is, we seek an equation of the form: 
,*(...)(...) ttdP   where { t } is a mean zero stationary time series. 
 We begin by pooling the data from all experiments and describing its time series 
properties. Our experimental data share many of the empirical regularities commonly 
noted of financial data. Namely: 1) The distribution of price changes (returns) exhibit 
fat-tails, 2) The time series of squared price changes (observed volatility) is conditionally 
heteroskedastic, and 3) Price changes are negatively correlated at the first lag. We 
describe each of these briefly below. We do not claim that the principles at work here 
are the same as those generating these features in financial markets, merely that these 
markets bear some similarities on the surface.  
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3.4.1 Fat-Tails 
 The most commonly cited feature of financial data is by far leptokurtosis, or fat-
tails. The distribution of price changes, pooled from all experiments, has an excess 
kurtosis of about 33, well beyond the kurtosis of the normal distribution. The 
distribution is approximately bell-shaped and symmetrical. Interested readers are 
referred to AP1 for further descriptions of price distributions. 
 Both conditional heteroskedasticity and the bid-ask bounce, discussed below, 
have been advanced as possible explanations of this empirical property.  
3.4.2 Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
 Simply put, conditional heteroskedasticity refers to the property that extreme 
price changes are more likely to be accompany by further extreme price changes in the 
near future. Evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity can be found in Figure 3.2c-d, 
which plots the ACF and PACF of the squared price change series. Figure 3.2c-d shows 
significant auto and partial correlations up to at least the second lag and possibly higher. 
 In finance, this phenomenon is largely a statistical one, with little theory linking 
the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity to either microstructural features of 
markets or to the fundamentals of supply and demand. Financial econometricians 
typically model this volatility behavior using autoregressive models, linking the 
magnitude of past shocks to future volatility.  
 In Section 5, we attempt to model conditional heteroskedasticity in a non-
autoregressive manner. That is, instead of trying to relate future volatility to past 
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shocks, we instead try to model volatility as a function of persistent (auto-correlated) 
microstructural features of the double auction market. 
3.4.3 Negative Autocorrelation 
 
 Figures 3.2a-b show the autocorrelation and partial auto correlation functions 
for the mean price change series, while 3.2c-d show the autocorrelation and partial auto 
correlation for the squared price change series.  
 The first lag of the ACF is approximately 0.25, the value one might expect if 
prices merely bounced back and forth between fixed bid and ask prices at random (Roll 
1984). At first, glance one might take this negative autocorrelation to be due to the bid 
ask spread as predicted by Roll, but on closer examination, the second and third lag of 
the ACF, as well as lags 1-7 of the PACF appear to be significant as well, a result not 
predicted by the Roll theory of the bid-ask bounce.  
 This is the only point in the chapter in which we will discuss unconditional time 
series properties, and we do so here only for theoretical interest. Our main interest in 
this chapter will be relating price changes and their squared time series to observable 
variables such as excess demand, current prices, etc. Each of these explanatory variables 
are also auto correlated and including them in a model will affect the time series 
structure of the model’s estimated residuals. 
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Figure 3.2: ACF and PACF’s of Price Changes and Squared Price Changes from Experiments 070208 Through 071208 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
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3.5 Results: Price Changes and the Dynamics of Price Movements 
 We divide the results section into three main sections. The first section of results 
focuses on the impact of the limit order book on both price friction and the observed 
volatility of price movements. Limit Order Book Friction is important for understanding 
the functioning of markets and evaluating theories of price movement since failing to 
account for friction can affect the estimated effect that market variables, such as excess 
demand, have on influencing future price movement.  In the second section we focus on 
a collection of theories that we refer to as “Classical theories.” These are theories that 
postulate about the form of the mean equation and relate expected future price 
movements to variables, which are observed by the experimenter but not by subjects. 
The third section presents results related to the Marshallian theory of quantity 
adjustment, the Probabilistic Marshallian Path, and the role of the limit order book.  
3.5.1 Limit Order Book Friction 
Theories of this price adjustment are largely stylized and postulate that prices 
respond immediately to excess demand. In experimental limit order markets however, 
prices are sticky, and may not respond to excess demand immediately, as we will 
describe in Result 1.  
 Previous studies, involving simulations, have already demonstrated that a major 
source of this “stickiness” is the existence of the limit order book itself (Smith et al. 
2003), (Bollerslev & Domowitz 1993), (Cohen et al. 1978). In order for prices to rise to a 
price of X in response to a change in excess demand, a transaction or cancellation must 
first occur at every sell-offer price listed below X. Similar adjustments to the book are 
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needed for declining price movement. The need for existing orders to be cleared or 
changed effectively slows the process of price adjustment. If existing orders are not 
cancelled fast enough to reflect current market conditions, the market necessarily 
“pauses” while existing orders become engaged in transactions created by new order 
flow. Not only does the limit order book induce serial correlation in transaction prices, 
Bollerslev & Domowitz have even shown that limit order books can induce serial 
correlation in price volatilities as well.  
 The extent to which the limit order book will slow price movement will depend 
on the relative size of market orders compared to the size of the book itself. 
Interestingly, the book has the function of creating liquidity by aggregating orders over 
time, but this same function of liquidity provision has the side effect of slowing market 
adjustments.  
In the experiments described here, market orders are small, nearly all are less 
than 20 units. Most market orders, nearly 70%, are single unit orders. There are no 
discernible differences between the size of market orders to buy versus market orders 
to sell. Both the distributions of buy and sell order book lengths are non-negative, fat 
tailed distributions. The means and variances of the buy and sell order book lengths are 
28.4, 426.2 and 16.1, 198.6 respectively. It is therefore a priori postulated that the 
friction effects of market micro structure will be large. 
 
Result 1:  Price changes are relatively insensitive to excess demand between 
individual trades due to limit order book friction. 
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Support: Figure 3.3a-d shows four different scatter plots which describe how price 
changes at varying levels of dt, co-vary with excess demand. Result 1 is illustrated by 
Figure 3.3a, which shows the price changes between individual trades. On this level,—
the level at which theory most often assumes that adjustments take place—there is 
both visually and statistically no discernable evidence that price changes co-vary with 
temporal excess demand at all.  
 When we look at price changes over the course of 50, 100 or 300 trades 
(approximately 10, 20 and 60 minutes of trading respectively), the positive relationship 
between excess demand and price changes appears. We also begin to notice distinct 
“clusters” of data. This is partly because the larger the value of dt we choose, the higher 
the level of induced auto correlation between data points. The data also appears to 
cluster between experiments as well.  
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Figure 3.3: The Effect of Excess Demand for Varying Levels of dt 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
 Unfortunately, limit order books are multi-dimensional market structures, 
characterized by a large number of parameters such as their level, depth and curvature. 
Because of the dimensionality of limit orders books, showing exactly how they slow 
price adjustment is difficult. Figure 3.4 shows a scatter plot of dP squared versus the 
lengths of the buy and sell order book. Here, we refer to the “length” of an order book 
as the total number of units offered for sale or purchase on that order book within 200 
francs of the current trading price. The length of a book is merely one dimension of an 
order book and does not take into account other features such as the price level of the 
best offer or the depth of the market at any particular price, but, for our purposes, 
serves as an acceptable summary statistic. The choice of 200 francs is admittedly ad hoc, 
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but reflects a tradeoff between including prices too far away from the market, making 
the measure less meaningful, and choosing a price interval so tight around the current 
price that there are too few units available to measure. 
 Also included in Figure 3.4 is an estimated hyperplane, which helps to illustrate 
the relationship between price volatility and limit order book friction. The regression 
results used to generate the hyperplane are listed in Table 3.2. As can be seen in Figure 
3.4 below, the level of limit order book friction is positively related to the lengths of 
both order books. Large price movements/high volatility occurs systematically more 
often when either one or both of the limit order books is small compared to when they 
are large. 
 Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression used to create the hyperplane 
visible in Figure 3.4. Here, we regress squared price change on the lengths of the buy 
and sell order books. 
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Figure 3.4: Limit Order Book Friction as a Function of Order Book Depths 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
 
Table 3.2: Limit Order Book Friction as a Function of Order Book Depths 
 
Variable Coefficient Confidence Interval 
Constant 2087.11 [1495.45, 2678.77] 
Length of Buy Order Book -18.20 [-33.56, -2.84] 
Length of Sell Order Book -40.17 [-62.13, -18.22] 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
 Three key features are visible in Figure 3.4. First, there are noticeably more units 
posted on the buy-order book than the sell order book, a feature which is true in every 
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as illustrated by the slope of the estimated hyperplane drawn in the figure. The sell-
order book slows upward price movement, while the buy-order book slows downward 
price movement. When the size of the relevant order book is sufficiently small, prices 
can change dramatically between trades.  
 The third feature visible in Figure 3.4 is that the buy-order book, while typically 
larger, does not increase order book friction to the same extent that the sell-order book 
does. As we will see later, a possible explanation for this lies in the fact that bids tend to 
arrive further away from current trading prices than do asks. This results in the buy 
order book having a steeper slope than the sell order book, and hence an asymmetric 
price response function. 
3.5.2 Classical Models of Price Adjustment 
Classical models of price change take the form:  
)3.3(),,,( 21 XXEDPf
dt
dP
  
Where ED is excess demand at the current price and 
21 X and X , etc. are other 
characteristics of the market and its supply and demand equations at a given moment in 
time. 
 Theories of the form described by Equation (3.4) can be further subdivided into 
two classes. The first is the classical Walrasian adjustment model, which holds that price 
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changes are proportional to excess demand, which we take to mean the temporal 
excess demand at the current best ask and best bid prices10. That is: 
 
  (3.4)constant positive a is   where,)()()(  ttbttatttdtt PEDPSPDPP   
 
This class of theories also includes a number of variations on the basic Walrasian 
hypothesis in which price changes are additionally influenced by the first, and possibly 
higher order, derivatives of excess demand. Such theories have been explored by 
(Asparouhova, Bossaerts, & Plott, 2003). Some variations involving elasticities and non-
linearities are also explored in (Hirota, Hsu, Plott, & Rogers, 2005). 
 
)5.3()),(),(),(,( tttttdtt PDEPDEPEDPfPP   
 
 The second class of models looks at other features of supply and demand other 
than classical excess demand. These theories include the Excess Rent hypothesis 
explored by (Smith V. , 1962) and (Smith V. , 1965), the fundamentalist adjustment 
theory, and the theory of potential gains from trade. Each of these theories is illustrated 
in Figure 3.5 below. According to the Excess Rent hypothesis, price changes are 
                                                     
10
 Quantity demanded at ask price – quantity supplied at the bid price. Typically, excess demand is 
measured at the last trade price. The results of this section are not sensitive to this difference in definition. 
Nonetheless, we define temporal excess demand in this way for two important reasons. First, the traditional 
way of measuring excess demand may not reflect actual excess demand because it does not consider the 
transaction costs induced by the bid-ask spread. Second, later in the paper, we will be interested in the 
relative probabilities of transacting at the bid and ask price treating these prices as given. There, we will be 
concerned with the level of excess demand that obtains at these specific prices rather than some singular 
price, which may not presently exist in the market.  
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proportional to the area labeled ER in Figure 3.5. An alternative version of the Excess 
Rent hypothesis, called the Modified Excess Rent hypothesis, relies on the area labeled 
MER. This quantity is considered in (Smith V. , 1962) and (Smith V. , 1965) and is 
interpreted as the amount of surplus sellers (or buyers depending on the location of the 
current price) would stand to lose if all trades occurred at the current price rather than 
the equilibrium price. 
 The fundamentalist adjustment theory is a theory most often found in financial 
models in which there is a true “fundamental” price for an asset, which is known to a 
group of fundamentalist traders. Other traders in these models are typically noise or 
speculative traders. In this theory, price movement between trades is proportional to 
the distance between the current price and the fundamental price, multiplied by the 
proportion of traders, β, engaging in a “fundamentalist” strategy.  
)6.3()1()(* tt
lFundamenta
tdtt PPPP    
 In our formulation of the fundamentalist adjustment model, we take the 
“fundamental” price to be either the temporal or the flow competitive equilibrium 
price. We also assume that all traders are fundamentalists. 
 The final model we consider is simply and intuitive model that we felt deserved 
consideration. The potential gains from trade hypothesis postulates that price 
movement is proportional to the amount of social welfare that would be lost if all 
trading occurred at the current price.  
 Since all of the areas labeled in Figure 3.5 are always non-negative, we adopt the 
convention of multiplying each area by (-1) when the price is above the temporal 
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equilibrium price, and leaving the measurements positive when the current price is 
below the temporal equilibrium. This convention allows each variable to be positively 
correlated with future price changes. 
 
Figure 3.5: Variables Used in Classical Models of Price Adjustment 
  
 
 The approach we take here is to first conduct a very course examination, asking 
which of the variables described above best explains variation in price changes in a 
single variable model. We then ask whether the variables described above have 
predictive power in the presence of each other. Essentially, we ask what is the best 
single variable model, and what is the best model nesting all of the theoretically 
important variables. 
 Classical excess demand is believed to affect price movement through the 
number of people willing to trade at a particular price. The distance to the equilibrium 
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price, the potential gains from trade and the amount of Excess Rent however, all contain 
information about both the number of profitable trades as well as the intensity of the 
preferences driving that desire to trade.  
3.5.2a Single Variable Models of Price Adjustment 
  Each of the single variable models considered are listed in Equations (3.7a-f). In 
estimating Equations (3.7a-f), we pool data from all experiments and exclude from our 
analysis trades that take place on opposite sides of the shift. That is, we do not use 
trades from the initial parameters to predict trades that will take place after the 
equilibrium has shifted, so the FCE equilibrium is always constant between the time at 
which the forecast is being made and the time that the forecasted price change will take 
place. 
 As a first pass at the data, we estimate these equations using ordinary least 
squares and observe the proportion of explained variance in dP as captured by the R 
squareds. We then build a set of more sophisticated models, which incorporates limit 
order book friction as well as the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the residuals 
time series. 
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Result 2:  The naïve OLS approach concludes that the best single predictor of per-
trade price changes, in terms of the proportion of explained variation in dP, is 
the distance between the TE price and the current price. Distance to the FCE 
price performs comparably well, followed by Excess. (2) All of the non-
fundamental models, including the classical Walrasian model individually explain 
less than 1% of the total variation in price changes.  
 
Support: For support of Result 2, we refer to the regression tables listed below. Given 
that the residuals of each of the naïve regressions listed 7a-7f are auto correlated and 
heteroskedastic, the standard errors reported by OLS, and hence the reported 
significance levels, are undoubtedly biased.  Nonetheless, we take these estimates as 
crude approximations of the total correlation between market conditions and price 
changes, and compare the levels of R squareds (which are also known to be biased in 
the presence of autocorrelation) across regressions in order to provide a vague sense of 
what theoretical model best describes the data. 
 Ignoring the likely bias in R squareds, the two fundamentalist adjustment models 
perform about equally well. Distance to the FCE price and distance to the TE price on 
their own explain about 4.5% and 7% of the price change variation. The next best 
model, Excess Rent explains only about 0.6% of variation in price changes. In general, 
potential gains from trade, Excess Rent, Modified Excess Rent and excess demand all 
perform about equally poorly according to this measure, explaining 0.1%, 0.6%, 0.2%, 
and 0.3% of variation respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation of Equations 3.7a-f 
Model Walrasian ER MER PGFT TE 
Distance 
FCE 
Distance 
Independent 
Variable 
1.67*** 2.47*** 1.29*** 1.19** 0.13*** 0.08*** 
Constant -0.25 -0.34 -0.02 0.04 -2.52*** -1.22*** 
R Squared 0.0025 0.0056 0.0014 0.0012 0.0675 0.0443 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
 In order to account for limit order book friction, we add two additional terms to 
the mean equation. The first term is an interaction between the negative component of 
the independent variable at the size of the buy order book. The second is the interaction 
between the positive component of the explanatory variable and the size of the sell 
order book. By negative (positive) component, we mean that neg(X) (pos(X)) is equal to 
X if X<=0 (X>0) and equal to zero otherwise11. The logic of these terms is as follows: the 
buy order book limits downward price motion while the sell order book limits upward 
price motion. Friction impacts the effect of an explanatory variable by limiting price 
motion in the direction that the explanatory variable dictates that prices should move. A 
negative coefficient on XX 32 or   in equation (3.8a) implies that friction slows 
convergence when the size of the buy or sell order book is large respectively. 
 To account for autocorrelation in the residuals, we also include four lags of dP 
into the mean equation as well. We also specify a volatility equation for the residual 
                                                     
11
 By the sign convention of excess demand, both definitions of Excess Rent and potential gains from trade, 
explanatory variables are always positive when they are below the TE price and negative when they are 
above. The one explanatory variable which does not always obey this sign convention is the distance to the 
FCE price since the FCE can vary from the TE price. 
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time series, which we model as a function of buy and sell order book lengths and the 
size of the bid-ask spread. The mean and volatility equations are listed below in 
Equations 8a and 8b. Here, we simply write the equations in terms of a generic variable 
X rather than repeat the same equation for each supply and demand characteristic. For 
each variable, we estimate the model in 8a-8b using maximum likelihood estimation. 
 Examination of the Box-Ljung statistic reveals that, even after accounting for four 
lags of dp, there is typically still some significant auto correlation present in the first 20 
lags. Examination of the ACF’s and PACF’s of residuals reveals that this remaining auto 
correlation is small in magnitude. We also compare the distribution of residuals to the 
quantiles of the standard normal distribution. The distributions of errors are 
symmetrically distributed around zero, but significantly fatter tailed than the normal 
distribution. For this reason, we also specify the use of Huber-White standard errors for 
our maximum likelihood coefficients since the Huber-White estimator is known to be 
robust against symmetric non-normality (See Hamilton, 1994). 
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Results 3-5, describe the results of the estimation of (3.8a) and (3.8b) for each 
explanatory variable individually. Each of these results is particularly theoretically 
important in light of the naïve conclusions made in Result 2 on the basis of the biased R 
squared statistics found in Table 3.3 from the simple OLS regression.  
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Result 3 demonstrates that testing competing models of price adjustment 
depends on the proper specification of mean and volatility equation. Failing to properly 
account for price frictions, auto correlations, and heteroskedasticity (even for theories 
in which these quantities are not acknowledged to exist) can lead to incorrect inferences 
regarding the explanatory power of a particular model over another.  
Result 3 states that price friction is indeed a real and measurable part of 
experimental double auctions. The existence of such friction, and the ability to link it to 
the existence of the limit order book begs the creation of new and more advanced price 
adjustment theories. 
Results 4 and 5 confirm results from (Blooerslev & Domowitz, 1993), which were 
based on simulations using robot traders, for an environment containing human traders. 
Namely, the size and existence of the limit order book as well as the bid-ask spread can 
create conditional heteroskedasticity in traded price time series, providing a powerful 
insight into the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Result 3:  After adjusting for order book friction, auto correlation and 
heteroskedasticity, there is little difference between models in terms of log 
likelihood.  
 
Support:  Even though our model is estimated using maximum likelihood, we can still 
compare model performance using the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) due to Schwarz 
(1978). The BIC is defined as )ln()ln(2 nkLBIC  , where n is the number of 
observations, k is the number of free parameters to be estimated, and L is the 
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maximized value of the likelihood function. Assuming a flat prior, the ratio of two BIC 
values obtained from two different models is approximately equal to the Bayes odds 
ratio of the two models.  
 When we used R squareds to compare models in Result 2, there was a dramatic 
difference between the two fundamentalist models and all other models. In terms of 
long likelihood and BIC, however, each of the models estimated from Equations (3.8a) 
and (3.8b) are virtually indistinguishable from one another. Using the values of BIC listed 
in Table 3.4, we compute the approximate Bayes odds ratio for the best and worst 
performing models from Result 2, the TE price distance model and the potential gains 
from trade model, to be 0.998. This means that, given no prior beliefs about which 
model generated the observed data, the posterior odds are approximately 1 to 1. 
Whatever force drove price equilibration in the experiments studied here, each of the 
six models listed in Table 3.2 capture that force about equally well.  
 Often negative results are not interesting. Why bother reporting that our 
posterior beliefs about what theory generated the data are identical to our, non-
informative, prior beliefs? We report  Result 3 because, when taken together with 
Result 2 it, it shows how failing to account for price friction and the time series 
properties of experimental data can lead to false inferences regarding theory.  
 
Table 3.4: BIC for Classical Models 
 
Model BIC -2ln(L) 
Classical Walrasian -28088.7 -28185.13 
Excess Rent -28074.5 -28170.9 
Modified Excess Rent -28017.8 -28114.16 
Potential gains from trade -28045.6 -28141.99 
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Distance to FCE -28074.8 -28171.25 
Distance to TE -27999.4 -28095.84 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
Result 4:  Significant levels of order book friction are observed for every single-
variable model.  
Support: As support for Result 4, we refer to the parameter estimates of the 
interactions between explanatory variables and the relevant order book length listed in 
Table 3.5. According to the estimates in Table 3.5,  1 standard deviation of excess 
demand above zero will, on average, produce a 2-0.02*SOB franc increase in price 
between the current time and the next trade, where SOB  is the current length of the 
sell order book. That is, each unit of depth in the sell order book slows upward price 
movement attributable to positive excess demand by 1/50th of a franc. Similarly, each 
unit of depth in the buy order book slows downward price movement attributable to 
negative excess by about 1/20th of a franc. 
 Admittedly, the model of price friction presented here leaves much room for 
improvement. In addition to our definition of order book depth being ad hoc, our model 
does not allow for non-linear effects of order book depth, or an effect of the curvature 
of order, which can vary considerably within and across experiments. We merely claim 
that limit order book friction does exist, and that it can significantly impact the 
explanatory power of theoretical models. 
Result 5:  A significant portion of heteroskedasticity is explainable by the size of the 
limit order books and the bid-ask spread. 
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Support: For support of Result 5, we refer to the results presented in Table 3.5. In each 
of the six classical models considered, the size of the bid ask spread is significant in 
predicting volatility at the .01 alpha level. We also find that the size of the buy and sell 
order books also tend to be significant in predicting volatility of price movements, 
though in all six regressions, the coefficient on the size of the buy and sell order book 
are oppositely signed, with the buy order book (asks) always contributing positively to 
volatility, while the sell order book (bids) always contributes negatively to volatility. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to offer an explanation for this phenomenon, merely 
reporting it as a statistical regularity.  
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Table 3.5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Equations 3.8a-b 
 
Model Walrasian ER MER PGFT TE Distance FCE 
Distance 
Mean Equation       
Independent 
Variable 
2.10*** 1.82*** 1.77*** 0.81*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
x(Buy Order Book) -0.05*** -0.03** -0.04*** 0.01 -0.00*** -0.00** 
x(Sell Order Book) -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.00** -0.00*** 
Constant -0.48** -0.14 -0.33* 0.08 -0.31* -0.56** 
L1 Price -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -
0.36*** 
-0.36*** -0.35*** 
L2 Price -0.12*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -
0.21*** 
-0.21*** -0.20*** 
L3 Price -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -
0.14*** 
-0.14*** -0.13*** 
L4 Price -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -
0.10*** 
-0.10*** -0.10*** 
Volatility Equation        
Buy Order Book 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01 
Sell Order Book -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.2*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
Spread 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Constant 5.36*** 5.36*** 5.35*** 5.36*** 5.36*** 5.33*** 
Regression Statistics        
N 6407 6407 6407 6397 6407 6397 
-2 Log Likelihood -28185.13 -28171 -28114 -28142 -28171.25 -28095.84 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
3.5.2b Multivariate Models of Price Adjustment 
As we have seen, each of the univariate classical models considered has the 
power to predict future price movements, although there is no clear winner in terms of 
which theory best predicts future price movement. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that there exists a single “true” model among the class of classical models, and 
that each of the variables considered so far are highly correlated. 
 In estimating the nested model, we again use Equations (3.8a-b), where Xt is now 
a vector of all of the relevant variables, and pos(Xt) (neg(Xt)) is equal to 1 if most of the 
variables in Xt are positive (negative) and zero otherwise. 
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Result 6:  When all of the theoretically important variables are included in a single 
nested model, only the distance to the temporal equilibrium and potential gains 
from trade are statistically significant in predicting price adjustment. 2) Of the 
two significant variables, only the distance to the temporal equilibrium price is 
found to be significantly positive. 
 
Support: In support of Result 6 we simply refer to Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6: The Nested Model 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Mean Equation  
Excess Demand 
Excess Rent 
Modified Excess Rent 
Potential Gains from Trade 
FCE Distance 
TE Distance 
x(Length of Buy Order Book) 
x(Length of Sell Order Book) 
Constant 
L1 Price 
L2 Price 
L3 Price 
L4 Price 
 0.68 
 0.14 
-0.85 
-0.68** 
 0.00 
0.03** 
-0.02 
 -0.03* 
-0.40* 
-0.35*** 
-0.20*** 
-0.14*** 
-0.10*** 
Volatility Equation  
Length of Buy Order Book 
Length of Sell Order Book 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Constant 
0.01 
-0.02*** 
0.02*** 
5.33*** 
Regression Statistics  
N 6397 
-2 Log Likelihood -28104.42 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
 
 Experiments 071205 and 071208 were designed to better understand the 
relationship between the fundamentalist models and the Walrasian model. In particular, 
in markets with linear flow competitive supply and demand curves, like the ones we 
study here, there is an approximate linear relationship between temporal excess 
demand and the distance to the current TE price. Given Result 6, we are then left to 
wonder why excess demand has no effect on price motion after accounting for the 
distance to the Temporal Equilibrium Price.  
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 Experiments 071205 and 071208 vary the relationship between excess demand 
and TE distance throughout the experiments by utilizing flow competitive supply and 
demand functions which alternate between kinked and un-kinked, as shown in Figure 
3.6.  The location of the kink is always directly at the flow competitive equilibrium price, 
which divides incentives between those with positive rents (to the left of the flow 
competitive equilibrium quantity) and those with zero rents (those to the right of the 
flow competitive equilibrium quantity).  
Since both inframarginal and extramarginal units contribute to temporal excess 
demand, we also decompose excess demand into its inframarginal and extramarginal 
components. Notice that by locating the kink at the FCE price, we allow the relationship 
between the rent component of excess demand and the TE distance to remain constant 
(the slope of the ED function to the left), while varying the relationship between the 
extramarginal component and the TE distance (the slope of the ED function to the right 
of the equilibrium, which is either steep or shallow). 
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Figure 3.6: Typical Flow Competitive Supply and Demand Curves for Experiments 071205 & 071208 
 
 
Result 7:  Price dynamics are influenced only by inframarginal excess demand.  
Support: We estimate the Walrasian version of Equations (3.8a-b) using both 
inframarginal and extramarginal components of excess demand as separate regressors. 
The results of this regression are listed in Table 3.7. To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper which has tried to decompose excess demand into inframarginal and 
extramarginal components. Accordingly, the Walrasian adjustment hypothesis holds 
that the coefficients on inframarginal excess demand and extramarginal excess demand 
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will be 1) positive and 2) equal to each other. As shown in Table 3.7, only the coefficient 
on inframarginal excess demand is estimated to be positive. We test and reject the 
hypothesis that both coefficients are equal at the .01 alpha level. Each standard 
deviation of inframarginal excess demand results in an average price movement of 2.76 
francs between trades. On the other hand, the estimated effect of extramarginal excess 
demand is not only insignificant, but is also negatively signed. For the first time, in Table 
3.7, we do not observe a significant role of friction caused by the limit order book.  
 Result 7 is surprising given the theoretical importance that many authors have 
placed on extra-marginal units in determining the speed of price adjustments. It also 
suggests that price adjustment may be related to Marshallian behavior on the part of 
subjects. That is, if the speed at which agents act on incentives is related to the amount 
of available rent, changing the number of extramarginal incentives will have no impact 
on the behavior of subjects, and hence no impact on price dynamics. 
 The possibility of such Marshallian individual behavior is explored further in 
Section 5.3. 
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Table 3.7: Predicting Price Changes Based upon Inframarginal and Extramarginal Components of Excess Demand 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Mean Equation  
Inframarginal Excess Demand 
Extramarginal Excess Demand 
x(Length of Buy Order Book) 
x(Length of Sell Order Book) 
Constant 
L1 Price 
L2 Price 
L3 Price 
L4 Price 
2.76*** 
-0.67 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.25 
-0.40*** 
-0.18*** 
-0.12*** 
-0.06*** 
Volatility Equation  
Length of Buy Order Book 
Length of Sell Order Book 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Constant 
-0.01*** 
-0.00 
0.01*** 
6.51*** 
Regression Statistics  
N 
-2 Log Likelihood 
3793 
-17989.42 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
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3.5.3 The Marshallian Nature of RA Environments 
 In all of the experiments discussed here, at a given moment in time, subjects 
typically had more than one incentive available in their private markets. When subjects 
accessed their private markets each of these orders were displayed in a list in order of 
most to least profitable. The technology also had the limitation that subjects were 
unable to sort the list of available incentives by other features, such as time till 
expiration. A natural assumption given the structure of preference inducement used 
here is that subjects acted on incentives in the order of most to least profitable. 
 Such behavior induces what has been called the Probabilistic Marshallian Path. 
In a deterministic Marshallian path traders are matched according to the available gains 
from trade, with the highest valued buyer and the lowest valued seller trading first, the 
second highest buyer and second lowest valued seller trading second and so on. In 
contrast, in a probabilistic Marshallian path traders with higher available gains from 
trade are not assured of trading before lower rent traders, they merely have a high 
probability of doing so. 
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3.5.3a The Marshallian Speed of Quantity Adjustment 
 We can still see the Marshallian theory of quantity adjustment at work by 
looking at individual bids and asks and ask whether the waiting time before an offer in 
the public market is accepted is a decreasing function of how profitable it is for the 
other side of the market (as a function of the offer’s distance from the TE price). 
 For this analysis, we use the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the 
hazard of a bid or ask being accepted as a function of its TE distance. The model 
assumes that for every offer price alive in the market at a moment in time there exists a 
distribution of waiting times, f(P,X,t), until that offer is accepted by the other side of the 
market. We can define a hazard at time t to be the instantaneous probability of an offer 
being accepted in the next infinitesimal moment of time, conditional on it having not 
been accepted up to time t.  
 
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 We will also assume, as a consequence of Marshallian theory, that the 
instantaneous probability of a bid or ask being taken is shifted either up or down by the 
amount of rent it offers potential traders on the opposite side of the market. That is: 
 
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Where hb(t) is the hazard rate for an incentive prices at the TE price. Cox (197?) shows 
that under the assumptions described above, we can estimate 
1  without making any 
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assumptions about the underlying distribution of failure times using partial maximum 
likelihood. By estimating 
1 , we can calculate relative hazard ratios:  
 
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This ratio tells us how much higher or lower, on average, the “instantaneous 
transaction rate” is for an offer a certain distance away from the TE price relative to an 
offer priced at the TE price. Similarly, the inverse of this ratio tells us how much longer 
(or shorter), in seconds, one will expect to wait for an order to be taken by pricing it a 
given distance away from the TE price. As one might expect, the higher (lower) an order 
to sell (buy) is priced relative to the TE price, the longer one can expect to wait until that 
order is filled.   
 By explicitly looking at adjustment in terms of transaction rates, we also learn 
more about the process of adjustment than what we have already shown. In particular, 
we learn that supply and demand works not only on the size and direction of price 
movement, but also on the rates of transaction. 
 For the purposes of our study, an offer is “born” the moment it is listed on the 
book as either the best bid or ask and survives until it is either taken or censored. Often, 
waiting times are censored because bids and asks either expire, are canceled, or are 
improved by a newly placed order. Such observations are said to be right censored 
because they did not survive long enough as the best bid or ask for a time-till-taken to 
be observed. These observations nonetheless contribute to the likelihood function of 
the Cox model, and hence to the estimation of parameters. Censored observations 
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contribute to the likelihood in that the unobserved waiting time is known to have been 
larger than the length of time that the offer existed before it was censored.  
Result 8:  The speed of transaction for units at the bid and ask price is influenced by 
the amount of rent available to the opposite side of the market at that price. The 
higher (lower) a bid (ask) is, the faster a transaction will occur at that price. 
Support: In Table 3.8, we estimate Equation (3.10), listed as Model 1, using partial 
maximum likelihood and report the hazard ratio and its level of significance. We also 
repeat the analysis for FCE distance in place of TE distance, reporting the results as 
Model 2, and as well as a combined model nesting all of the classical variables, reported 
as Model 3. We stratify each model by experiment and by whether the offer was a bid 
or ask. In essence, this allows the base hazard rate to vary across bids, asks and 
experiments. 
 Hazard ratios less than one, are associated with increased waiting times until an 
offer is accepted, while hazard ratios are associated with decreased waiting times. For 
example, in Model 1, we estimate hazard ratios on TE distance of about 0.8 for both 
bids and asks. This means that for every standard deviation a bid (ask) is below (above) 
the TE price, that offer will be accepted by the other side of the market only about 80% 
as fast as an offer placed at the equilibrium price. 
  Models 2 and 3 confirm that FCE distance also affects the rate at which bids and 
asks are accepted, although the effect of FCE distance appears to be larger in magnitude 
and significance for asks than for bids. The effect of TE distance on the speed at which 
offers are accepted also appears to be robust to the inclusion of other classical 
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variables. Some of the these variables, such as Excess Rent and potential gains from 
trade also affect transaction speeds independent of the distance to the temporal 
equilibrium, although the direction of these effects is theoretically hard to interpret. For 
example, in theory, positive ER and/or potential gains from trade should be associated 
with upward price movement and thus an increased spread of offer acceptance at the 
ask price and decreased speed of acceptance at the bid price. Yet, what we observe is 
that Excess Rent increases the speed of both bid and ask taking, while positive potential 
gains from trade decreases the rate of bid and ask taking. 
 
Table 3.8: Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Bids Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio 
TE Distance 0.80*** -NA- 0.79*** 
FCE Distance 
Excess Demand 
Excess Rent 
Modified Excess Rent 
Potential Gains from Trade 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
0.83*** 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
0.95* 
0.98 
1.28* 
1.05 
0.89* 
Asks Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio 
TE Distance 0.83*** -NA- 0.81*** 
FCE Distance 
Excess Demand 
Excess Rent 
Modified Excess Rent 
Potential Gains from Trade 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
0.83*** 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
-NA- 
0.84*** 
1.03 
1.17*** 
0.87** 
0.83*** 
Regression Statistics    
Observations 
Offers Accepted 
-2 Log Likelihood 
11152 
6776 
-37419.678 
11152 
6776 
-37433.466 
11150 
6775 
-37369.312 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071004 
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 While Result 8 is consistent with Marshallian behavior on the part of individuals, 
we are unable to relate the rent of individual incentives to the speed with which they 
transact in markets where subjects are allowed to hold more than one unit of inventory. 
This is because inventory is fungible. For the purposes of addressing the Marshallian 
nature of our experimental environment, experiment 080201 was designed with the 
restriction that traders could hold at most 1 unit of inventory, allowing experimenters to 
match transactions in the public market to individual incentives in traders’ private 
markets. Result 9 states that individuals in RA environments do exhibit characteristics 
creating a probabilistic Marshallian path. In Section 5.3b, we look closer at the process 
of limit order placement to see how this probabilistic Marshallian path, combined with 
limit order book structure helps to stabilize trade prices close to the temporal and flow 
competitive equilibria. 
Result 9:  Incentives with higher temporal equilibrium rents were 1) accepted faster 
in traders’ private markets 2) had higher probability of being transacted in 
traders’ private markets, and 3) transacted faster in the public market than 
lower rent incentives. 
Support: Support for Result 8(1-2) come from data from all experiments listed in Table 
3.1, while support for Result 8(3) comes only from experiment 080201. 
 On the left y-axis, Figure 3.7 plots the waiting time between when incentives 
arrived in a traders’ private market (for buyers and sellers) and when each incentive was 
accepted by the subject. Included in Figure 3.7 is a piecewise linear fit of waiting times 
as a function of the available rent of an incentive at the current temporal equilibrium 
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price. On the right y-axis, Figure 3.7 also plots uniform Kernel estimates of the 
probability that a trader acts on an incentive as a function of its temporal equilibrium 
rent.  
 A general pattern can be seen in the scatter plot and the piecewise linear fit 
plotted in Figure 3.7. Incentives with large amounts of rent, in francs, at the temporal 
equilibrium are acted upon in subject’s private market much faster than those with 
small rent. Units with negative amounts of rent (those that would be unprofitable if all 
trading were to occur at the TE price) that are still close to the TE are sometimes acted 
upon, but with much less frequency and typically after a longer amount of time. Also 
seen in Figure 3.7 is the fact that negative-rent incentives far from the equilibrium, 
those with less than -200 francs rent, are never accepted. 
 While Results 8(1) and 8(2) say that high rent incentives are more likely to enter 
the market before lower rent and/or non-profitable incentives, Result 8(3) says that 
these higher rent incentives are actually transacted faster in the public market. 
Admittedly a good portion of Result 8(3) may be due to the single-unit inventory 
restriction in market 080201, but 1) we suspect that this result is true of markets in 
general and 2) without the restriction of a single unit of inventory, we would be unable 
to measure transaction waiting times since once incentives are accepted by sellers as 
inventory, they become indistinguishable from one another. 
 Figure 3.8, shows both a scatter plot of transaction waiting times against 
incentive rents, as well as a piecewise linear fit. Similar to Figure 3.7, we see a general 
downward sloping  fit curve, individuals with higher incentives to trade do tend to enter 
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and transact in the public market faster than individuals with lower incentives. Nearly all 
incentives with rent above 200 francs traded in under a minute compared to an average 
transaction time of about two minutes for a extramarginal incentive. 
Figure 3.7: Waiting Times and Acceptance Probabilities for Incentives by Rent 
 
Source: using data from experiments 070208 through 071208 
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Figure 3.8: Waiting Times until Incentives Transacted in Public Market 
 
Source: using data from experiment 080201 
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3.6 Conclusions 
 We view this chapter as an exploratory examination of price adjustment in 
dynamic markets, with the hope that it will spur improvements in theories of dynamics 
and econometric methods for analyzing market experiments. Our findings in this 
direction indicate that fruitful models will require incorporating an explicit role of order-
book induced price friction, heteroskedasticity and price change auto correlation. Failing 
to properly account for price frictions, auto correlations, and heteroskedasticity (even 
for theories in which these quantities are not acknowledged to exist) can lead to 
incorrect inferences regarding the explanatory power of a particular model over 
another. The size and existence of the limit order book and the bid-ask spread 
contribute to the occurrence of conditional heteroskedasticity in traded price time 
series. 
We also shed light on which classical variables are most directly related to price 
movements. After nesting all of the theoretically important variables are included into a 
single model, only the distance to the temporal equilibrium is the only statistically 
significant variable with positive partial correlation to price changes. 
The distance to the temporal equilibrium appears to be the most important 
classical variable for several reasons. First, price dynamics are influenced only by the 
inframarginal portion of excess demand. Second, the speed with which individuals act 
on private incentives, and transact in the market is sensitive to the amount of profit 
available on each incentive at the current market prices. Incentives with higher rents at 
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current offer prices were accepted faster in traders’ private markets traded quicker in 
the public market and had higher probability of being acted on in general. 
Such findings support the hypothesis that market convergence is in part aided by 
the “probabilistic Marshallian Path,” that is, the idea that trades will form along the 
Marshallian path with greater probability than would occur by randomness alone.  
The distance to the FCE and TE prices are the most important variables 
predicting both the location of new bids and asks as well as the probability of a bid or 
ask improvement. Large under pricings relative to either equilibrium concept are likely 
to result in a faster rate of market orders on the buy side, higher bid prices, and a 
greater chance of bid improvement. Similarly large over pricings relative to either 
equilibrium are likely to result in a faster rate of market orders on the sell side, lower 
ask prices, and a high chance of ask price improvement. 
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Chapter 4 Experimental Random Arrival Markets with 
Competing Insiders 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 We study a continuous double auction with competing insiders. Informed traders 
hold identical information about future order flow. Our environment differs from 
traditional inside information trading experiments in that previous research has tended 
to focus on double auctions with common valued assets. In the experiments considered 
here, non-informed traders are given private incentives to trade, market supply and 
demand is fully defined, and insiders’ information takes the form of knowledge about 
non-insiders’ current and future private incentives.  
(Smith V. , 1976) argues that supply and demand in experimental double 
auctions creates an “induced common value” at the Walrasian equilibrium towards 
which prices are drawn. This is because the Walrasian equilibrium represents a price at 
which speculators can buy units below and sell units above to make a profit, similar to a 
common valued asset. As this chapter will show, the similarities between a pure 
common value double auction and one with a supply and demand induces Walrasian 
equilibrium end there. 
In a common value environment, asymmetric information held by insiders is 
incorporated into prices through cumulative signed order flow (Kyle, 1985), (Glosten & 
Milgrom, 1985), (Copeland & Galai, 1983), (Huang & Stoll, 1997). In theory, this is 
128 
 
because of two assumptions. First, it is typically assumed that the market is made by 
(an) uninformed market maker(s). Second, it is also assumed that traders with 
asymmetric information will always initiate trades through market orders in an attempt 
to hide their information from market makers.  
 In this environment we ask three questions. First, does the information held by 
competing insiders get reflected in informational efficiency and prices? Second, is 
information held by insiders reflected in the inventories of non-insiders? Third, how is 
insiders’ information transmitted?  
4.2 Background and Trading Environment 
 
(Forsythe & Lundholm, 1990) examine a trading environment in which insiders 
are asymmetrically informed about the dividend payment of a risk asset. They find that 
trading in such markets can achieve a rational expectations equilibrium provided traders 
have sufficient trading experience and the structure of dividend payments are 
commonly known.  
 (Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1992) and (Back, Cao, & Willard, 2000) study a 
theoretical environment in which multiple insiders all have the same information. They 
show that when such is the case, there does not exist a stable equilibrium trading 
strategy among competition insiders. If all insiders are equipped with identical 
information, all insiders will rush into the market to grab informational rents, pushing 
prices to the full information price and exhausting informational rents. 
(Kyle, 1985), on the other hand, shows that when information is held about a 
common liquidation value by a single insider, then the insider will act on his information 
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gradually, accumulating inventory, and revealing his information through signed order 
flow linearly over time. 
(Miller, Plott, & Smith, 1977) study an environment in which supply and demand 
parameters shift at random between seasons. In their experiments, some traders could 
become informed about future supply and demand. They find that intertemporal 
speculation between seasons reduces price differences in both seasons towards the 
intertemporal competitive equilibrium. 
 The trading environment we study here is a modification of the Random Arrival 
(RA) market found in (Alton & Plott, Working Paper1) and (Alton & Plott, Working 
Paper2). An important feature of RA markets is the Flow Competitive Equilibrium (FCE) 
price, which is an induced common value similar to the “consensus value” of (Goettler, 
Parlou, & Uajan, 2005). Buyers and sellers arrive to the market each having private 
valuations which are symmetrically distributed around the FCE price. That is, each 
trader’s valuation for the asset is determined both by a common value and an 
idiosyncratic component. Idiosyncratic components of traders’ valuations provide 
incentives to trade similar to “noise traders.” 
 Uninformed traders receive a stream of private offers to buy or sell shares of an 
asset, “X,” to or from the experimenter. These offers are sent to participants according 
to a Poisson process and last for 6 minutes before they expire. The price associated with 
each private offer is equal to the FCE price, plus or minus a random amount drawn from 
a distribution of potential values. 
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 Informed traders, on the other hand, have no private markets and hence 
no idiosyncratic reasons for trade. Their payoff is based solely on their ability to buy low 
and resell high using their inside information. Insiders know the rate of arrival and 
distribution of incentives of the uninformed traders. Using this information, insiders can 
compute supply and demand curves and equilibrium prices. For example, if private 
offers to buy and sell arrived to the market at a rate of 4 offers per minute, and the 
offers were distributed uniformly between 0 and 200 for the first half of the experiment 
and uniformly between 200 and 400 for the second half. Figure 4.1 shows this 
graphically. The way in which supply and demand changes in these experiments is 
similar to (Miller, Plott, & Smith, 1977), which studies intertemporal competitive 
equilibrium in markets with random, seasonal fluctuations in demand and traders can 
purchase “foreknowledge” of future demand and supply.  
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Figure 4.1: Supply and Demand Curves 
 
Given the above parameters, the FCE prices for the first and second half of the 
experiment would be 100 francs and 300 francs respectively, and trade would occur at a 
rate of 2 trades per minute. For a more detailed explanation of the FCE price, see (Alton 
& Plott, Working Paper1). 
Since insiders know that prices will be higher in the second half of the 
experiment, the problem they face is that they would like to buy cheap units at the 
beginning of the experiment and sell them for more money during the second half. This 
type of speculation shifts the demand curve to the right during the first half of the 
experiment, and shifts the supply curve to the right during the second half as seen 
below: 
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Figure 4.2: Speculation Between low and High Equilibria 
  
This raises prices in the beginning of the experiment, and lowers prices during 
the second half of the experiment, cutting into insiders’ profits. If the insiders compete 
so aggressively that they drive prices up to 200 francs in the first half, and down to 200 
francs in the second half, they won’t make any profit off their information. In this 
example, 200 francs is the insiders’ “break-even point.” In each experiment, insiders are 
explicitly told what the “break-even point” is for that experiment. 
Another problem for informed traders is that uninformed traders may also be 
observing traded price levels relative to their own private incentives. These uniformed 
traders may try to learn about the parameters of the market from the insiders’ actions 
and begin to speculate themselves, cutting into insiders’ profits even further. 
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Multiple experiments were run on each date, and insiders designations were 
randomly shuffled between each period. Each experiment date also included a practice 
period, which we also report, in which there was only a single FCE price and all subjects 
were informed about what that price was. Subjects earned no money during the 
practice period. 
4.3 Information Diffusion: Theory and Measurement 
 Experimental outcomes can be classified into four broad categories depending 
on the behavior of insiders and uninformed traders. Identically informed insiders can 
either perfectly compete or imperfectly compete, while uninformed traders can act as 
naïve price takers, demanding liquidity based solely on their private redemption values, 
or act strategically, inferring insiders information from market prices and competing 
with insiders to gain information rents by providing liquidity.  
 These experimental outcomes are described in Table 4.1 and do not necessarily 
conform to any specific theory of trading behavior. If uninformed individuals act solely 
on their private incentives, then they will never submit limit orders above their private 
willingness to buy or below their private willingness to sell. This means that naïve 
uninformed traders will be primarily liquidity demanders. Prices will be fully revealing if 
insiders compete perfectly, and be less than fully revealing if insiders compete 
imperfectly.  
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Table 4.1: Competing Theories of Information Diffusion 
  Insiders 
  Perfect Competition Imperfect Competition 
U
n
in
fo
rm
e
d
 N
aï
ve
 P
ri
ce
 T
ak
in
g 
 100% Information 
aggregation 
 Close to 100% of 
informational rents going 
to uninformed 
 Insiders supply most of 
the market’s liquidity 
 (Holden & 
Subrahmanyam, 1992) 
(Back, Cao, & Willard, 
2000) 
 50% Information 
aggregation 
 Most of informational 
rents gong to insiders 
 Insiders supply most if 
the market’s liquidity 
 (Holden & 
Subrahmanyam, 1992) 
(Back, Cao, & Willard, 
2000) 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
B
eh
av
io
r 
 100% Information 
aggregation 
 Close to 100% of 
informational rents going 
to uninformed 
 Both insiders and 
uninformed supply 
liquidity 
 (Copeland & Friedman, 
1991) 
 >50%, <100% 
Information aggregation 
 Informational rents split 
between insiders and 
uninformed 
 Both insiders and 
uninformed supply 
liquidity 
 (Kyle, 1985) 
 
4.3.1 A Theory of Information Diffusion 
 In a pure common value double auction similar to (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985), 
information becomes reflected in prices through a process of Bayesian updating on the 
part of a rational market maker(s). In such an environment, the market maker 
continually updates prices after each trade so that the midpoint of the bid-ask spread is 
equal to the expected value of the asset, and uninformed agents are unable to profit off 
the insiders’ information.  
135 
 
When private incentives to trade are introduced, however, trading on the part of 
insiders directly transmits information to uninformed traders, allowing them to profit 
off the information of insiders. To see this, consider the example given in Section 2. In 
the first half of trading, the FCE price is low relative to second half of trading, creating 
opportunities for insiders to profit from buying during the first period and selling during 
the second period. 
Both insiders and uninformed traders observe both a current trading price and 
the rate of trade at that price, which can be compared to the natural rate of trade at the 
current price.  
 
Figure 4.3: Rate of Speculation 
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Let R P =  
D p , if p > FCE price
S p , if p ≤ FCE price
    (4.1) 
be the natural rate of trade for the entire market, where D and S are the demand 
and supply functions. Then, both informed and uninformed traders can observe:  
𝑆 𝑝 =  𝑆𝑖
𝑢
𝑖∈𝑈 (𝑝) +  𝑆𝑗
𝐼(𝑝)𝑗 ∈𝐼  (4.2) 
Where 𝑆𝑖
𝑢(𝑝) is the rate of speculation of uninformed agent i at a price of p and 
𝑆𝑗
𝐼(𝑝) is the rate of speculation of informed agent j at price p.  
Notice that, under the assumptions that all of the speculation in the market up 
until a given point in time is due to insiders and that the insiders interpret their 
information correctly (i.e., they are on the correct side of the market), outsiders can 
infer the direction of the Full Information Price (FIP) based on the direction of 
speculation. Outsiders cannot, however, identify the individual values of 𝑆𝑖
𝑢
𝑖∈𝑈 (𝑝) 
and 𝑆𝑖
𝐼
𝑖∈𝑈 (𝑝), nor can they learn the exact location of the FIP without more 
information about insiders’ trading strategies. 
4.3.2 Measuring Information Diffusion 
 
 In each experiment, there is at least one shift in equilibrium. More aggregate 
surplus is available by trading at the full-information price with a higher rate of 
transaction than there is trading at a slower rate at each of the individual FCE prices. 
Since the amount of surplus available by trading at each of the individual FCE does not 
depend on information, we can subtract this amount from the actual level of surplus 
extracted during an experiment to obtain the amount of rent achieved due to 
information. We can also take the difference in the amount of surplus available at the 
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full-information equilibrium and at the individual FCE’s to obtain the maximum amount 
of informational rent that could be extracted during an experiment. Dividing these two 
numbers gives us a measure of informational efficiency. 
% 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡
=
 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 −𝐹𝐶𝐸 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 −𝐹𝐶𝐸  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠  
 (4.3) 
An alternative measure based on (Smith V. , 1962) looks at the average distance 
of traded prices to the full information price. 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
1
𝑁
  𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝐼𝑃𝑡  
𝑁
𝑡=1   (4.4) 
 It should be noted that the measure of informational efficiency defined in 
Equation (4.3) above has little to do with the level of traded prices in the experiment. 
Likewise Equation (4.4) has little to do with efficiency. An experiment can have traded 
prices that are very different from the full information price and still have high levels of 
informational efficiency. This is because Equation (4.3) only measures the aggregate 
amount of surplus achieved, and does not depend on how that surplus is divided 
between buyers and sellers.   
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4.4 Results 
 The results are divided into 5 sections. In Section 4.4.1, we discuss results related 
to the informational efficiency, and how information surplus is distributed among 
insiders and non-insiders. In Section 4.4.2, we examine the strategic behavior of insider 
and uninformed agents in terms of the choice between market and limit orders. Section 
4.4.3 examines the evolution of insiders and outsiders’ inventory positions and suggests 
that information is transmitted from insiders to outsiders via the observable rate of 
trade in the market. Finally, in Section 4.4.4, we show that information is not 
incorporated into prices through signed order flow.  
4.4.1 Informational Efficiency 
 
Result 1:  Informational efficiency in random arrival market experiments 
with competing insiders is high, though typically below 100%. 
Approximately one third of information surplus accrued to insiders. 
Support: Table 4.2 computes the percentage of information aggregated in each 
experiment using Equation (4.1). Information aggregation in the experiments considered 
ranged from 42% (58% excluding experiment 080727 period 3) to virtually 100%. Also 
listed in Table 4.2 are the percentages of information rent accrued to all insiders and all 
uninformed agents. Since insiders had no private markets in these experiments it is 
assumed that all of their earnings from that period are attributed to information.  
 The results listed in Table 4.2 are consistent with imperfect competition among 
insiders and strategic behavior among the uninformed, since the level of information 
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aggregation was typically less than 100% and most of the surplus due to information 
was actually accrued to the uninformed. 
 The only anomalous results come from experiment 080727 pd 3, in which 
aggregate insider profits were negative and the level of information aggregated was less 
than one half. Most of the insider losses in this experiment were accounted for by a 
single insider who failed to unload all of his inventory before the end of the experiment. 
This was likely due to the subject misunderstanding either his inside information, or the 
instructions for trading. As a result of this behavior, we exclude this experiment when 
calculating the average amount of information aggregation. 
 
Table 4.2: Experimental Results 
Date Period 
Max 
Surplus 
FCE 
Surplus 
Actual 
Surplus 
Informational 
Rent 
Informational 
Efficiency 
Percent of 
information 
Rent 
Accrued to 
Insiders 
Percent of 
information 
Rent 
Accrued to 
Non-
Insiders 
080611 1 4923 4923 1428 NA NA NA NA 
080611 2 44566 23868 35794 11926 58% 51% 49% 
080611 3 67828 22618 61529 38911 86% 34% 66% 
080611 4 57808 27904 54454 26550 89% 9% 91% 
080611 5 98574 28881 98308 69427 100% 30% 70% 
080727 1 6804 6804 5214 -1590 NA NA NA 
080727 2 88886 33700 81020 47320 86% 25% 75% 
080727 3 55987 31166 41631 10465 42% -149% 249% 
080727 4 119118 64213 111466 47253 86% 50% 50% 
080727 5 56023 31179 36893 5714 23% 32% 68% 
Average*      84% 33% 67% 
* Average excludes 080727 pd. 3 
 
4.4.2 Price Levels 
 
A natural assumption given the fact that the average level of informational 
efficiency was about 85% is that traded prices would have remained close or 
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equilibrated to the full information price. Another natural assumption, given the results 
of (Alton & Plott, Working Paper1) and (Alton & Plott, Working Paper2), is that when 
information diffusion is less than 100%, prices will be pulled toward the FCE price as 
well. We state these possibilities as Hypothesis 1 and 2: 
Hypothesis 1:  Traded prices will stabilize to the full information 
equilibrium price. 
Hypothesis 2:  Traded prices will be affected by both the full information 
price and the flow competitive equilibrium price. Prices will typically be 
found between the two equilibria. 
Result 2:  Hypothesis 1 is false. Traded prices typically did not stabilize to 
the full information price. Hypothesis 2 is correct. Prices were slightly 
more likely to be found between the full information price and the FCE 
price. 
Support: As stated earlier, informational efficiency, as we measure it, has little to do 
with price levels, and the experimental results bear that out.  
 As support of Result 2, we refer to Figure 4.3, which plots traded price paths for 
all experiments along with FCE prices, the full information price, and aggregate levels of 
inventory. Figure 4.3 shows that prices tend not to equilibrate to a constant level.  
 The average distance across all experiments to the full information price, as 
measured by equation (4.2), was 39 francs, or about 20% of the support of the 
distribution of latent preferences. 
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 Traded prices, were between the FCE and the full information price about XX% of 
the time, which is significantly different from 50% at the 99% confidence level, and 
hence we accept Hypothesis 2. This result holds regardless of whether we include 
experiment 080727 pd 3. 
The influence of the FCE away from the full information price is likely the result 
of uncertainty about the full information price on the part of non-insiders. To test 
whether the influence of the FCE changes over time as information is transmitted from 
insiders to non-insiders, we include interactions between the FCE, TE, FIP and a dummy 
variable indicating that the trade occurred during the last period of an experiment. 
Surprisingly, we find that traded prices continue to be biased in the direction of the FCE 
price even in the last period of each experiment.  
Table 4.3: Predicting Prices Based on Competing Equilibria 
Variable Coeficient 
FCE 0.28*** 
FIP 0.75*** 
TE -0.09*** 
FCE*Last Period 0.08** 
FIP*Last Period 0.01 
TE*Last Period -0.01 
Seller Initiated 
Dummy 
-6.02** 
Constant 6.13 
R2 .7774 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
4.4.3 Inventories 
 
 A fundamental question regarding auctions with asymmetric information has 
been whether markets diffuse information. That is, do non-insiders learn the 
information held by insiders as trading evolves.  
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 One way to answer this question is to compare the market activities of insiders 
and uninformed traders in terms of inventories. Since uninformed traders, trading solely 
on the basis of their private incentives, have no reason other than information learned 
from insiders to accumulate positive or negative levels of inventory. While the inventory 
levels of uninformed traders may fluctuate, they have no reason to trend over time. 
Therefore, any trend in non-insider inventories can be attributed to information flow 
between insiders and outsiders.  
Result 3:  The inventory buildup of uninformed traders mirrors the 
inventory buildup of insiders.  
 Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the aggregate and average levels of inventories per 
trader for both insiders and uninformed agents. Outsiders’ inventories tend to trend 
with insiders. In nearly every period, uninformed traders accumulate non-zero inventory 
levels in the same direction as informed traders. The level of inventory per trader is 
typically less than the level of inventory per informed trader, but the level of inventory 
buildup on the part of uninformed traders does occasionally exceed that of informed 
subjects. This can be clearly seen in 080727 period 4 in which nearly all of the 
speculation during the first half of the experiment is accounted for by outsiders.  
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Figure 4.4: All Experiments and Inventories 
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Figure 4.5: All Experiments and Inventories per Trader 
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Hypothesis 3:  The inventory accumulation rate of non-insiders will 
depend on the lagged total rate of inventory accumulation. 
Hypothesis 4:  Insiders inventory accumulation rate will be driven by the 
location of FCE relative to the FIP.  
Hypothesis 5:  Competition for information rents will also affect insiders’ 
inventory accumulation decisions, reflected in a significantly positive 
slope coefficient on the lagged total rate of inventory accumulation. 
 
Result 4:  Uninformed traders use the observed rate of trade to speculate 
on the direction of the Full Information Price, but never learn either the 
identities of the insiders or the true location of the Full Information Price. 
  Table 4.4 summarizes the results for uninformed traders. A t-test of the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on lagged rate of inventory accumulation per 
uninformed trader and lagged rate of inventory accumulation per informed trader are 
equal fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level. This means that 
while uninformed traders are about to speculate on the direction of the FIP based on 
the total rate of speculation in the market, they are unable to identify exactly how much 
speculation is due to insiders and how much is due to other uninformed subjects.  
 Interestingly, conditional on the total rate of speculation, outsiders’ inventory 
accumulation does not depend at all on the relative location of the FCE to the FIP. This 
means that despite the ability of uninformed agents to profit off the observed rate of 
speculation, they never actually learn the true FIP. An implication of this is that these 
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markets are likely to be subject to informational mirages and bubbles (see (Camerer & 
Weigelt, 1991), (Oechssler, Schmidt, & Schnedler, 2007)). Such a situation can occur in 
which uninformed traders rationally respond to market information which might 
possibly contain information about the state of the world, but which in actuality does 
not.  
Table 4.4: Inventory Accumulation Rate of Uninformed Traders 
Variable Coefficient 
Lagged Rate of Inventory Accumulation per 
Uninformed Trader 
0.08** 
Lagged Rate of Inventory Accumulation per 
Informed Trader 
0.10** 
FCE<FIP Dummy 0.18 
FCE>FIP Dummy -0.14 
Constant -0.03 
R2 0.13 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Result 5:  Hypothesis 4 is correct. The aggregate rate of insiders depends on 
location of the FCE price relative to the FIP. When the FCE is below the 
FIP, insider have a positive rate of inventory accumulation. When it is 
above the FIP, insiders have a negative, rate of inventory accumulation. 
Result 6:  Insiders are also affected by competition, accelerating their rate 
of inventory accumulation in direct response to past rates of 
accumulation. 
The results for insiders are listed in Table 4.5. The effect of competition from 
both insiders and uninformed traders is much higher for insiders than it is for outsiders. 
For every ten units accumulated per thirty second interval, informed traders tend to 
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increase their rate of speculation as a whole by about 3 to 6 additional units in the next 
thirty second interval.  
Over all experiments, insiders tended to over accumulate inventory during 
periods of low FCE prices and under sell inventory during periods of high FCE. This is 
reflected in the slope coefficients FCE<FIP Dummy  and FCE>FIP Dummy not summing to 
zero, although both estimates are in the direction predicted by theory. 
Table 4.5: Inventory Accumulation Rate of Uniformed Traders 
Variable Coefficient 
Lagged Rate of Inventory Accumulation per 
Uninformed Trader 
0.30*** 
Lagged Rate of Inventory Accumulation per 
Informed Trader 
0.58*** 
FCE<FIP Dummy 0.21** 
FCE>FIP Dummy -0.11* 
Constant -0.01 
R2 0.57 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
4.4.4 The Effects of Order Flow on Price Changes 
 In the common value environment studied by (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985), 
asymmetric information held by insiders is gradually incorporated into prices via signed 
order flow. By convention, trades initiated by market orders to buy are signed positively, 
and trades initiated by market orders to sell are signed negatively.  
 Market orders play a special informational role in Glosten and Milgrom’s theory 
because of the assumption that informed traders transact only through market orders. 
This assumption is based on the idea that informed traders attempt to hold off revealing 
their information to the market. When traded prices in a double auction increase 
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(decrease), it is either because of an increased (decreased) rate of buy (sell) market 
orders eroding asks (bids) in the sell (buy) order book, or because of an increase 
(decrease) in the level of limit prices at which market orders transact. By submitting a 
higher bid or lower ask than the current market prices, an insider risks revealing the 
direction of his or her information prior to making a transaction. Placing market orders, 
on the other hand, also reveals a small amount of insiders’ information to the market, 
but does so after the insider has already transacted. Exactly why insiders have this 
preference is not fully explained by the Glosten and Milgrom model and is hence left as 
an assumption rather than a consequence of utility maximizing behavior. 
 Alton (Chapter 1) shows that the informational content of trades can be 
estimated by looking at runs in trade initiation. When we apply the same methodology 
to our experimental data, we discover that, while the direction of trade initiation does 
appear to impact prices, the actual amount traded in each run, paradoxically, does not 
affect prices.  
Result 7:  Asymmetric information in Random Arrival Markets is not 
transmitted through signed order flow. The direction of order flow 
however, does impact prices. 
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Table 4.6: Effect of Signed Run Size on Traded Prices 
Variable Coefficient 
Positive Order Flow 
Dummy 
31.96*** 
Size of Trade Run 0.24 
Constant -16.06*** 
R2 0.14 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
According to the results presented in Table 4.6, positive order flow (buy market 
orders) tend to increase traded prices by approximately 32 Francs per run and negative 
order flow tends to decrease prices by about 16 Francs per run. The fact that prices tend 
to increase more on a positive run than they decrease on a negative run, is due to a 
combination of parameter choices (tending to shift FCE prices upward over the course 
of an experiment) as well as mistakes made by insiders (such as in 080727 pd. 3, in 
which insiders accumulated too much inventory during the first half of the experiment 
and failed to unload all of it by the end of the experiment). The size of the signed order 
flow, on the other hand, which should be the only significant explanatory variable, is not 
significantly different from zero. While this indicated that prices generally move in the 
direction predicted by theory, it also indicated a general deficiency in the theory. 
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Figure 4.6: Scatter Plot of Price Changes Vs Size of Run Size 
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state this as Hypothesis 6, and test it by comparing the proportion of limit orders sent 
by insiders to the proportion of limit orders sent by non-insiders. 
Hypothesis 6:  Informed subjects will always submit market orders. 
Result 8:  We reject hypothesis 6. Informed subjects submitted both market 
and limit orders in the same proportion as uninformed traders. 
There were no significant differences between insiders and uninformed agents in 
terms of the proportion of limit and market orders that both types of agents submitted. 
Both uniformed and informed trades submitted about 60% of their orders in the form of 
limit orders. This result can be seen in Table 4.7 below, which lists the number of limit 
and market orders submitted by insiders and uninformed traders. 
Table 4.7: Market And Limit Order Submission 
 Number of 
Orders 
Submitted by 
Insiders 
Submitted by 
Uninformed 
Limit Bids 2693 251 2444 
Limit Asks 2196 245 1951 
Market Buy 2063 132 1931 
Market Sell 1497 160 1337 
Excluded 080727 pd 3 
 Result 9 helps to explain why price movement does not seem to be directly 
related to signed order flow. Such a result may also explain why the measured effect of 
asymmetric information in the Australian Stock Market in Chapter One appears to be so 
small. If informed traders attempt to hide their identities in electronic limit order 
markets by placing both market and limit orders in the same proportion as the rest of 
the market, such behavior can attenuate the measurements of the effect of asymmetric 
information toward zero. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
 
Prices, efficiencies and inventory levels indicate that trading in random arrival 
markets with competing insiders is characterized by incomplete information 
incorporation into prices and incomplete diffusion of information form insiders to 
uninformed agents. While high, levels of efficiency are typically well below 100%, and 
prices do not converge to the full information price as predicted by (Back, Cao, & 
Willard, 2000) and (Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1992).  
The results of the experiments presented here suggest that partial information 
diffusion in random arrival markets can be achieved through uninformed subjects 
observing the price and rate of trade in a market and comparing it to the natural rate of 
trade. While such behavior can allow uninformed traders to successfully speculate in the 
same direction as insiders, outsiders never fully learn the location of the Full 
Information Price. 
 This chapter also suggests a possible explanation for why measurements of the 
effect of asymmetric information on asset prices may be hard to detect in electronic 
limit order markets. When insiders transact through both limit and market orders, which 
are oppositely signed when determining signed order flow, the measured effects of 
signed order flow are attenuated toward zero.  
 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
  
154 
 
 
Chapter 5 Bibliography 
Ahn, H.-J., & Cheung, Y. (1999). Intraday Patterns of the Spread and Depth in a Market with 
Market Makers: the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal , 7. 
Ahn, H.-J., Bae, K.-H., & Chan, K. (2001). Limit Orders, Depth and Volatility: Evidence from the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Finance , 56. 
Aliprantis, R., & Plott, C. (1992). Competitive Equilibria in Overlapping Generations Experiments. 
Econometric Theory , 2, 389-426. 
Alton, M., & Plott, C. (Working Paper2). Price Dynamics of Random Arrival Markets. 
Alton, M., & Plott, C. (Working Paper1). Principles of Continuous Price Determination in an 
Experimental Environment with Flows of Random Arrivals and Departures. 
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1980). Dealership Market: Market-Making with Inventory. Journal 
of Financial Economics , 8, 31-53. 
Asparouhova, E., Bossaerts, P., & Plott, C. (2003). Excess Demand and Equilibration in Multi-
Security Financial Markets: The Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Markets , 6, 1-21. 
Back, K., Cao, H., & Willard, G. (2000). Imperfect Competition Among Informed Traders. The 
Journal of Finance , 55 (5), 2117-2155. 
Bias, B., Hillion, P., & Spatt, C. (1995). An Empirical Analysis of the Limit Order Book and the 
Order Flow in the Paris Bourse. Journal of Finance , 50 (5). 
Blooerslev, T., & Domowitz, I. (1993). Some Effects of Restricting the Electronic Order Book in an 
Automated Trade Execution System. In D. Friedman, & J. Rust, The Double Auction Market: 
Theory and Evidence (pp. 221-252). Redwood City: Addison-Wesley. 
Bollerslev, T., & Melvin, M. (1994). Bid-Ask Spreads and Volatility in the Foreign Exchange 
Market: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of International Economics , 36. 
Bortoli, L., Frino, A., Jarnecic, E., & Johnstone, D. (2006). Limit Order Book Transparency, 
Execution Risk and Market Liquidity. Working Paper . 
Brewer, P., Jiang, M., & Plott, C. (2003). On the Behavioral Foundations of the Law of Supply and 
Demand: Human Convergence and Robot Randomness. Experimental Economics , 5, 179-208. 
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1991). Information Mirages in Experimental Asset Markets. Journal of 
Business , 64. 
Cason, T., & Friedman, D. (1993). Empirical Analysis of Price Formation in Double Auction 
Markets. In D. Friedman, & J. Rust, The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theory and Evidence 
(pp. 253-284). Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley. 
Chamberlin, E. (1948). An Experimental Imperfect Market. Journal of Political Economy , 95-108. 
Chan, Y.-C. (2005). Price Movement Effects on the State of the Electronic Limit-Order Book. The 
Financial Review , 40 (2). 
155 
 
Choi, J., Salandro, D., & Shastri, K. (1988). On the Estimation of Bid-Ask Spreads: Theory and 
Evidence. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anaylsis , 23 (2). 
Cliff, D., & Preist, C. (1998). Days Without End: On the Stability of Experimental Single Period 
Continous Double Auction Markets. Hewlett-Packard Laboratories. 
Copeland, T., & Friedman, D. (1991). Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset 
Markets. The Journal of Finance , 46 (1). 
Copeland, T., & Galai, D. (1983, Dec.). Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread. Journal of 
Finance . 
Danielson, & Payne. (2001). Liquidity Determination in an Order Driven Market. Working Paper . 
Easley, D., & Ledyard, J. (1993). Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral 
Auctions. In D. Friedman, & J. Rust (Eds.), The Double Auction Market Institutions, Theories, and 
Evidence (pp. 63-97). Addison-Wesley. 
Easley, D., & O'Hara, M. (1987). Price, Trade Size and Information in Securities Markets. Journal 
of Financial Economics , 19. 
Forsythe, R., & Lundholm, R. (1990). Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market. 
Econometrica , 58 (2). 
Forsythe, R., Palfrey, T., & Plott, C. (1982). Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market. 
Econometrica , 50, 537-567. 
Foucault, T. (1999). Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in a Dynamic Limit Order 
Market. Journal of Financial Markets , 2. 
Foucault, T., Kadan, O., & Kandel, E. (2003). The Limit Order Book and a Market for Liquidity. 
Working Paper . 
Friedman, D. (1991). A Simple Testable Model of Double Auction Markets. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organizations , 16, 47-70. 
Garman, M. (1976). Market Microstructure. Journal of Financial Economics , 3 (3), 257-275. 
George, T., Kaul, G., & Nimalendran, M. Estimation of the Bid-Ask Spread and It's Components: A 
New Approach. The Review of Financial Studies , 4, 1991. 
Glosten, L. (1987). Components of the Bid-Ask Spread and the Statistical Properties of 
Transaction Prices. The Journal of Finance , 42. 
Glosten, L., & Harris, L. (1988). Estimating Components of the Bid/Ask Spread. Journal of 
Financial Economics , 19. 
Glosten, L., & Milgrom, P. (1985). Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with 
Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics , 14. 
Gode, D., & Sunder, S. (1993). Alocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence Traders: 
Markets as a Partial Substitute for Rationality. The Journal of Political Economy , 101, 119-137. 
156 
 
Goettler, R., Parlou, C., & Uajan, U. (2005). Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit Order Market. Journal 
of Finance , 60 (5), 2149-2192. 
Harris, L. (1990). Estimation of Stock Price Variance and Serial Covariances from Discrete 
Observations. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 25. 
Hasbrouck, J., & Sofianos, G. (1993). The Trades of Market Makers: An Empirical Analysis of 
NYSE Specialists. The Journal od Finance , 48. 
Hirota, M., Hsu, M., Plott, C., & Rogers, B. (2005). Divergence of Closed Cycles and Convergence in 
Scarf Environments: Experiments in the Dynamics of General Equilibrium Systems. Caltech 
Working Papers . 
Ho, T., & Stoll, H. (1981). Optimal Dealer Pricing Under Transaction and Return Uncertainty. 
Journal of Financial Economics , 9. 
Holden, C., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1992). Long Lived Private Information and Imperfect 
Competition. Journal of Finance , 47, 247-270. 
Huang, R., & Stoll, H. (1997). The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach. 
Review of Financial Studies , 10. 
Jamison, J., & Plott, C. (1997). Costly Offers and the Equilibrium Properties of the Multiple UNit 
Double Auction Under Conditions of Unpredictable Shifts of Demand and Supply. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization , 31 (4), 591-612. 
Kagel, J. (2004). Double Auction Markets with Stochastic Supply and Demand Schedules: Call 
Markets and Continuous Auction Trading Mechanisms. In S. Hack (Ed.), Advances in 
Understanding Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Werner Guth. Palgrave. 
Kyle, A. (1985). Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica , 53, 1315-1335. 
Lei, V., Noussair, C., & Plott, C. (2001). Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: 
Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality. Econometrica , 69 (4). 
Madhavan, A., & Smidt, S. (1993). An Analysis of Changes in Specialist Inventories and 
Quotations. The Journal of Finance , 48. 
Marimon, R., & Sunder, S. (1993). Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: 
Experimental Evidence. Econometrica , 61 (5), 1073-1108. 
Miller, R., Plott, C., & Smith, V. (1977). Intertemporal Competetive Equilibria: An Empirical Study 
of Speculation. Quarrterly Journal of Economics , 91, 599-624. 
Millner, E., Pratt, M., & Reilly, R. (1990). Contestability in Real-Time Experimental Flow Markets. 
Rand Journal of Economics , 21 (4), 584-499. 
Oechssler, J., Schmidt, C., & Schnedler, W. (2007, April). Asset Bubbles without Dividends - An 
Experiment. Working Paper . 
O'Hara, M. (1995). Market Microstructure Theory. Blackwell Publishing. 
O'Hara, M., & Oldfield, G. (1986). The Microeconomics of Market Making. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis , 21. 
157 
 
Parlour, C. (1998). Price Dynamics in Limit Order Markets. Review of Financial Studies , 11, 789-
816. 
Parlour, C. (1998). Price Dynamics in Limit Order Markets. Review of Financial Studies , 11 (4). 
Parlour, C., & Seppi, D. (Forthcomming). Limit Order Markets: A Survey. In A. Boot, & A. Thankor 
(Eds.), Handbook of Financial Intermediation & Banking.  
Peng, L., & Plott, C. (1998). General Equilibrium, Markets, Macroeconomics and Money in a 
Laboratory Experimental Environment. Economic Theory , 12 (1), 21-75. 
Plott, C., & Gray, P. (1990). The Multiple Unit Double Auction. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization , 13, 245-258. 
Plott, C., & Smith, V. (1978). An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions. The 
Review of Economic Studies , 45 (1), 133-153. 
Roll, R. (1984). A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market. 
The Journal of Finance , 39. 
Smith, V. (1962). An Experimental Study of Competetive Market Behavior. Jouranl of Political 
Economy , 70 (2), 111-137. 
Smith, V. (1965). Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis. Journal of 
Political Economy , 73, 387-393. 
Smith, V. (1976). Induced Value Theory. The American Economic Review , 66 (2). 
Smith, V., Suchanek, G., & Williams, A. (1988). Bubbles, Crashes and Endogenous Expectations in 
Experimental Spot Asset Markets. Econometrica , 56, 1119-1151. 
Stoll, H. (1989). Inferring Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests. The 
Journal of Finance , 44. 
Warren, E. (1975). A Dynamic, Stochastic Model of Stock Market Adjustment. Purdue University. 
Wilson, R. (1987). On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets. In G. Feiwel (Ed.), Arrow and the Ascent of 
Modern Economic Theory (pp. 375-414). U.K.: MacMillan. 
 
 
 
  
158 
 
Chapter 6 Appendices 
6.1 Appendices from Chapter1 
6.1.1 Predicting the Size of Trade Initiation Runs 
 
 
IVC
Obs 1636
R-squared 0.1234
Adj R-squared 0.1037
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price 0.033 0.112 0.29 0.77 -0.186 0.252
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.033 0.036 0.93 0.35 -0.037 0.103
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.262 0.036 7.29 0.00 0.191 0.332
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.049 0.037 1.31 0.19 -0.024 0.121
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.124 0.037 3.36 0.00 0.052 0.197
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.116 0.036 3.21 0.00 0.045 0.187
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.019 0.036 0.54 0.59 -0.052 0.091
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask 0.014 0.036 0.40 0.69 -0.057 0.086
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.127 0.036 3.52 0.00 0.056 0.197
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.035 0.036 0.97 0.33 -0.036 0.107
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.127 0.036 3.52 0.00 0.056 0.198
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.003 0.036 -0.07 0.94 -0.074 0.069
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.030 0.036 0.84 0.40 -0.041 0.102
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.030 0.036 0.85 0.40 -0.039 0.100
Time (in sec from Open) -0.187 0.097 -1.93 0.05 -0.376 0.003
Time^2 (in sec from Open) -0.127 0.154 -0.83 0.41 -0.430 0.175
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.158 0.074 2.14 0.03 0.013 0.303
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.085 0.072 1.18 0.24 -0.056 0.225
Ttues Dummy -0.064 0.096 -0.67 0.51 -0.251 0.124
Wed Dummy -0.063 0.096 -0.66 0.51 -0.252 0.126
Thurs Dummy 0.185 0.101 1.82 0.07 -0.014 0.384
Fri Dummy 0.022 0.103 0.21 0.83 -0.180 0.224
First Trading Day of Month -0.032 0.149 -0.22 0.83 -0.324 0.260
Last Trading Day of Month 0.235 0.183 1.29 0.20 -0.124 0.593
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -0.405 3.670 -0.11 0.91 -7.604 6.794
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 2.116 4.300 0.49 0.62 -6.318 10.550
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 1.826 4.485 0.41 0.68 -6.972 10.623
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -0.250 4.486 -0.06 0.96 -9.048 8.549
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -0.784 4.307 -0.18 0.86 -9.231 7.663
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -1.379 3.682 -0.38 0.71 -8.601 5.842
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 0.581 3.664 0.16 0.87 -6.607 7.768
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -0.507 4.256 -0.12 0.91 -8.854 7.840
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -2.054 4.419 -0.47 0.64 -10.722 6.614
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) 1.848 4.415 0.42 0.68 -6.812 10.509
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) 2.528 4.243 0.60 0.55 -5.795 10.851
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 3.421 3.634 0.94 0.35 -3.706 10.548
Constant 0.003 0.111 0.03 0.98 -0.215 0.222
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AWC
Obs 14373
R-squared 0.0294
Adj R-squared 1.2314
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price -0.043 0.047 -0.92 0.36 -0.135 0.049
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.018 0.012 1.46 0.14 -0.006 0.042
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.093 0.012 7.66 0.00 0.069 0.117
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.030 0.012 2.47 0.01 0.006 0.054
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.043 0.012 3.56 0.00 0.020 0.067
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.003 0.012 0.21 0.83 -0.021 0.026
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.051 0.012 4.21 0.00 0.027 0.075
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask 0.038 0.012 3.15 0.00 0.014 0.061
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.082 0.012 6.79 0.00 0.058 0.105
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.031 0.012 2.55 0.01 0.007 0.054
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.079 0.012 6.56 0.00 0.055 0.102
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.008 0.012 -0.66 0.51 -0.032 0.016
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.076 0.012 6.37 0.00 0.053 0.100
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.047 0.012 3.95 0.00 0.024 0.070
Time (in sec from Open) -0.059 0.031 -1.89 0.06 -0.120 0.002
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.139 0.058 2.39 0.02 0.025 0.253
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.063 0.021 3.09 0.00 0.023 0.104
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.071 0.027 -2.61 0.01 -0.125 -0.018
Ttues Dummy 0.080 0.034 2.39 0.02 0.014 0.146
Wed Dummy -0.019 0.032 -0.60 0.55 -0.082 0.043
Thurs Dummy 0.059 0.033 1.78 0.08 -0.006 0.124
Fri Dummy 0.040 0.033 1.20 0.23 -0.025 0.105
First Trading Day of Month -0.021 0.053 -0.39 0.69 -0.126 0.084
Last Trading Day of Month 0.266 0.062 4.29 0.00 0.145 0.388
Lag(Change in Bid Price) 3.013 2.579 1.17 0.24 -2.043 8.068
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 4.549 3.100 1.47 0.14 -1.527 10.624
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 3.327 3.216 1.04 0.30 -2.976 9.630
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) 1.994 3.211 0.62 0.54 -4.300 8.289
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) 1.999 3.098 0.65 0.52 -4.074 8.072
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -0.972 2.581 -0.38 0.71 -6.032 4.088
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) -3.016 2.701 -1.12 0.26 -8.311 2.279
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -3.682 3.199 -1.15 0.25 -9.952 2.588
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -3.612 3.312 -1.09 0.28 -10.103 2.880
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -2.034 3.307 -0.62 0.54 -8.516 4.447
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -1.322 3.178 -0.42 0.68 -7.551 4.907
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 2.799 2.669 1.05 0.29 -2.433 8.032
Constant -0.057 0.040 -1.41 0.16 -0.135 0.022
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BBG
Obs 5496
R-squared 0.0538
Adj R-squared 0.0475
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price -0.197 0.067 -2.91 0.00 -0.329 -0.064
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.069 0.020 3.48 0.00 0.030 0.107
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.129 0.020 6.51 0.00 0.090 0.168
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.051 0.020 2.56 0.01 0.012 0.090
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.001 0.020 -0.07 0.94 -0.041 0.038
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.005 0.020 -0.26 0.80 -0.044 0.034
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.051 0.020 2.56 0.01 0.012 0.089
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask 0.051 0.020 2.58 0.01 0.012 0.090
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.081 0.020 4.05 0.00 0.042 0.120
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.065 0.020 3.24 0.00 0.026 0.104
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.128 0.020 6.46 0.00 0.089 0.167
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.014 0.020 0.71 0.48 -0.025 0.053
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.056 0.020 2.83 0.01 0.017 0.095
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.003 0.019 0.14 0.89 -0.035 0.040
Time (in sec from Open) 0.061 0.048 1.28 0.20 -0.033 0.156
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.148 0.088 1.68 0.09 -0.025 0.321
Time^3 (in sec from Open) -0.002 0.033 -0.06 0.95 -0.066 0.062
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.048 0.040 -1.19 0.24 -0.127 0.031
Ttues Dummy -0.033 0.053 -0.62 0.54 -0.136 0.070
Wed Dummy 0.083 0.053 1.57 0.12 -0.020 0.186
Thurs Dummy 0.031 0.057 0.55 0.59 -0.081 0.143
Fri Dummy -0.052 0.054 -0.97 0.33 -0.158 0.054
First Trading Day of Month 0.183 0.080 2.29 0.02 0.027 0.339
Last Trading Day of Month -0.282 0.111 -2.55 0.01 -0.499 -0.065
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -1.152 0.983 -1.17 0.24 -3.080 0.776
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 0.856 1.205 0.71 0.48 -1.506 3.218
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -0.811 1.262 -0.64 0.52 -3.285 1.662
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) 0.561 1.262 0.44 0.66 -1.913 3.035
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) 0.758 1.207 0.63 0.53 -1.608 3.125
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) 1.109 0.985 1.13 0.26 -0.823 3.041
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 0.472 1.091 0.43 0.67 -1.667 2.611
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -0.409 1.285 -0.32 0.75 -2.928 2.111
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 0.624 1.336 0.47 0.64 -1.996 3.243
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -0.649 1.327 -0.49 0.63 -3.251 1.953
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -1.681 1.268 -1.33 0.19 -4.166 0.804
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) -1.181 1.064 -1.11 0.27 -3.267 0.904
Constant 0.014 0.064 0.22 0.82 -0.112 0.141
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GWT
Obs 1562
R-squared 0.0602
Adj R-squared 0.038
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price -0.135 0.135 -1.00 0.32 -0.399 0.129
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.063 0.037 1.70 0.09 -0.010 0.136
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.129 0.037 3.46 0.00 0.056 0.202
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.060 0.037 -1.61 0.11 -0.133 0.013
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.098 0.037 2.61 0.01 0.024 0.171
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.050 0.037 1.34 0.18 -0.023 0.124
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.066 0.037 1.76 0.08 -0.008 0.139
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.036 0.036 -0.98 0.33 -0.107 0.036
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.132 0.036 3.64 0.00 0.061 0.203
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.058 0.037 1.59 0.11 -0.014 0.130
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.051 0.037 1.41 0.16 -0.020 0.123
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.003 0.037 0.08 0.94 -0.069 0.075
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.057 0.036 1.56 0.12 -0.015 0.128
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.038 0.036 -1.05 0.29 -0.108 0.033
Time (in sec from Open) 0.016 0.088 0.18 0.86 -0.156 0.188
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.139 0.152 0.92 0.36 -0.158 0.437
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.012 0.055 0.21 0.84 -0.097 0.120
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.051 0.067 -0.76 0.45 -0.183 0.081
Ttues Dummy 0.088 0.115 0.77 0.44 -0.137 0.313
Wed Dummy 0.133 0.109 1.21 0.23 -0.082 0.347
Thurs Dummy 0.051 0.117 0.43 0.67 -0.180 0.281
Fri Dummy -0.043 0.110 -0.39 0.70 -0.258 0.172
First Trading Day of Month -0.139 0.152 -0.91 0.36 -0.437 0.159
Last Trading Day of Month 0.167 0.217 0.77 0.44 -0.258 0.593
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -12.786 5.139 -2.49 0.01 -22.867 -2.706
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) -7.035 6.017 -1.17 0.24 -18.838 4.768
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -15.728 6.189 -2.54 0.01 -27.868 -3.587
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -10.289 6.203 -1.66 0.10 -22.457 1.879
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -7.104 6.057 -1.17 0.24 -18.985 4.777
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -8.277 5.166 -1.60 0.11 -18.410 1.857
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 15.337 5.370 2.86 0.00 4.803 25.871
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) 14.902 6.360 2.34 0.02 2.427 27.377
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 12.905 6.530 1.98 0.05 0.096 25.714
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) 8.097 6.512 1.24 0.21 -4.676 20.870
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) 7.182 6.306 1.14 0.26 -5.188 19.552
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 6.061 5.315 1.14 0.25 -4.366 16.487
Constant -0.038 0.125 -0.30 0.76 -0.283 0.207
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MBL
Obs 26084
R-squared 0.24
Adj R-squared 0.0227
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price -0.052 0.031 -1.67 0.09 -0.114 0.009
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.004 0.009 0.41 0.68 -0.014 0.021
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.087 0.009 9.69 0.00 0.069 0.104
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.032 0.009 3.59 0.00 0.015 0.050
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.048 0.009 5.35 0.00 0.030 0.066
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.011 0.009 1.25 0.21 -0.006 0.029
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.044 0.009 4.90 0.00 0.026 0.061
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.001 0.009 -0.16 0.87 -0.019 0.016
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.079 0.009 8.78 0.00 0.062 0.097
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.011 0.009 -1.26 0.21 -0.029 0.006
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.069 0.009 7.61 0.00 0.051 0.087
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.025 0.009 2.76 0.01 0.007 0.043
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.063 0.009 7.02 0.00 0.046 0.081
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.003 0.009 -0.40 0.69 -0.021 0.014
Time (in sec from Open) 0.026 0.022 1.16 0.24 -0.017 0.068
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.128 0.041 3.12 0.00 0.048 0.208
Time^3 (in sec from Open) -0.008 0.014 -0.61 0.54 -0.035 0.018
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.027 0.018 -1.49 0.14 -0.063 0.009
Ttues Dummy -0.025 0.026 -0.96 0.34 -0.076 0.026
Wed Dummy 0.094 0.025 3.77 0.00 0.045 0.142
Thurs Dummy 0.052 0.025 2.05 0.04 0.002 0.101
Fri Dummy 0.030 0.026 1.15 0.25 -0.021 0.082
First Trading Day of Month -0.089 0.047 -1.88 0.06 -0.182 0.004
Last Trading Day of Month -0.144 0.053 -2.74 0.01 -0.248 -0.041
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -0.879 0.341 -2.58 0.01 -1.548 -0.211
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 0.416 0.412 1.01 0.31 -0.391 1.224
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 0.059 0.426 0.14 0.89 -0.777 0.895
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -0.359 0.425 -0.84 0.40 -1.193 0.474
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -0.450 0.411 -1.10 0.27 -1.255 0.356
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -0.285 0.342 -0.83 0.41 -0.956 0.386
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 0.822 0.348 2.36 0.02 0.140 1.503
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -0.130 0.411 -0.32 0.75 -0.937 0.676
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -0.262 0.426 -0.62 0.54 -1.097 0.573
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -0.291 0.426 -0.68 0.50 -1.127 0.545
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -0.323 0.411 -0.79 0.43 -1.129 0.483
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 0.100 0.344 0.29 0.77 -0.574 0.774
Constant -0.093 0.029 -3.17 0.00 -0.150 -0.036
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NWS
Obs 9256
R-squared 0.0228
Adj R-squared 0.019
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price -0.097 0.054 -1.78 0.08 -0.203 0.010
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.021 0.015 1.35 0.18 -0.009 0.050
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.057 0.015 3.76 0.00 0.027 0.087
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.019 0.015 1.24 0.21 -0.011 0.049
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.053 0.015 3.49 0.00 0.023 0.083
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.008 0.015 0.52 0.60 -0.022 0.038
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.054 0.015 3.55 0.00 0.024 0.084
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask 0.019 0.015 1.32 0.19 -0.009 0.048
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.020 0.015 1.35 0.18 -0.009 0.048
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.001 0.015 -0.08 0.94 -0.030 0.028
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.085 0.015 5.85 0.00 0.057 0.114
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.019 0.015 1.29 0.20 -0.010 0.048
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.048 0.015 3.28 0.00 0.019 0.077
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.014 0.014 0.99 0.32 -0.014 0.043
Time (in sec from Open) -0.063 0.038 -1.68 0.09 -0.137 0.011
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.261 0.071 3.65 0.00 0.120 0.401
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.057 0.024 2.39 0.02 0.010 0.103
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.074 0.032 -2.28 0.02 -0.137 -0.010
Ttues Dummy -0.035 0.045 -0.79 0.43 -0.123 0.052
Wed Dummy 0.000 0.042 0.00 1.00 -0.083 0.083
Thurs Dummy 0.016 0.042 0.39 0.70 -0.067 0.099
Fri Dummy -0.069 0.045 -1.54 0.12 -0.156 0.019
First Trading Day of Month 0.062 0.072 0.86 0.39 -0.080 0.204
Last Trading Day of Month -0.002 0.077 -0.02 0.98 -0.152 0.149
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -1.088 1.598 -0.68 0.50 -4.221 2.045
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) -0.799 1.918 -0.42 0.68 -4.559 2.960
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 2.795 1.993 1.40 0.16 -1.112 6.702
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) 2.695 1.988 1.36 0.18 -1.202 6.592
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) 2.640 1.914 1.38 0.17 -1.112 6.393
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) 1.264 1.596 0.79 0.43 -1.865 4.392
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 0.192 1.705 0.11 0.91 -3.150 3.534
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) 1.620 2.019 0.80 0.42 -2.339 5.578
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -2.229 2.092 -1.07 0.29 -6.331 1.872
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -2.811 2.087 -1.35 0.18 -6.901 1.279
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -1.476 2.006 -0.74 0.46 -5.408 2.456
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) -0.709 1.692 -0.42 0.68 -4.025 2.608
Constant -0.086 0.050 -1.72 0.09 -0.185 0.012
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ZFX
Obs 17246
R-squared 0.0202
Adj R-squared 0.0182
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Error t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Last trade at Bid Price 0.017 0.041 0.42 0.68 -0.064 0.098
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.004 0.011 -0.37 0.71 -0.026 0.018
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.077 0.011 6.95 0.00 0.055 0.099
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.009 0.011 -0.83 0.41 -0.031 0.013
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.040 0.011 3.65 0.00 0.019 0.062
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.008 0.011 0.77 0.44 -0.013 0.030
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.037 0.011 3.34 0.00 0.015 0.059
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.008 0.011 -0.68 0.49 -0.029 0.014
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.072 0.011 6.54 0.00 0.050 0.094
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.010 0.011 0.91 0.36 -0.012 0.032
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.067 0.011 6.06 0.00 0.045 0.088
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.044 0.011 4.03 0.00 0.023 0.066
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.056 0.011 5.12 0.00 0.035 0.078
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.000 0.011 -0.04 0.97 -0.022 0.021
Time (in sec from Open) -0.023 0.031 -0.74 0.46 -0.084 0.038
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.102 0.053 1.91 0.06 -0.003 0.206
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.048 0.023 2.11 0.04 0.003 0.093
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.045 0.026 -1.71 0.09 -0.096 0.006
Ttues Dummy -0.072 0.032 -2.24 0.03 -0.136 -0.009
Wed Dummy -0.003 0.031 -0.08 0.94 -0.063 0.058
Thurs Dummy 0.102 0.032 3.15 0.00 0.039 0.166
Fri Dummy 0.042 0.032 1.31 0.19 -0.021 0.105
First Trading Day of Month 0.053 0.048 1.09 0.28 -0.042 0.147
Last Trading Day of Month -0.125 0.059 -2.13 0.03 -0.240 -0.010
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -3.705 2.075 -1.79 0.07 -7.772 0.362
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) -0.071 2.533 -0.03 0.98 -5.036 4.894
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -1.175 2.633 -0.45 0.66 -6.337 3.987
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -1.087 2.633 -0.41 0.68 -6.248 4.073
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -0.458 2.531 -0.18 0.86 -5.418 4.503
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -2.012 2.073 -0.97 0.33 -6.076 2.052
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 3.698 2.067 1.79 0.07 -0.353 7.749
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -0.151 2.522 -0.06 0.95 -5.095 4.792
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 2.049 2.625 0.78 0.44 -3.096 7.195
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -0.290 2.628 -0.11 0.91 -5.441 4.862
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -1.242 2.524 -0.49 0.62 -6.189 3.705
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 0.534 2.077 0.26 0.80 -3.538 4.606
Constant -0.066 0.038 -1.75 0.08 -0.140 0.008
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IVC
Obs 1630
R-squared 0.1075
Adj R-squared 0.0838
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. 0.0838 Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price 0.027 0.815 0.03 0.97 -1.571 1.626
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.177 0.381 -0.47 0.64 -0.924 0.570
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.322 0.382 -0.84 0.40 -1.070 0.427
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.618 0.380 1.62 0.11 -0.128 1.364
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 1.473 0.381 3.87 0.00 0.726 2.221
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.146 0.383 -0.38 0.70 -0.896 0.605
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.288 0.382 -0.75 0.45 -1.038 0.462
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.290 0.324 -0.89 0.37 -0.926 0.346
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) -1.545 0.321 -4.81 0.00 -2.175 -0.915
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.188 0.331 0.57 0.57 -0.462 0.837
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 1.430 0.329 4.35 0.00 0.786 2.075
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.070 0.323 -0.22 0.83 -0.703 0.562
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.074 0.321 -0.23 0.82 -0.703 0.556
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.049 0.258 0.19 0.85 -0.457 0.556
Time (in sec from Open) -0.554 0.701 -0.79 0.43 -1.928 0.820
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.025 1.119 0.02 0.98 -2.170 2.219
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.412 0.536 0.77 0.44 -0.639 1.463
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.045 0.519 0.09 0.93 -0.974 1.063
Ttues Dummy -0.292 0.696 -0.42 0.68 -1.657 1.074
Wed Dummy -0.181 0.697 -0.26 0.80 -1.548 1.186
Thurs Dummy 1.049 0.735 1.43 0.15 -0.392 2.491
Fri Dummy 0.495 0.747 0.66 0.51 -0.971 1.961
First Trading Day of Month -0.435 1.115 -0.39 0.70 -2.622 1.752
Last Trading Day of Month 0.664 1.330 0.50 0.62 -1.944 3.273
Lag(Change in Bid Price) 0.076 26.592 0.00 1.00 -52.084 52.236
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 4.085 31.150 0.13 0.90 -57.015 65.184
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -9.342 32.482 -0.29 0.77 -73.054 54.369
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -6.436 32.471 -0.20 0.84 -70.126 57.254
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -7.407 31.180 -0.24 0.81 -68.565 53.751
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -28.151 26.669 -1.06 0.29 -80.462 24.160
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 0.004 26.563 0.00 1.00 -52.099 52.106
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) 29.295 30.848 0.95 0.34 -31.213 89.803
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 10.887 31.993 0.34 0.73 -51.866 73.640
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -0.598 31.960 -0.02 0.99 -63.287 62.090
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) 18.600 30.726 0.61 0.55 -41.667 78.867
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 41.406 26.313 1.57 0.12 -10.206 93.017
Lag(sigma_run) 0.022 0.041 0.54 0.59 -0.058 0.102
Lag2(sigma_run) 0.382 0.041 9.39 0.00 0.302 0.462
Lag3(sigma_run) -0.045 0.042 -1.07 0.28 -0.128 0.038
Lag4(sigma_run) -0.234 0.042 -5.53 0.00 -0.317 -0.151
Lag5(sigma_run) -0.002 0.041 -0.04 0.97 -0.083 0.080
Lag6(sigma_run) 0.041 0.041 0.98 0.33 -0.040 0.122
Constant 1.058 0.822 1.29 0.20 -0.555 2.670
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AWC
Obs 14367
R-squared 0.0234
Adj R-squared 0.0206
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price 0.355 0.289 1.23 0.22 -0.211 0.922
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.170 0.086 -1.97 0.05 -0.340 -0.001
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.208 0.086 2.41 0.02 0.039 0.377
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.231 0.087 2.67 0.01 0.061 0.401
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.020 0.087 -0.23 0.82 -0.190 0.150
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.076 0.086 -0.88 0.38 -0.245 0.093
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.140 0.086 -1.63 0.10 -0.309 0.029
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.002 0.093 -0.02 0.98 -0.184 0.180
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.059 0.093 0.64 0.52 -0.123 0.242
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.057 0.093 -0.61 0.54 -0.240 0.126
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.065 0.093 0.69 0.49 -0.118 0.247
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.031 0.093 -0.33 0.74 -0.213 0.151
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.038 0.093 -0.41 0.69 -0.219 0.144
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.407 0.073 5.59 0.00 0.265 0.550
Time (in sec from Open) -0.148 0.191 -0.78 0.44 -0.522 0.226
Time^2 (in sec from Open) -0.138 0.359 -0.39 0.70 -0.841 0.565
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.191 0.126 1.52 0.13 -0.056 0.439
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.001 0.168 0.01 0.99 -0.329 0.332
Ttues Dummy 0.190 0.207 0.92 0.36 -0.215 0.595
Wed Dummy -0.140 0.196 -0.71 0.48 -0.524 0.245
Thurs Dummy 0.105 0.204 0.51 0.61 -0.296 0.505
Fri Dummy 0.306 0.205 1.49 0.14 -0.096 0.707
First Trading Day of Month -0.255 0.330 -0.77 0.44 -0.901 0.391
Last Trading Day of Month 2.212 0.384 5.77 0.00 1.460 2.965
Lag(Change in Bid Price) 4.341 15.883 0.27 0.79 -26.793 35.474
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 1.997 19.098 0.11 0.92 -35.437 39.432
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 12.286 19.831 0.62 0.54 -26.586 51.157
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -7.087 19.820 -0.36 0.72 -45.937 31.763
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -2.638 19.126 -0.14 0.89 -40.127 34.852
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -6.779 15.926 -0.43 0.67 -37.995 24.438
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) -6.493 16.635 -0.39 0.70 -39.099 26.114
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) 0.654 19.706 0.03 0.97 -37.973 39.281
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -3.133 20.420 -0.15 0.88 -43.159 36.893
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) 7.047 20.405 0.35 0.73 -32.950 47.044
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) 1.910 19.615 0.10 0.92 -36.538 40.358
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 8.162 16.465 0.50 0.62 -24.112 40.437
Lag(sigma_run) 0.027 0.012 2.34 0.02 0.004 0.050
Lag2(sigma_run) 0.028 0.012 2.37 0.02 0.005 0.050
Lag3(sigma_run) 0.036 0.012 3.13 0.00 0.014 0.059
Lag4(sigma_run) 0.025 0.012 2.10 0.04 0.002 0.047
Lag5(sigma_run) 0.011 0.012 0.94 0.35 -0.012 0.034
Lag6(sigma_run) 0.094 0.012 8.04 0.00 0.071 0.116
Constant 0.975 0.252 3.87 0.00 0.481 1.468
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BBG
Obs 5490
R-squared 0.0215
Adj R-squared 0.014
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price -1.126 0.429 -2.63 0.01 -1.967 -0.286
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.134 0.147 0.91 0.36 -0.155 0.423
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.362 0.148 2.45 0.01 0.072 0.651
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.210 0.148 1.41 0.16 -0.081 0.500
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.255 0.149 -1.72 0.09 -0.546 0.036
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.161 0.147 -1.09 0.28 -0.450 0.128
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.133 0.147 0.91 0.37 -0.155 0.421
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask 0.011 0.145 0.07 0.94 -0.275 0.296
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.376 0.146 2.58 0.01 0.090 0.662
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.258 0.146 1.77 0.08 -0.028 0.545
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.689 0.146 4.72 0.00 0.403 0.974
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.031 0.147 0.21 0.83 -0.257 0.319
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.331 0.146 2.27 0.02 0.045 0.617
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.062 0.121 0.51 0.61 -0.176 0.299
Time (in sec from Open) 0.442 0.306 1.44 0.15 -0.159 1.043
Time^2 (in sec from Open) -0.276 0.561 -0.49 0.62 -1.376 0.825
Time^3 (in sec from Open) -0.187 0.209 -0.90 0.37 -0.596 0.222
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.187 0.257 0.73 0.47 -0.317 0.692
Ttues Dummy -0.142 0.334 -0.43 0.67 -0.797 0.513
Wed Dummy 0.178 0.335 0.53 0.60 -0.479 0.835
Thurs Dummy -0.272 0.363 -0.75 0.45 -0.984 0.440
Fri Dummy -0.433 0.343 -1.26 0.21 -1.106 0.239
First Trading Day of Month 0.470 0.512 0.92 0.36 -0.533 1.473
Last Trading Day of Month -0.650 0.703 -0.93 0.36 -2.029 0.728
Lag(Change in Bid Price) 2.869 6.252 0.46 0.65 -9.387 15.125
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 10.006 7.662 1.31 0.19 -5.015 25.026
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -1.903 8.025 -0.24 0.81 -17.634 13.829
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) 3.938 8.026 0.49 0.62 -11.796 19.672
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) 0.171 7.677 0.02 0.98 -14.879 15.221
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) 6.789 6.264 1.08 0.28 -5.490 19.069
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) -3.958 6.936 -0.57 0.57 -17.554 9.639
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -10.189 8.173 -1.25 0.21 -26.210 5.833
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 1.570 8.498 0.19 0.85 -15.090 18.229
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -7.378 8.440 -0.87 0.38 -23.923 9.167
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -5.935 8.061 -0.74 0.46 -21.739 9.868
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) -8.741 6.763 -1.29 0.20 -22.000 4.518
Lag(sigma_run) -0.003 0.018 -0.16 0.88 -0.038 0.032
Lag2(sigma_run) -0.016 0.018 -0.89 0.37 -0.051 0.019
Lag3(sigma_run) -0.016 0.018 -0.88 0.38 -0.051 0.019
Lag4(sigma_run) 0.035 0.018 1.95 0.05 0.000 0.070
Lag5(sigma_run) 0.005 0.018 0.28 0.78 -0.030 0.040
Lag6(sigma_run) -0.020 0.018 -1.10 0.27 -0.055 0.015
Constant 2.138 0.417 5.13 0.00 1.320 2.955
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GWT
Obs 1556
R-squared 0.0317
Adj R-squared 0.0049
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price 0.028 0.551 0.05 0.96 -1.052 1.108
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.118 0.190 0.62 0.54 -0.255 0.492
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.345 0.191 1.81 0.07 -0.029 0.719
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.161 0.191 -0.84 0.40 -0.536 0.215
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.355 0.191 1.86 0.06 -0.020 0.731
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.073 0.191 0.38 0.70 -0.303 0.449
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.174 0.191 0.91 0.36 -0.201 0.549
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.110 0.203 -0.54 0.59 -0.508 0.287
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.531 0.202 2.63 0.01 0.135 0.926
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.274 0.203 1.35 0.18 -0.124 0.673
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.176 0.204 0.86 0.39 -0.223 0.575
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.068 0.203 0.34 0.74 -0.331 0.467
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.133 0.203 0.66 0.51 -0.265 0.530
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.093 0.146 -0.64 0.52 -0.379 0.193
Time (in sec from Open) -0.113 0.359 -0.32 0.75 -0.816 0.591
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.271 0.619 0.44 0.66 -0.944 1.486
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.123 0.226 0.54 0.59 -0.321 0.567
Time^4 (in sec from Open) -0.027 0.274 -0.10 0.92 -0.564 0.510
Ttues Dummy 0.328 0.467 0.70 0.48 -0.589 1.244
Wed Dummy 0.041 0.446 0.09 0.93 -0.835 0.917
Thurs Dummy 0.849 0.481 1.77 0.08 -0.094 1.793
Fri Dummy 0.186 0.450 0.41 0.68 -0.697 1.069
First Trading Day of Month -0.092 0.637 -0.14 0.89 -1.342 1.158
Last Trading Day of Month -0.283 0.887 -0.32 0.75 -2.023 1.458
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -37.810 21.003 -1.80 0.07 -79.008 3.389
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) -12.586 24.564 -0.51 0.61 -60.770 35.597
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -51.396 25.257 -2.04 0.04 -100.938 -1.853
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -39.621 25.323 -1.57 0.12 -89.292 10.050
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -14.165 24.695 -0.57 0.57 -62.606 34.276
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -8.353 21.066 -0.40 0.69 -49.675 32.969
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 51.489 21.945 2.35 0.02 8.444 94.534
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) 33.368 25.955 1.29 0.20 -17.544 84.280
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 44.607 26.647 1.67 0.09 -7.662 96.875
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) 33.825 26.590 1.27 0.20 -18.331 85.982
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) 10.097 25.727 0.39 0.70 -40.367 60.562
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 7.847 21.687 0.36 0.72 -34.693 50.386
Lag(sigma_run) 0.002 0.041 0.04 0.97 -0.078 0.081
Lag2(sigma_run) -0.044 0.040 -1.08 0.28 -0.123 0.036
Lag3(sigma_run) -0.003 0.041 -0.09 0.93 -0.083 0.076
Lag4(sigma_run) 0.004 0.041 0.11 0.92 -0.075 0.084
Lag5(sigma_run) -0.008 0.041 -0.19 0.85 -0.087 0.072
Lag6(sigma_run) -0.021 0.041 -0.51 0.61 -0.100 0.059
Constant 1.026 0.526 1.95 0.05 -0.006 2.058
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MBL
Obs 26072
R-squared 0.0069
Adj R-squared 0.0053
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price -0.363 0.229 -1.58 0.11 -0.812 0.086
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.099 0.083 -1.20 0.23 -0.261 0.063
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.447 0.083 5.41 0.00 0.285 0.608
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.161 0.083 1.94 0.05 -0.001 0.323
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.164 0.083 1.99 0.05 0.002 0.327
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.028 0.083 0.34 0.74 -0.134 0.190
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.194 0.082 2.36 0.02 0.033 0.356
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.209 0.076 -2.74 0.01 -0.358 -0.059
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.405 0.076 5.32 0.00 0.256 0.555
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.083 0.076 -1.09 0.28 -0.233 0.067
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.250 0.076 3.27 0.00 0.100 0.399
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.130 0.076 1.70 0.09 -0.020 0.280
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.321 0.076 4.21 0.00 0.171 0.470
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.055 0.064 -0.86 0.39 -0.180 0.071
Time (in sec from Open) 0.217 0.160 1.36 0.17 -0.096 0.530
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.096 0.299 0.32 0.75 -0.489 0.681
Time^3 (in sec from Open) -0.157 0.099 -1.59 0.11 -0.351 0.037
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.027 0.134 0.20 0.84 -0.235 0.289
Ttues Dummy -0.086 0.189 -0.45 0.65 -0.455 0.284
Wed Dummy 0.341 0.181 1.88 0.06 -0.014 0.696
Thurs Dummy 0.017 0.183 0.09 0.93 -0.342 0.376
Fri Dummy 0.048 0.192 0.25 0.80 -0.329 0.424
First Trading Day of Month -0.358 0.347 -1.03 0.30 -1.037 0.322
Last Trading Day of Month -0.072 0.384 -0.19 0.85 -0.824 0.681
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -5.951 2.485 -2.40 0.02 -10.821 -1.081
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) -0.843 3.003 -0.28 0.78 -6.730 5.043
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) -2.030 3.107 -0.65 0.51 -8.119 4.060
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -5.985 3.098 -1.93 0.05 -12.056 0.086
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) -4.606 2.993 -1.54 0.12 -10.472 1.260
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -0.969 2.494 -0.39 0.70 -5.858 3.920
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 7.085 2.534 2.80 0.01 2.119 12.051
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -0.452 2.997 -0.15 0.88 -6.326 5.423
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) 2.017 3.103 0.65 0.52 -4.066 8.099
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) 2.299 3.105 0.74 0.46 -3.786 8.384
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) 2.093 2.994 0.70 0.48 -3.774 7.961
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 0.373 2.505 0.15 0.88 -4.536 5.282
Lag(sigma_run) 0.010 0.009 1.12 0.26 -0.007 0.027
Lag2(sigma_run) -0.027 0.009 -3.07 0.00 -0.044 -0.010
Lag3(sigma_run) -0.004 0.009 -0.51 0.61 -0.022 0.013
Lag4(sigma_run) -0.012 0.009 -1.40 0.16 -0.029 0.005
Lag5(sigma_run) -0.004 0.009 -0.43 0.67 -0.021 0.013
Lag6(sigma_run) 0.000 0.009 -0.03 0.98 -0.017 0.017
Constant 1.604 0.218 7.36 0.00 1.177 2.031
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NWS
Obs 9250
R-squared 0.0054
Adj R-squared 0.0009
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price 0.400 0.560 0.71 0.48 -0.698 1.498
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.047 0.164 0.29 0.77 -0.274 0.368
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.240 0.164 1.46 0.14 -0.081 0.561
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.141 0.164 0.86 0.39 -0.180 0.462
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.253 0.164 1.54 0.12 -0.068 0.573
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.063 0.164 -0.38 0.70 -0.383 0.258
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.076 0.163 0.47 0.64 -0.244 0.396
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask 0.157 0.197 0.79 0.43 -0.230 0.543
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.051 0.197 -0.26 0.80 -0.437 0.335
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.090 0.197 0.46 0.65 -0.297 0.476
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.614 0.196 3.13 0.00 0.229 0.998
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.106 0.197 0.54 0.59 -0.280 0.491
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.144 0.196 -0.73 0.46 -0.529 0.241
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.019 0.148 0.13 0.90 -0.271 0.308
Time (in sec from Open) -0.818 0.384 -2.13 0.03 -1.570 -0.066
Time^2 (in sec from Open) 0.064 0.728 0.09 0.93 -1.363 1.492
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.498 0.241 2.07 0.04 0.025 0.971
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.124 0.330 0.38 0.71 -0.522 0.770
Ttues Dummy -0.047 0.455 -0.10 0.92 -0.938 0.845
Wed Dummy 0.072 0.431 0.17 0.87 -0.772 0.916
Thurs Dummy 0.361 0.431 0.84 0.40 -0.484 1.205
Fri Dummy -0.347 0.454 -0.76 0.45 -1.236 0.543
First Trading Day of Month 0.073 0.741 0.10 0.92 -1.379 1.525
Last Trading Day of Month -0.188 0.782 -0.24 0.81 -1.720 1.344
Lag(Change in Bid Price) 22.010 16.268 1.35 0.18 -9.880 53.899
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 31.330 19.557 1.60 0.11 -7.005 69.666
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 60.099 20.345 2.95 0.00 20.219 99.979
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) 63.517 20.342 3.12 0.00 23.643 103.391
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) 32.967 19.606 1.68 0.09 -5.465 71.400
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) 1.250 16.309 0.08 0.94 -30.720 33.220
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) -39.840 17.367 -2.29 0.02 -73.883 -5.797
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -31.527 20.614 -1.53 0.13 -71.935 8.881
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -59.280 21.379 -2.77 0.01 -101.187 -17.372
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) -69.809 21.366 -3.27 0.00 -111.691 -27.927
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -28.385 20.555 -1.38 0.17 -68.677 11.907
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) 0.265 17.292 0.02 0.99 -33.632 34.162
Lag(sigma_run) -0.012 0.014 -0.82 0.41 -0.040 0.016
Lag2(sigma_run) -0.002 0.014 -0.16 0.87 -0.030 0.026
Lag3(sigma_run) -0.010 0.014 -0.71 0.48 -0.038 0.018
Lag4(sigma_run) -0.027 0.014 -1.92 0.06 -0.055 0.001
Lag5(sigma_run) -0.006 0.014 -0.41 0.68 -0.034 0.022
Lag6(sigma_run) 0.017 0.014 1.20 0.23 -0.011 0.045
Constant 1.193 0.519 2.30 0.02 0.175 2.210
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ZFX
Obs 17240
R-squared 0.0069
Adj R-squared 0.0045
Dep. Var: Size of Run Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95%
Last trade at Bid Price 0.144 0.253 0.57 0.57 -0.351 0.640
Lag(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.051 0.083 -0.62 0.54 -0.213 0.111
Lag2(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.351 0.083 4.24 0.00 0.189 0.514
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) -0.044 0.083 -0.53 0.60 -0.207 0.119
Lag3(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.173 0.083 2.08 0.04 0.010 0.336
Lag4(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.042 0.083 0.51 0.61 -0.120 0.204
Lag5(Quantity traded at Bid) 0.202 0.083 2.45 0.02 0.040 0.365
lqatask
Quantity traded at Ask -0.086 0.084 -1.02 0.31 -0.251 0.079
Lag(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.137 0.084 1.62 0.10 -0.028 0.302
Lag2(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.031 0.084 -0.37 0.71 -0.197 0.135
Lag3(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.143 0.084 1.69 0.09 -0.022 0.308
Lag4(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.273 0.084 3.24 0.00 0.108 0.439
Lag5(Quantity traded at Ask) 0.365 0.084 4.33 0.00 0.200 0.530
Lag6(Quantity traded at Ask) -0.093 0.066 -1.41 0.16 -0.223 0.036
Time (in sec from Open) -0.069 0.191 -0.36 0.72 -0.444 0.306
Time^2 (in sec from Open) -0.549 0.328 -1.67 0.09 -1.192 0.094
Time^3 (in sec from Open) 0.075 0.140 0.53 0.59 -0.200 0.350
Time^4 (in sec from Open) 0.219 0.161 1.36 0.17 -0.096 0.534
Ttues Dummy -0.200 0.198 -1.01 0.31 -0.589 0.188
Wed Dummy 0.134 0.188 0.71 0.48 -0.235 0.503
Thurs Dummy 0.299 0.199 1.50 0.13 -0.092 0.689
Fri Dummy 0.320 0.197 1.63 0.10 -0.066 0.707
First Trading Day of Month 0.223 0.296 0.75 0.45 -0.358 0.803
Last Trading Day of Month -0.620 0.360 -1.72 0.09 -1.327 0.086
Lag(Change in Bid Price) -13.869 12.742 -1.09 0.28 -38.845 11.106
Lag2(Change in Bid Price) 10.521 15.554 0.68 0.50 -19.966 41.008
Lag3(Change in Bid Price) 2.913 16.170 0.18 0.86 -28.783 34.608
Lag4(Change in Bid Price) -3.702 16.167 -0.23 0.82 -35.390 27.986
Lag5(Change in Bid Price) 1.596 15.539 0.10 0.92 -28.863 32.054
Lag6(Change in Bid Price) -2.334 12.731 -0.18 0.86 -27.289 22.621
dbestask
Lag(Change in Ask Price) 10.241 12.692 0.81 0.42 -14.636 35.119
Lag2(Change in Ask Price) -8.285 15.487 -0.54 0.59 -38.642 22.072
Lag3(Change in Ask Price) -0.430 16.120 -0.03 0.98 -32.027 31.166
Lag4(Change in Ask Price) 3.120 16.140 0.19 0.85 -28.516 34.755
Lag5(Change in Ask Price) -8.608 15.498 -0.56 0.58 -38.986 21.769
Lag6(Change in Ask Price) -3.648 12.757 -0.29 0.78 -28.653 21.357
Lag(sigma_run) 0.005 0.011 0.45 0.65 -0.017 0.027
Lag2(sigma_run) -0.004 0.011 -0.40 0.69 -0.026 0.017
Lag3(sigma_run) 0.005 0.011 0.44 0.66 -0.017 0.026
Lag4(sigma_run) -0.004 0.011 -0.33 0.74 -0.025 0.018
Lag5(sigma_run) -0.001 0.011 -0.13 0.90 -0.023 0.020
Lag6(sigma_run) -0.022 0.011 -1.98 0.05 -0.043 0.000
Constant 1.597 0.238 6.72 0.00 1.131 2.063
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6.1.3 VAR Regressions of Bid-Ask Spread and Order Book 
 
IVC AWC
Equation Obs R-sq Chi2 Equation Obs R-sq Chi2
dbestbid 1636 0.392 1539 dbestbid 14373 0.404 13326
dbestask 1636 0.330 1292 dbestask 14373 0.371 12335
spread 1636 0.008 2407 spread 14373 0.062 23009
QD1 1636 0.331 922 QD1 14373 0.525 17646
QD2 1636 0.126 314 QD2 14373 0.388 10924
QD3 1636 0.249 646 QD3 14373 0.279 6685
QD4 1636 0.269 748 QD4 14373 0.383 11547
QD5 1636 0.385 1210 QD5 14373 0.401 10958
Q1 1636 0.345 963 Q1 14373 0.579 23521
Q2 1636 0.332 899 Q2 14373 0.561 23216
Q3 1636 0.366 1007 Q3 14373 0.516 20597
Q4 1636 0.187 490 Q4 14373 0.382 12471
Q5 1636 0.227 573 Q5 14373 0.459 13474
ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z
dbestbid dbestbid
buyinit 0.006364 0.001257 5.062 buyinit 0.006748 0.000486 13.893
qatask 0.003222 0.001429 2.255 qatask -0.000063 0.000605 -0.103
qatbid -0.003181 0.001219 -2.610 qatbid -0.000449 0.000655 -0.686
qatask2 -0.000417 0.000204 -2.047 qatask2 -0.000130 0.000108 -1.201
qatbid2 0.000426 0.000139 3.064 qatbid2 0.000479 0.000107 4.473
askshock 0.004117 0.001374 2.997 askshock 0.003624 0.000587 6.178
bidshock -0.002122 0.001190 -1.783 bidshock -0.004500 0.000635 -7.093
sigmarun -0.000276 0.000173 -1.597 sigmarun -0.000116 0.000112 -1.038
dbestbid dbestbid
L1 -0.390344 0.016991 -22.973 L1 -0.318312 0.005784 -55.035
L2 -0.136145 0.018213 -7.475 L2 -0.023834 0.006070 -3.927
L3 -0.162378 0.018137 -8.953 L3 -0.058631 0.006050 -9.691
L4 -0.069260 0.018195 -3.807 L4 0.002890 0.006059 0.477
L5 -0.053174 0.017540 -3.032 L5 -0.027731 0.005945 -4.665
L6 -0.003616 0.012046 -0.300 L6 0.004696 0.004347 1.080
_cons -0.002871 0.000880 -3.264 _cons -0.003379 0.000321 -10.530
dbestask dbestask
buyinit 0.005342 0.001240 4.307 buyinit 0.005857 0.000462 12.687
qatask 0.002687 0.001431 1.878 qatask 0.000813 0.000577 1.409
qatbid -0.001662 0.001224 -1.358 qatbid 0.000023 0.000624 0.037
qatask2 -0.000657 0.000205 -3.212 qatask2 -0.000221 0.000103 -2.144
qatbid2 0.000288 0.000140 2.062 qatbid2 0.000361 0.000102 3.536
askshock 0.005128 0.001374 3.731 askshock 0.002900 0.000559 5.186
bidshock -0.003438 0.001194 -2.879 bidshock -0.004493 0.000605 -7.429
sigmarun -0.000101 0.000174 -0.581 sigmarun -0.000022 0.000107 -0.202
dbestask dbestask
L1 -0.388881 0.017266 -22.522 L1 -0.311489 0.005849 -53.259
L2 -0.135747 0.018468 -7.351 L2 -0.020654 0.006122 -3.374
L3 -0.162514 0.018394 -8.835 L3 -0.054991 0.006101 -9.014
L4 -0.069318 0.018445 -3.758 L4 0.005220 0.006111 0.854
L5 -0.051981 0.017770 -2.925 L5 -0.027399 0.005999 -4.568
L6 -0.002882 0.012157 -0.237 L6 0.004302 0.004482 0.960
_cons -0.002147 0.000876 -2.449 _cons -0.002697 0.000304 -8.861
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spread spread
buyinit -0.001054 0.000633 -1.665 buyinit -0.000906 0.000164 -5.532
qatask -0.000536 0.000788 -0.680 qatask 0.000547 0.000214 2.558
qatbid 0.001335 0.000673 1.983 qatbid 0.000187 0.000232 0.803
qatask2 -0.000227 0.000113 -2.011 qatask2 -0.000074 0.000038 -1.923
qatbid2 -0.000129 0.000077 -1.680 qatbid2 -0.000102 0.000038 -2.696
askshock 0.000951 0.000755 1.260 askshock -0.000427 0.000207 -2.061
bidshock -0.001193 0.000657 -1.816 bidshock 0.000275 0.000225 1.221
sigmarun 0.000170 0.000096 1.773 sigmarun 0.000078 0.000040 1.963
spread spread
L1 0.518768 0.017531 29.591 L1 0.544737 0.006097 89.353
L2 0.220626 0.019576 11.270 L2 0.265953 0.006771 39.278
L3 -0.021950 0.019746 -1.112 L3 -0.022368 0.006910 -3.237
L4 0.077151 0.019744 3.908 L4 0.059220 0.006908 8.572
L5 0.014069 0.019497 0.722 L5 -0.017889 0.006760 -2.646
L6 0.045661 0.017825 2.562 L6 0.031943 0.006221 5.135
_cons 0.002743 0.000553 4.963 _cons 0.002078 0.000133 15.657
QD1 QD1
buyinit -0.239266 0.063264 -3.782 buyinit -0.198784 0.029587 -6.719
qatask -0.121829 0.080813 -1.508 qatask -0.036910 0.039535 -0.934
qatbid 0.225016 0.069320 3.246 qatbid 0.255366 0.042742 5.975
qatask2 -0.004308 0.011211 -0.384 qatask2 -0.010043 0.006921 -1.451
qatbid2 -0.005465 0.007713 -0.709 qatbid2 -0.007425 0.006846 -1.085
askshock -0.006065 0.077226 -0.079 askshock 0.026540 0.038316 0.693
bidshock -0.230293 0.066591 -3.458 bidshock -0.320477 0.041503 -7.722
sigmarun 0.015377 0.009564 1.608 sigmarun 0.003552 0.007159 0.496
QD1 QD1
L1 0.374424 0.023802 15.731 L1 0.391791 0.008010 48.910
L2 0.225527 0.025671 8.785 L2 0.292900 0.008436 34.722
L3 0.008631 0.025923 0.333 L3 -0.013772 0.008670 -1.588
L4 0.027596 0.026061 1.059 L4 0.113862 0.008661 13.147
L5 -0.006378 0.025364 -0.251 L5 -0.002938 0.008434 -0.348
L6 0.045764 0.023857 1.918 L6 0.085468 0.007951 10.750
_cons 0.157240 0.046509 3.381 _cons 0.179569 0.020197 8.891
QD2 QD2
buyinit -0.059515 0.071616 -0.831 buyinit 0.092233 0.033318 2.768
qatask -0.009210 0.089224 -0.103 qatask 0.076046 0.044102 1.724
qatbid 0.221198 0.076563 2.889 qatbid 0.187785 0.047698 3.937
qatask2 0.002331 0.012784 0.182 qatask2 -0.011450 0.007852 -1.458
qatbid2 -0.016173 0.008746 -1.849 qatbid2 -0.024830 0.007772 -3.195
askshock -0.029025 0.085535 -0.339 askshock -0.083091 0.042791 -1.942
bidshock -0.094734 0.074462 -1.272 bidshock -0.185324 0.046309 -4.002
sigmarun 0.007352 0.010884 0.675 sigmarun 0.026317 0.008117 3.242
QD2 QD2
L1 0.221084 0.023692 9.332 L1 0.306558 0.007872 38.944
L2 0.187875 0.024097 7.797 L2 0.318382 0.008202 38.818
L3 0.049069 0.024418 2.010 L3 -0.010166 0.008536 -1.191
L4 0.024965 0.024509 1.019 L4 0.086992 0.008534 10.194
L5 0.048831 0.024083 2.028 L5 -0.002042 0.008198 -0.249
L6 0.014953 0.023886 0.626 L6 0.100607 0.007879 12.769
_cons 0.058616 0.052988 1.106 _cons 0.013120 0.022693 0.578
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QD3 QD3
buyinit 0.176996 0.066321 2.669 buyinit -0.123859 0.036319 -3.410
qatask -0.183253 0.083937 -2.183 qatask 0.200476 0.047560 4.215
qatbid 0.489185 0.071639 6.829 qatbid -0.028504 0.051654 -0.552
qatask2 -0.008968 0.011955 -0.750 qatask2 0.017136 0.008533 2.008
qatbid2 -0.016009 0.008139 -1.967 qatbid2 0.012616 0.008440 1.495
askshock 0.096976 0.081091 1.196 askshock -0.193664 0.046106 -4.200
bidshock -0.510449 0.069744 -7.319 bidshock 0.015366 0.050051 0.307
sigmarun 0.019737 0.010179 1.939 sigmarun -0.012738 0.008821 -1.444
QD3 QD3
L1 0.204976 0.023607 8.683 L1 0.270151 0.007946 33.998
L2 0.351898 0.023380 15.052 L2 0.307686 0.008220 37.430
L3 0.015573 0.024859 0.626 L3 -0.031678 0.008521 -3.718
L4 0.047306 0.024745 1.912 L4 0.089338 0.008516 10.491
L5 -0.009248 0.023345 -0.396 L5 -0.001696 0.008193 -0.207
L6 0.000025 0.022943 0.001 L6 0.083195 0.007936 10.484
_cons -0.001726 0.049122 -0.035 _cons 0.094029 0.024535 3.832
QD4 QD4
buyinit -0.031482 0.065285 -0.482 buyinit -0.062620 0.033457 -1.872
qatask -0.008905 0.081283 -0.110 qatask 0.067787 0.043936 1.543
qatbid 0.030054 0.069559 0.432 qatbid -0.014133 0.047697 -0.296
qatask2 0.001154 0.011644 0.099 qatask2 0.013901 0.007875 1.765
qatbid2 0.000465 0.007949 0.059 qatbid2 0.015184 0.007789 1.949
askshock -0.014012 0.078031 -0.180 askshock -0.088313 0.042570 -2.075
bidshock -0.044061 0.067855 -0.649 bidshock 0.003910 0.046217 0.085
sigmarun 0.000168 0.009889 0.017 sigmarun -0.014265 0.008141 -1.752
QD4 QD4
L1 0.390082 0.023702 16.458 L1 0.280135 0.007721 36.281
L2 0.213579 0.025358 8.422 L2 0.339327 0.007968 42.588
L3 -0.047055 0.025706 -1.831 L3 0.013400 0.008308 1.613
L4 0.089344 0.025733 3.472 L4 0.109666 0.008308 13.201
L5 -0.003885 0.025460 -0.153 L5 -0.007635 0.007967 -0.958
L6 0.056259 0.023786 2.365 L6 0.085767 0.007718 11.112
_cons 0.028175 0.048328 0.583 _cons 0.044132 0.022662 1.947
QD5 QD5
buyinit -0.146703 0.060420 -2.428 buyinit 0.000221 0.032999 0.007
qatask 0.229498 0.075517 3.039 qatask 0.088920 0.043339 2.052
qatbid -0.243358 0.065062 -3.740 qatbid 0.058744 0.047026 1.249
qatask2 0.049968 0.010781 4.635 qatask2 -0.009124 0.007763 -1.175
qatbid2 0.039834 0.007371 5.404 qatbid2 -0.004633 0.007678 -0.603
askshock -0.314300 0.072565 -4.331 askshock -0.098971 0.042005 -2.356
bidshock 0.254648 0.063157 4.032 bidshock -0.098137 0.045569 -2.154
sigmarun -0.047478 0.009184 -5.170 sigmarun 0.009514 0.008026 1.185
QD5 QD5
L1 0.345262 0.023585 14.639 L1 0.260821 0.008038 32.448
L2 0.305881 0.024802 12.333 L2 0.326910 0.008279 39.488
L3 -0.072498 0.025535 -2.839 L3 0.012718 0.008613 1.477
L4 0.131975 0.025623 5.151 L4 0.130977 0.008614 15.205
L5 0.036722 0.024441 1.502 L5 0.003689 0.008281 0.445
L6 0.017251 0.023609 0.731 L6 0.087049 0.008038 10.830
_cons 0.057706 0.044500 1.297 _cons 0.045549 0.022358 2.037
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Q1 Q1
buyinit 0.161665 0.062441 2.589 buyinit 0.068703 0.027741 2.477
qatask 0.002836 0.079410 0.036 qatask 0.116894 0.036839 3.173
qatbid 0.405757 0.068146 5.954 qatbid 0.174593 0.039706 4.397
qatask2 -0.014251 0.011057 -1.289 qatask2 -0.021893 0.006506 -3.365
qatbid2 -0.021491 0.007562 -2.842 qatbid2 -0.018071 0.006435 -2.808
askshock 0.054776 0.076368 0.717 askshock -0.095576 0.035685 -2.678
bidshock -0.133109 0.065838 -2.022 bidshock -0.220396 0.038525 -5.721
sigmarun 0.009109 0.009408 0.968 sigmarun 0.022656 0.006727 3.368
Q1 Q1
L1 0.133760 0.023676 5.650 L1 0.311641 0.007840 39.753
L2 0.564566 0.023934 23.588 L2 0.490040 0.008144 60.176
L3 -0.015557 0.026827 -0.580 L3 -0.066917 0.008996 -7.439
L4 -0.187177 0.026968 -6.941 L4 0.095516 0.008995 10.619
L5 0.044304 0.023763 1.864 L5 0.011890 0.008150 1.459
L6 0.104664 0.023698 4.417 L6 0.038453 0.007834 4.908
_cons -0.037377 0.046314 -0.807 _cons 0.045264 0.018978 2.385
Q2 Q2
buyinit -0.147545 0.062916 -2.345 buyinit -0.005996 0.028192 -0.213
qatask 0.358404 0.080726 4.440 qatask 0.090478 0.037225 2.431
qatbid -0.057004 0.069177 -0.824 qatbid 0.104092 0.040385 2.577
qatask2 0.038449 0.011192 3.436 qatask2 -0.018056 0.006638 -2.720
qatbid2 0.041962 0.007655 5.482 qatbid2 -0.021440 0.006564 -3.266
askshock -0.416482 0.077195 -5.395 askshock -0.075921 0.036054 -2.106
bidshock -0.026133 0.066808 -0.391 bidshock -0.069436 0.039187 -1.772
sigmarun -0.040692 0.009536 -4.267 sigmarun 0.015300 0.006863 2.229
Q2 Q2
L1 0.303126 0.023656 12.814 L1 0.318294 0.007678 41.457
L2 0.233661 0.024811 9.418 L2 0.431431 0.007956 54.229
L3 0.010976 0.025267 0.434 L3 -0.039792 0.008529 -4.666
L4 -0.000785 0.025954 -0.030 L4 0.147024 0.008522 17.252
L5 0.014547 0.025492 0.571 L5 0.009361 0.007963 1.176
L6 0.112665 0.024868 4.530 L6 0.028617 0.007675 3.728
_cons 0.136301 0.046976 2.902 _cons 0.053559 0.019167 2.794
Q3 Q3
buyinit 0.294289 0.061743 4.766 buyinit 0.119648 0.029659 4.034
qatask -0.191843 0.080167 -2.393 qatask -0.071173 0.038950 -1.827
qatbid 0.779376 0.067763 11.501 qatbid 0.189712 0.042354 4.479
qatask2 -0.000652 0.011079 -0.059 qatask2 0.007787 0.006972 1.117
qatbid2 -0.015118 0.007568 -1.998 qatbid2 0.007154 0.006894 1.038
askshock 0.158403 0.077495 2.044 askshock 0.045869 0.037738 1.215
bidshock -0.629036 0.065616 -9.587 bidshock -0.191769 0.041069 -4.669
sigmarun -0.002291 0.009436 -0.243 sigmarun -0.006162 0.007208 -0.855
Q3 Q3
L1 0.247985 0.023314 10.637 L1 0.304335 0.007548 40.323
L2 0.251472 0.023370 10.760 L2 0.377578 0.007876 47.940
L3 -0.024193 0.023882 -1.013 L3 -0.020625 0.008260 -2.497
L4 0.112233 0.023624 4.751 L4 0.146228 0.008258 17.707
L5 -0.050412 0.022971 -2.195 L5 -0.007177 0.007874 -0.912
L6 0.137189 0.022446 6.112 L6 0.079292 0.007538 10.519
_cons -0.024471 0.045704 -0.535 _cons -0.031850 0.020073 -1.587
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Q4 Q4
buyinit -0.036033 0.068300 -0.528 buyinit -0.013151 0.033469 -0.393
qatask -0.029121 0.085502 -0.341 qatask -0.000858 0.043806 -0.020
qatbid 0.098909 0.073277 1.350 qatbid 0.030522 0.047665 0.640
qatask2 -0.005224 0.012209 -0.428 qatask2 0.005008 0.007877 0.636
qatbid2 -0.008705 0.008331 -1.045 qatbid2 0.009673 0.007791 1.241
askshock -0.008693 0.081907 -0.106 askshock -0.010508 0.042459 -0.247
bidshock -0.028390 0.071383 -0.398 bidshock -0.047057 0.046169 -1.019
sigmarun 0.007147 0.010365 0.690 sigmarun -0.006006 0.008143 -0.737
Q4 Q4
L1 0.263403 0.023536 11.191 L1 0.277173 0.007589 36.525
L2 0.282639 0.024267 11.647 L2 0.363172 0.007819 46.446
L3 -0.057126 0.025012 -2.284 L3 0.006222 0.008203 0.758
L4 0.042754 0.025013 1.709 L4 0.121667 0.008201 14.835
L5 0.022041 0.024309 0.907 L5 -0.008389 0.007815 -1.073
L6 0.074628 0.023427 3.186 L6 0.065381 0.007587 8.617
_cons 0.027744 0.050566 0.549 _cons 0.014475 0.022608 0.640
Q5 Q5
buyinit 0.022173 0.066539 0.333 buyinit 0.004713 0.031399 0.150
qatask -0.009904 0.082890 -0.119 qatask 0.020669 0.041046 0.504
qatbid -0.059803 0.071165 -0.840 qatbid 0.059886 0.044745 1.338
qatask2 0.019632 0.011892 1.651 qatask2 0.002086 0.007383 0.283
qatbid2 0.011350 0.008124 1.397 qatbid2 0.004335 0.007303 0.594
askshock -0.103914 0.079638 -1.305 askshock -0.041810 0.039779 -1.051
bidshock 0.003566 0.069425 0.051 bidshock -0.057934 0.043327 -1.337
sigmarun -0.010697 0.010109 -1.058 sigmarun -0.000703 0.007632 -0.092
Q5 Q5
L1 0.333266 0.023659 14.086 L1 0.316518 0.008099 39.079
L2 0.173471 0.024820 6.989 L2 0.380483 0.008477 44.883
L3 0.023044 0.025066 0.919 L3 0.003837 0.008992 0.427
L4 0.024318 0.025057 0.971 L4 0.070602 0.008993 7.851
L5 0.025323 0.024796 1.021 L5 0.031777 0.008475 3.749
L6 0.103279 0.023664 4.364 L6 0.009129 0.008096 1.128
_cons -0.009475 0.049283 -0.192 _cons 0.015772 0.021189 0.744
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BBG GWT
Equation Obs R-sq Chi2 Equation Obs R-sq Chi2
dbestbid 5496 0.389 4620 dbestbid 1562 0.368 1391
dbestask 5496 0.301 3774 dbestask 1562 0.345 1241
spread 5496 -0.014 5984 spread 1562 0.011 2134
QD1 5496 0.203 1620 QD1 1562 0.343 939
QD2 5496 0.085 588 QD2 1562 0.310 917
QD3 5496 0.210 1654 QD3 1562 0.522 2299
QD4 5496 0.120 816 QD4 1562 0.462 1459
QD5 5496 0.191 1317 QD5 1562 0.614 3204
Q1 5496 0.225 1938 Q1 1562 0.561 2138
Q2 5496 0.139 1115 Q2 1562 0.157 369
Q3 5496 0.121 825 Q3 1562 0.362 901
Q4 5496 0.209 1578 Q4 1562 0.122 268
Q5 5496 0.235 1793 Q5 1562 0.308 714
ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z
dbestbid dbestbid
buyinit 0.010192 0.001756 5.803 buyinit 0.001718 0.001291 1.330
qatask 0.005388 0.001899 2.837 qatask 0.006389 0.001494 4.276
qatbid -0.004648 0.002289 -2.031 qatbid -0.004142 0.001505 -2.753
qatask2 -0.000842 0.000411 -2.049 qatask2 0.000043 0.000333 0.129
qatbid2 0.000577 0.000474 1.217 qatbid2 0.000612 0.000345 1.777
askshock 0.006870 0.001871 3.672 askshock -0.003552 0.001402 -2.534
bidshock -0.008411 0.002210 -3.806 bidshock -0.000289 0.001428 -0.202
sigmarun 0.000282 0.000463 0.609 sigmarun -0.000262 0.000339 -0.773
dbestbid dbestbid
L1 -0.336884 0.009463 -35.599 L1 -0.391289 0.017721 -22.081
L2 -0.069214 0.009948 -6.957 L2 -0.129560 0.019005 -6.817
L3 -0.081356 0.009934 -8.189 L3 -0.160201 0.018737 -8.550
L4 -0.024831 0.009963 -2.492 L4 -0.113149 0.018691 -6.054
L5 -0.031688 0.009734 -3.255 L5 -0.074540 0.018059 -4.128
L6 -0.000633 0.007323 -0.086 L6 -0.009170 0.012491 -0.734
_cons -0.004717 0.001087 -4.339 _cons 0.000062 0.000847 0.074
dbestask dbestask
buyinit 0.009435 0.001558 6.054 buyinit 0.002010 0.001240 1.621
qatask 0.000498 0.001684 0.296 qatask 0.004117 0.001437 2.865
qatbid -0.002324 0.002044 -1.137 qatbid -0.004140 0.001453 -2.850
qatask2 -0.000723 0.000367 -1.972 qatask2 0.000044 0.000320 0.136
qatbid2 0.000259 0.000423 0.613 qatbid2 0.000711 0.000332 2.141
askshock 0.010952 0.001658 6.604 askshock -0.001269 0.001348 -0.942
bidshock -0.007514 0.001975 -3.805 bidshock -0.000177 0.001378 -0.129
sigmarun 0.000381 0.000413 0.922 sigmarun -0.000335 0.000326 -1.026
dbestask dbestask
L1 -0.317387 0.009609 -33.029 L1 -0.388280 0.018221 -21.310
L2 -0.060964 0.010023 -6.082 L2 -0.121962 0.019620 -6.216
L3 -0.075929 0.010009 -7.586 L3 -0.156614 0.019281 -8.123
L4 -0.018875 0.010042 -1.880 L4 -0.109615 0.019243 -5.696
L5 -0.032258 0.009827 -3.283 L5 -0.070877 0.018605 -3.810
L6 -0.001423 0.007722 -0.184 L6 -0.010664 0.012931 -0.825
_cons -0.005511 0.000972 -5.669 _cons -0.000691 0.000821 -0.841
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spread spread
buyinit -0.001393 0.000922 -1.511 buyinit 0.000169 0.000634 0.267
qatask -0.003452 0.001034 -3.339 qatask -0.001871 0.000764 -2.448
qatbid 0.002139 0.001254 1.705 qatbid 0.000067 0.000774 0.086
qatask2 0.000124 0.000225 0.549 qatask2 0.000030 0.000171 0.177
qatbid2 -0.000297 0.000260 -1.144 qatbid2 0.000121 0.000177 0.681
askshock 0.002708 0.001018 2.661 askshock 0.001808 0.000718 2.520
bidshock 0.001055 0.001211 0.871 bidshock -0.000022 0.000734 -0.029
sigmarun 0.000077 0.000254 0.303 sigmarun -0.000095 0.000174 -0.544
spread spread
L1 0.502965 0.009885 50.882 L1 0.512617 0.018481 27.738
L2 0.229846 0.010826 21.231 L2 0.236748 0.020225 11.706
L3 -0.009179 0.011013 -0.833 L3 -0.031686 0.020684 -1.532
L4 0.047280 0.010989 4.302 L4 0.036362 0.020485 1.775
L5 0.000856 0.010800 0.079 L5 0.043542 0.020084 2.168
L6 0.031250 0.010104 3.093 L6 0.046447 0.018496 2.511
_cons 0.003301 0.000642 5.143 _cons 0.001341 0.000506 2.652
QD1 QD1
buyinit -0.180532 0.051883 -3.480 buyinit -0.265635 0.091382 -2.907
qatask -0.076209 0.057581 -1.323 qatask -0.061705 0.105200 -0.587
qatbid 0.248502 0.070751 3.512 qatbid 0.131721 0.107877 1.221
qatask2 0.017854 0.012588 1.418 qatask2 0.045194 0.023812 1.898
qatbid2 0.013685 0.014508 0.943 qatbid2 0.046818 0.024688 1.896
askshock -0.015488 0.056683 -0.273 askshock -0.020634 0.098624 -0.209
bidshock -0.329621 0.068404 -4.819 bidshock -0.172779 0.102524 -1.685
sigmarun -0.011830 0.014187 -0.834 sigmarun -0.053697 0.024242 -2.215
QD1 QD1
L1 0.330311 0.013107 25.201 L1 0.393393 0.024309 16.183
L2 0.148741 0.013738 10.827 L2 0.236847 0.025915 9.140
L3 0.008072 0.013753 0.587 L3 -0.022431 0.026497 -0.847
L4 0.079668 0.013850 5.752 L4 0.080270 0.026482 3.031
L5 -0.036391 0.013731 -2.650 L5 -0.023626 0.026033 -0.908
L6 0.055620 0.013079 4.253 L6 0.041682 0.024518 1.700
_cons 0.157520 0.032988 4.775 _cons 0.165677 0.060592 2.734
QD2 QD2
buyinit 0.067423 0.054838 1.229 buyinit -0.000574 0.090338 -0.006
qatask -0.001993 0.061457 -0.032 qatask 0.025360 0.107752 0.235
qatbid 0.106935 0.075119 1.424 qatbid -0.004414 0.109948 -0.040
qatask2 -0.016014 0.013481 -1.188 qatask2 -0.067087 0.024477 -2.741
qatbid2 -0.014527 0.015535 -0.935 qatbid2 -0.088334 0.025377 -3.481
askshock 0.049304 0.060481 0.815 askshock -0.009040 0.100915 -0.090
bidshock -0.131542 0.072507 -1.814 bidshock 0.100121 0.104388 0.959
sigmarun 0.015777 0.015191 1.039 sigmarun 0.092934 0.024924 3.729
QD2 QD2
L1 0.239639 0.013330 17.977 L1 0.421405 0.022354 18.851
L2 0.122787 0.013636 9.004 L2 0.156964 0.024254 6.472
L3 -0.003357 0.013730 -0.244 L3 -0.109415 0.024381 -4.488
L4 0.044090 0.013716 3.215 L4 0.106029 0.024316 4.360
L5 -0.012752 0.013637 -0.935 L5 0.033457 0.024406 1.371
L6 0.025902 0.013321 1.944 L6 0.132717 0.022417 5.920
_cons -0.007055 0.035061 -0.201 _cons 0.002582 0.060787 0.042
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QD3 QD3
buyinit 0.070073 0.050906 1.377 buyinit 0.006632 0.075299 0.088
qatask 0.028976 0.057067 0.508 qatask -0.068739 0.089498 -0.768
qatbid 0.087612 0.069606 1.259 qatbid -0.017321 0.091456 -0.189
qatask2 0.004077 0.012590 0.324 qatask2 0.001261 0.020273 0.062
qatbid2 0.004001 0.014545 0.275 qatbid2 -0.009988 0.021004 -0.476
askshock -0.008683 0.056199 -0.154 askshock 0.008807 0.083798 0.105
bidshock -0.097462 0.067271 -1.449 bidshock 0.020650 0.086692 0.238
sigmarun -0.004964 0.014193 -0.350 sigmarun 0.013906 0.020640 0.674
QD3 QD3
L1 0.370012 0.013135 28.170 L1 0.407950 0.022199 18.377
L2 0.201048 0.013955 14.407 L2 0.286937 0.024094 11.909
L3 -0.020991 0.014166 -1.482 L3 -0.089595 0.024719 -3.624
L4 -0.072319 0.014148 -5.112 L4 0.124386 0.024644 5.047
L5 -0.005702 0.014004 -0.407 L5 0.067977 0.024147 2.815
L6 0.071670 0.013246 5.411 L6 0.072176 0.022267 3.241
_cons -0.010417 0.032552 -0.320 _cons -0.021227 0.050525 -0.420
QD4 QD4
buyinit 0.043625 0.053757 0.812 buyinit -0.121411 0.080015 -1.517
qatask -0.057306 0.060185 -0.952 qatask -0.045547 0.095927 -0.475
qatbid 0.065550 0.073492 0.892 qatbid -0.155481 0.097963 -1.587
qatask2 -0.005407 0.013216 -0.409 qatask2 -0.004874 0.021610 -0.226
qatbid2 -0.011378 0.015230 -0.747 qatbid2 0.018370 0.022386 0.821
askshock 0.059777 0.059236 1.009 askshock 0.093961 0.089626 1.048
bidshock -0.046139 0.070972 -0.650 bidshock 0.104351 0.092514 1.128
sigmarun 0.009941 0.014892 0.668 sigmarun -0.008494 0.021971 -0.387
QD4 QD4
L1 0.193540 0.013337 14.512 L1 0.352347 0.023276 15.138
L2 0.240079 0.013562 17.702 L2 0.224255 0.024605 9.114
L3 -0.028978 0.013916 -2.082 L3 -0.002110 0.025149 -0.084
L4 0.044135 0.013918 3.171 L4 0.016909 0.025170 0.672
L5 0.008200 0.013571 0.604 L5 0.059415 0.024565 2.419
L6 0.037228 0.013343 2.790 L6 0.167269 0.023123 7.234
_cons -0.023264 0.034355 -0.677 _cons 0.010556 0.053917 0.196
QD5 QD5
buyinit -0.008175 0.051551 -0.159 buyinit -0.042589 0.067550 -0.630
qatask 0.095207 0.057713 1.650 qatask 0.000714 0.081184 0.009
qatbid 0.065818 0.070585 0.932 qatbid -0.048151 0.082691 -0.582
qatask2 0.042226 0.012671 3.332 qatask2 0.015081 0.018270 0.825
qatbid2 0.053456 0.014602 3.661 qatbid2 0.045151 0.018913 2.387
askshock -0.076785 0.056792 -1.352 askshock 0.052789 0.075848 0.696
bidshock -0.146453 0.068154 -2.149 bidshock -0.031535 0.078261 -0.403
sigmarun -0.052036 0.014279 -3.644 sigmarun -0.042196 0.018574 -2.272
QD5 QD5
L1 0.458025 0.013364 34.274 L1 0.432506 0.021907 19.743
L2 -0.115326 0.014682 -7.855 L2 0.225592 0.024157 9.338
L3 0.077206 0.014778 5.225 L3 0.033725 0.024560 1.373
L4 -0.010550 0.014773 -0.714 L4 0.108318 0.024481 4.425
L5 0.011208 0.014682 0.763 L5 -0.044420 0.024186 -1.837
L6 0.016837 0.013333 1.263 L6 0.138756 0.021912 6.332
_cons 0.036975 0.032950 1.122 _cons 0.016226 0.045621 0.356
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Q1 Q1
buyinit 0.161144 0.050734 3.176 buyinit 0.097736 0.072537 1.347
qatask -0.015240 0.057479 -0.265 qatask -0.118318 0.086369 -1.370
qatbid 0.249309 0.070141 3.554 qatbid -0.058645 0.088347 -0.664
qatask2 0.025849 0.012410 2.083 qatask2 0.045423 0.019510 2.328
qatbid2 0.025281 0.014298 1.768 qatbid2 0.047255 0.020226 2.336
askshock -0.018271 0.056454 -0.324 askshock 0.028646 0.080935 0.354
bidshock -0.270834 0.067637 -4.004 bidshock -0.003929 0.083665 -0.047
sigmarun -0.028716 0.013981 -2.054 sigmarun -0.047487 0.019876 -2.389
Q1 Q1
L1 0.241004 0.013122 18.367 L1 0.325200 0.024837 13.093
L2 0.259787 0.013361 19.443 L2 0.368651 0.026039 14.158
L3 0.025646 0.013771 1.862 L3 -0.001838 0.027658 -0.066
L4 0.083364 0.013758 6.059 L4 0.088580 0.027889 3.176
L5 0.019500 0.013419 1.453 L5 0.071645 0.026511 2.702
L6 0.067385 0.013125 5.134 L6 0.025728 0.025920 0.993
_cons -0.020568 0.032620 -0.631 _cons -0.078806 0.048752 -1.616
Q2 Q2
buyinit -0.004507 0.053191 -0.085 buyinit -0.082984 0.099952 -0.830
qatask 0.192325 0.060001 3.205 qatask -0.072163 0.119268 -0.605
qatbid 0.140647 0.073478 1.914 qatbid 0.016147 0.122066 0.132
qatask2 0.001498 0.013072 0.115 qatask2 -0.012936 0.027013 -0.479
qatbid2 0.009730 0.015063 0.646 qatbid2 0.010055 0.028004 0.359
askshock -0.180359 0.058969 -3.059 askshock 0.107515 0.111772 0.962
bidshock -0.134161 0.070921 -1.892 bidshock -0.042765 0.115675 -0.370
sigmarun -0.008621 0.014730 -0.585 sigmarun 0.009726 0.027502 0.354
Q2 Q2
L1 0.189954 0.013082 14.520 L1 0.171290 0.023252 7.367
L2 0.244674 0.013180 18.564 L2 0.238047 0.023674 10.055
L3 -0.014740 0.013494 -1.092 L3 0.095213 0.024198 3.935
L4 0.074308 0.013494 5.507 L4 0.071748 0.024227 2.962
L5 0.016844 0.013150 1.281 L5 -0.045882 0.023689 -1.937
L6 0.074547 0.012991 5.738 L6 0.032094 0.023384 1.372
_cons 0.079392 0.034126 2.326 _cons 0.013753 0.067234 0.205
Q3 Q3
buyinit -0.117407 0.053883 -2.179 buyinit -0.125504 0.087028 -1.442
qatask 0.377163 0.061072 6.176 qatask 0.277032 0.103955 2.665
qatbid 0.156545 0.074956 2.088 qatbid 0.118402 0.105966 1.117
qatask2 -0.001104 0.013218 -0.084 qatask2 -0.032134 0.023537 -1.365
qatbid2 0.001206 0.015235 0.079 qatbid2 -0.028224 0.024421 -1.156
askshock -0.365044 0.059983 -6.086 askshock -0.217228 0.097401 -2.230
bidshock -0.145359 0.072308 -2.010 bidshock -0.051634 0.100585 -0.513
sigmarun -0.000697 0.014898 -0.047 sigmarun 0.018810 0.023976 0.785
Q3 Q3
L1 0.188911 0.013329 14.173 L1 0.350847 0.024784 14.156
L2 0.178732 0.013524 13.216 L2 0.114901 0.026139 4.396
L3 0.033521 0.013704 2.446 L3 0.175159 0.026286 6.664
L4 0.026233 0.013699 1.915 L4 0.033452 0.026291 1.272
L5 0.040283 0.013507 2.982 L5 0.085360 0.026145 3.265
L6 0.029847 0.013334 2.238 L6 -0.025413 0.024832 -1.023
_cons 0.183444 0.034652 5.294 _cons 0.164605 0.058605 2.809
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Q4 Q4
buyinit 0.055580 0.051038 1.089 buyinit -0.029267 0.101688 -0.288
qatask 0.175714 0.057586 3.051 qatask 0.013512 0.121328 0.111
qatbid 0.183908 0.070609 2.605 qatbid 0.021696 0.123905 0.175
qatask2 0.005308 0.012533 0.424 qatask2 0.001591 0.027490 0.058
qatbid2 0.009436 0.014449 0.653 qatbid2 0.008942 0.028482 0.314
askshock -0.206841 0.056609 -3.654 askshock 0.017732 0.113704 0.156
bidshock -0.187625 0.068011 -2.759 bidshock 0.036682 0.117674 0.312
sigmarun -0.006381 0.014125 -0.452 sigmarun -0.009243 0.027995 -0.330
Q4 Q4
L1 0.234916 0.013336 17.616 L1 0.182467 0.023699 7.699
L2 0.181122 0.013670 13.249 L2 0.141638 0.023979 5.907
L3 0.067752 0.013682 4.952 L3 0.053107 0.024032 2.210
L4 0.157745 0.013672 11.538 L4 0.119156 0.024128 4.938
L5 -0.029495 0.013664 -2.159 L5 0.041706 0.023947 1.742
L6 0.019405 0.013319 1.457 L6 0.039714 0.023670 1.678
_cons 0.061732 0.032715 1.887 _cons 0.001184 0.068475 0.017
Q5 Q5
buyinit 0.028493 0.050195 0.568 buyinit 0.186908 0.090622 2.062
qatask 0.173455 0.056396 3.076 qatask 0.070087 0.108278 0.647
qatbid 0.136820 0.069104 1.980 qatbid 0.458790 0.110681 4.145
qatask2 0.003177 0.012327 0.258 qatask2 0.005665 0.024480 0.231
qatbid2 0.002300 0.014209 0.162 qatbid2 -0.014412 0.025364 -0.568
askshock -0.188996 0.055467 -3.407 askshock -0.118149 0.101514 -1.164
bidshock -0.129448 0.066675 -1.941 bidshock -0.403886 0.105059 -3.844
sigmarun -0.003734 0.013892 -0.269 sigmarun -0.001606 0.024926 -0.064
Q5 Q5
L1 0.214125 0.013278 16.126 L1 0.280442 0.024636 11.384
L2 0.266792 0.013550 19.690 L2 0.127946 0.025588 5.000
L3 0.012980 0.013945 0.931 L3 -0.017011 0.024700 -0.689
L4 0.096495 0.013951 6.917 L4 0.301575 0.024706 12.206
L5 0.020062 0.013547 1.481 L5 -0.030368 0.025514 -1.190
L6 0.056619 0.013271 4.266 L6 0.039001 0.024599 1.585
_cons 0.062568 0.032105 1.949 _cons 0.044608 0.061021 0.731
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MBL NWS
Equation Obs R-sq Chi2 Equation Obs R-sq Chi2
dbestbid 26083 0.324 18002 dbestbid 9256 0.294 6252
dbestask 26083 0.244 14567 dbestask 9256 0.237 5388
spread 26083 0.100 45867 spread 9256 0.054 13393
QD1 26083 0.149 5135 QD1 9256 0.273 4062
QD2 26083 0.152 5772 QD2 9256 0.200 2913
QD3 26083 0.167 6368 QD3 9256 0.238 3602
QD4 26083 0.179 6275 QD4 9256 0.198 2786
QD5 26083 0.122 3957 QD5 9256 0.187 2348
Q1 26083 0.207 8601 Q1 9256 0.402 6584
Q2 26083 0.188 6798 Q2 9256 0.168 2293
Q3 26083 0.157 5768 Q3 9256 0.299 4901
Q4 26083 0.155 5746 Q4 9256 0.285 4972
Q5 26083 0.153 5083 Q5 9256 0.294 5042
ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z
dbestbid dbestbid
buyinit 0.005167 0.001378 3.749 buyinit 0.006364 0.001257 5.062
qatask 0.022124 0.001941 11.400 qatask 0.003222 0.001429 2.255
qatbid -0.012042 0.002091 -5.759 qatbid -0.003181 0.001219 -2.610
qatask2 -0.001572 0.000475 -3.306 qatask2 -0.000417 0.000204 -2.047
qatbid2 -0.000326 0.000478 -0.682 qatbid2 0.000426 0.000139 3.064
askshock -0.006430 0.001883 -3.415 askshock 0.004117 0.001374 2.997
bidshock -0.001634 0.002071 -0.789 bidshock -0.002122 0.001190 -1.783
sigmarun 0.000789 0.000481 1.641 sigmarun -0.000276 0.000173 -1.597
dbestbid dbestbid
L1 -0.303842 0.004405 -68.979 L1 -0.390344 0.016991 -22.973
L2 -0.009893 0.004645 -2.130 L2 -0.136145 0.018213 -7.475
L3 -0.042830 0.004610 -9.292 L3 -0.162378 0.018137 -8.953
L4 0.000438 0.004659 0.094 L4 -0.069260 0.018195 -3.807
L5 -0.026566 0.004563 -5.821 L5 -0.053174 0.017540 -3.032
L6 0.014641 0.003387 4.323 L6 -0.003616 0.012046 -0.300
_cons -0.000373 0.000974 -0.383 _cons -0.002871 0.000880 -3.264
dbestask dbestask
buyinit 0.001662 0.001351 1.230 buyinit 0.005342 0.001240 4.307
qatask 0.015646 0.001911 8.189 qatask 0.002687 0.001431 1.878
qatbid -0.015592 0.002065 -7.551 qatbid -0.001662 0.001224 -1.358
qatask2 -0.002377 0.000469 -5.070 qatask2 -0.000657 0.000205 -3.212
qatbid2 -0.001255 0.000471 -2.664 qatbid2 0.000288 0.000140 2.062
askshock 0.001469 0.001854 0.792 askshock 0.005128 0.001374 3.731
bidshock 0.004863 0.002046 2.377 bidshock -0.003438 0.001194 -2.879
sigmarun 0.001626 0.000474 3.429 sigmarun -0.000101 0.000174 -0.581
dbestask dbestask
L1 -0.301335 0.004452 -67.685 L1 -0.388881 0.017266 -22.522
L2 -0.012330 0.004682 -2.634 L2 -0.135747 0.018468 -7.351
L3 -0.043726 0.004639 -9.426 L3 -0.162514 0.018394 -8.835
L4 0.002681 0.004690 0.572 L4 -0.069318 0.018445 -3.758
L5 -0.025313 0.004590 -5.514 L5 -0.051981 0.017770 -2.925
L6 0.016047 0.003421 4.690 L6 -0.002882 0.012157 -0.237
_cons -0.001417 0.000960 -1.476 _cons -0.002147 0.000876 -2.449
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spread spread
buyinit -0.003965 0.000715 -5.549 buyinit -0.001054 0.000633 -1.665
qatask -0.003173 0.001031 -3.078 qatask -0.000536 0.000788 -0.680
qatbid -0.001650 0.001098 -1.503 qatbid 0.001335 0.000673 1.983
qatask2 -0.000641 0.000253 -2.530 qatask2 -0.000227 0.000113 -2.011
qatbid2 -0.000764 0.000254 -3.004 qatbid2 -0.000129 0.000077 -1.680
askshock 0.004388 0.001000 4.389 askshock 0.000951 0.000755 1.260
bidshock 0.004418 0.001084 4.075 bidshock -0.001193 0.000657 -1.816
sigmarun 0.000674 0.000256 2.631 sigmarun 0.000170 0.000096 1.773
spread spread
L1 0.549764 0.004572 120.236 L1 0.518768 0.017531 29.591
L2 0.273797 0.005086 53.832 L2 0.220626 0.019576 11.270
L3 -0.018147 0.005201 -3.489 L3 -0.021950 0.019746 -1.112
L4 0.048890 0.005188 9.424 L4 0.077151 0.019744 3.908
L5 -0.015760 0.005048 -3.122 L5 0.014069 0.019497 0.722
L6 0.037077 0.004666 7.946 L6 0.045661 0.017825 2.562
_cons 0.003663 0.000541 6.771 _cons 0.002743 0.000553 4.963
QD1 QD1
buyinit -0.284819 0.029675 -9.598 buyinit -0.239266 0.063264 -3.782
qatask 0.094183 0.042274 2.228 qatask -0.121829 0.080813 -1.508
qatbid 0.286791 0.045523 6.300 qatbid 0.225016 0.069320 3.246
qatask2 -0.027476 0.010390 -2.645 qatask2 -0.004308 0.011211 -0.384
qatbid2 -0.027449 0.010441 -2.629 qatbid2 -0.005465 0.007713 -0.709
askshock -0.057886 0.040942 -1.414 askshock -0.006065 0.077226 -0.079
bidshock -0.286162 0.044856 -6.380 bidshock -0.230293 0.066591 -3.458
sigmarun 0.026902 0.010509 2.560 sigmarun 0.015377 0.009564 1.608
QD1 QD1
L1 0.266822 0.006107 43.690 L1 0.374424 0.023802 15.731
L2 0.150380 0.006307 23.845 L2 0.225527 0.025671 8.785
L3 0.002160 0.006342 0.341 L3 0.008631 0.025923 0.333
L4 0.046765 0.006340 7.377 L4 0.027596 0.026061 1.059
L5 0.012362 0.006280 1.969 L5 -0.006378 0.025364 -0.251
L6 0.045871 0.006096 7.524 L6 0.045764 0.023857 1.918
_cons 0.238901 0.021374 11.177 _cons 0.157240 0.046509 3.381
QD2 QD2
buyinit -0.026818 0.029261 -0.916 buyinit -0.059515 0.071616 -0.831
qatask 0.010289 0.042115 0.244 qatask -0.009210 0.089224 -0.103
qatbid 0.126664 0.045096 2.809 qatbid 0.221198 0.076563 2.889
qatask2 -0.017968 0.010386 -1.730 qatask2 0.002331 0.012784 0.182
qatbid2 -0.020283 0.010437 -1.943 qatbid2 -0.016173 0.008746 -1.849
askshock -0.005923 0.040814 -0.145 askshock -0.029025 0.085535 -0.339
bidshock -0.150760 0.044477 -3.390 bidshock -0.094734 0.074462 -1.272
sigmarun 0.020606 0.010505 1.962 sigmarun 0.007352 0.010884 0.675
QD2 QD2
L1 0.294607 0.006046 48.724 L1 0.221084 0.023692 9.332
L2 0.158316 0.006252 25.321 L2 0.187875 0.024097 7.797
L3 0.036537 0.006312 5.789 L3 0.049069 0.024418 2.010
L4 0.074271 0.006306 11.778 L4 0.024965 0.024509 1.019
L5 0.000570 0.006256 0.091 L5 0.048831 0.024083 2.028
L6 0.007874 0.006042 1.303 L6 0.014953 0.023886 0.626
_cons 0.058191 0.021192 2.746 _cons 0.058616 0.052988 1.106
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QD3 QD3
buyinit -0.006873 0.029002 -0.237 buyinit 0.176996 0.066321 2.669
qatask -0.022058 0.041731 -0.529 qatask -0.183253 0.083937 -2.183
qatbid 0.039378 0.044632 0.882 qatbid 0.489185 0.071639 6.829
qatask2 0.009013 0.010302 0.875 qatask2 -0.008968 0.011955 -0.750
qatbid2 0.006778 0.010352 0.655 qatbid2 -0.016009 0.008139 -1.967
askshock -0.003552 0.040444 -0.088 askshock 0.096976 0.081091 1.196
bidshock -0.069566 0.044020 -1.580 bidshock -0.510449 0.069744 -7.319
sigmarun -0.007287 0.010420 -0.699 sigmarun 0.019737 0.010179 1.939
QD3 QD3
L1 0.304864 0.006034 50.529 L1 0.204976 0.023607 8.683
L2 0.152662 0.006275 24.329 L2 0.351898 0.023380 15.052
L3 0.067524 0.006328 10.670 L3 0.015573 0.024859 0.626
L4 0.037921 0.006325 5.996 L4 0.047306 0.024745 1.912
L5 -0.002821 0.006278 -0.449 L5 -0.009248 0.023345 -0.396
L6 0.041389 0.006034 6.859 L6 0.000025 0.022943 0.001
_cons 0.018078 0.020998 0.861 _cons -0.001726 0.049122 -0.035
QD4 QD4
buyinit 0.025542 0.028763 0.888 buyinit -0.031482 0.065285 -0.482
qatask -0.022927 0.041423 -0.553 qatask -0.008905 0.081283 -0.110
qatbid 0.081713 0.044208 1.848 qatbid 0.030054 0.069559 0.432
qatask2 -0.008601 0.010226 -0.841 qatask2 0.001154 0.011644 0.099
qatbid2 -0.010636 0.010276 -1.035 qatbid2 0.000465 0.007949 0.059
askshock 0.017607 0.040142 0.439 askshock -0.014012 0.078031 -0.180
bidshock -0.094895 0.043629 -2.175 bidshock -0.044061 0.067855 -0.649
sigmarun 0.011218 0.010343 1.085 sigmarun 0.000168 0.009889 0.017
QD4 QD4
L1 0.270115 0.006133 44.042 L1 0.390082 0.023702 16.458
L2 0.184108 0.006332 29.074 L2 0.213579 0.025358 8.422
L3 0.038001 0.006420 5.919 L3 -0.047055 0.025706 -1.831
L4 0.057316 0.006420 8.928 L4 0.089344 0.025733 3.472
L5 0.031203 0.006335 4.925 L5 -0.003885 0.025460 -0.153
L6 0.038636 0.006134 6.298 L6 0.056259 0.023786 2.365
_cons 0.009439 0.020844 0.453 _cons 0.028175 0.048328 0.583
QD5 QD5
buyinit -0.008360 0.029762 -0.281 buyinit -0.146703 0.060420 -2.428
qatask 0.024648 0.042873 0.575 qatask 0.229498 0.075517 3.039
qatbid 0.031041 0.045779 0.678 qatbid -0.243358 0.065062 -3.740
qatask2 -0.004426 0.010580 -0.418 qatask2 0.049968 0.010781 4.635
qatbid2 -0.001348 0.010632 -0.127 qatbid2 0.039834 0.007371 5.404
askshock -0.025282 0.041549 -0.608 askshock -0.314300 0.072565 -4.331
bidshock -0.061180 0.045173 -1.354 bidshock 0.254648 0.063157 4.032
sigmarun 0.005160 0.010701 0.482 sigmarun -0.047478 0.009184 -5.170
QD5 QD5
L1 0.225541 0.006135 36.766 L1 0.345262 0.023585 14.639
L2 0.171689 0.006278 27.349 L2 0.305881 0.024802 12.333
L3 0.009378 0.006352 1.477 L3 -0.072498 0.025535 -2.839
L4 0.063682 0.006350 10.029 L4 0.131975 0.025623 5.151
L5 0.022204 0.006281 3.535 L5 0.036722 0.024441 1.502
L6 0.041241 0.006134 6.724 L6 0.017251 0.023609 0.731
_cons 0.024065 0.021572 1.116 _cons 0.057706 0.044500 1.297
185 
 
 
Q1 Q1
buyinit 0.042884 0.028384 1.511 buyinit 0.161665 0.062441 2.589
qatask 0.159181 0.041304 3.854 qatask 0.002836 0.079410 0.036
qatbid 0.132758 0.043524 3.050 qatbid 0.405757 0.068146 5.954
qatask2 -0.022657 0.010022 -2.261 qatask2 -0.014251 0.011057 -1.289
qatbid2 -0.017142 0.010072 -1.702 qatbid2 -0.021491 0.007562 -2.842
askshock -0.102731 0.039979 -2.570 askshock 0.054776 0.076368 0.717
bidshock -0.064190 0.042950 -1.495 bidshock -0.133109 0.065838 -2.022
sigmarun 0.021046 0.010137 2.076 sigmarun 0.009109 0.009408 0.968
Q1 Q1
L1 0.270580 0.006041 44.795 L1 0.133760 0.023676 5.650
L2 0.209113 0.006179 33.842 L2 0.564566 0.023934 23.588
L3 0.027363 0.006270 4.364 L3 -0.015557 0.026827 -0.580
L4 0.110693 0.006256 17.695 L4 -0.187177 0.026968 -6.941
L5 0.038250 0.006184 6.185 L5 0.044304 0.023763 1.864
L6 0.020977 0.006005 3.493 L6 0.104664 0.023698 4.417
_cons 0.026215 0.020772 1.262 _cons -0.037377 0.046314 -0.807
Q2 Q2
buyinit 0.016604 0.028638 0.580 buyinit -0.147545 0.062916 -2.345
qatask 0.114941 0.041249 2.787 qatask 0.358404 0.080726 4.440
qatbid 0.118269 0.043972 2.690 qatbid -0.057004 0.069177 -0.824
qatask2 -0.027610 0.010177 -2.713 qatask2 0.038449 0.011192 3.436
qatbid2 -0.024337 0.010227 -2.380 qatbid2 0.041962 0.007655 5.482
askshock -0.078369 0.039971 -1.961 askshock -0.416482 0.077195 -5.395
bidshock -0.114626 0.043400 -2.641 bidshock -0.026133 0.066808 -0.391
sigmarun 0.026806 0.010293 2.604 sigmarun -0.040692 0.009536 -4.267
Q2 Q2
L1 0.391463 0.006076 64.426 L1 0.303126 0.023656 12.814
L2 0.130746 0.006499 20.118 L2 0.233661 0.024811 9.418
L3 -0.069562 0.006542 -10.633 L3 0.010976 0.025267 0.434
L4 0.020589 0.006542 3.147 L4 -0.000785 0.025954 -0.030
L5 0.020791 0.006500 3.199 L5 0.014547 0.025492 0.571
L6 0.021961 0.006075 3.615 L6 0.112665 0.024868 4.530
_cons 0.047535 0.020759 2.290 _cons 0.136301 0.046976 2.902
Q3 Q3
buyinit -0.069817 0.029147 -2.395 buyinit 0.294289 0.061743 4.766
qatask 0.097938 0.041966 2.334 qatask -0.191843 0.080167 -2.393
qatbid -0.066429 0.044770 -1.484 qatbid 0.779376 0.067763 11.501
qatask2 0.026582 0.010362 2.565 qatask2 -0.000652 0.011079 -0.059
qatbid2 0.029589 0.010413 2.842 qatbid2 -0.015118 0.007568 -1.998
askshock -0.123835 0.040673 -3.045 askshock 0.158403 0.077495 2.044
bidshock 0.019580 0.044188 0.443 bidshock -0.629036 0.065616 -9.587
sigmarun -0.028120 0.010481 -2.683 sigmarun -0.002291 0.009436 -0.243
Q3 Q3
L1 0.319182 0.006080 52.494 L1 0.247985 0.023314 10.637
L2 0.172764 0.006354 27.190 L2 0.251472 0.023370 10.760
L3 -0.019075 0.006433 -2.965 L3 -0.024193 0.023882 -1.013
L4 0.024361 0.006433 3.787 L4 0.112233 0.023624 4.751
L5 0.031245 0.006356 4.916 L5 -0.050412 0.022971 -2.195
L6 0.022753 0.006083 3.740 L6 0.137189 0.022446 6.112
_cons 0.047747 0.021118 2.261 _cons -0.024471 0.045704 -0.535
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Q4 Q4
buyinit -0.008592 0.029171 -0.295 buyinit -0.036033 0.068300 -0.528
qatask 0.059057 0.041995 1.406 qatask -0.029121 0.085502 -0.341
qatbid -0.026985 0.044806 -0.602 qatbid 0.098909 0.073277 1.350
qatask2 0.002472 0.010371 0.238 qatask2 -0.005224 0.012209 -0.428
qatbid2 0.006226 0.010421 0.597 qatbid2 -0.008705 0.008331 -1.045
askshock -0.058466 0.040704 -1.436 askshock -0.008693 0.081907 -0.106
bidshock -0.008114 0.044224 -0.183 bidshock -0.028390 0.071383 -0.398
sigmarun -0.003906 0.010490 -0.372 sigmarun 0.007147 0.010365 0.690
Q4 Q4
L1 0.314712 0.006071 51.837 L1 0.263403 0.023536 11.191
L2 0.136686 0.006341 21.557 L2 0.282639 0.024267 11.647
L3 0.021165 0.006374 3.320 L3 -0.057126 0.025012 -2.284
L4 0.044843 0.006374 7.036 L4 0.042754 0.025013 1.709
L5 0.016401 0.006339 2.587 L5 0.022041 0.024309 0.907
L6 0.052256 0.006070 8.609 L6 0.074628 0.023427 3.186
_cons 0.019050 0.021132 0.901 _cons 0.027744 0.050566 0.549
Q5 Q5
buyinit 0.024852 0.029231 0.850 buyinit 0.022173 0.066539 0.333
qatask 0.056062 0.042104 1.331 qatask -0.009904 0.082890 -0.119
qatbid 0.070309 0.044926 1.565 qatbid -0.059803 0.071165 -0.840
qatask2 -0.026042 0.010392 -2.506 qatask2 0.019632 0.011892 1.651
qatbid2 -0.034315 0.010443 -3.286 qatbid2 0.011350 0.008124 1.397
askshock -0.047223 0.040805 -1.157 askshock -0.103914 0.079638 -1.305
bidshock -0.043866 0.044333 -0.989 bidshock 0.003566 0.069425 0.051
sigmarun 0.034961 0.010511 3.326 sigmarun -0.010697 0.010109 -1.058
Q5 Q5
L1 0.242681 0.006117 39.676 L1 0.333266 0.023659 14.086
L2 0.167542 0.006287 26.650 L2 0.173471 0.024820 6.989
L3 0.062109 0.006361 9.765 L3 0.023044 0.025066 0.919
L4 0.052714 0.006359 8.289 L4 0.024318 0.025057 0.971
L5 0.000458 0.006288 0.073 L5 0.025323 0.024796 1.021
L6 0.051940 0.006117 8.492 L6 0.103279 0.023664 4.364
_cons 0.016167 0.021182 0.763 _cons -0.009475 0.049283 -0.192
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ZFX QAN
Equation Obs R-sq Chi2 Equation Obs R-sq Chi2
dbestbid 17246 0.301 11760 dbestbid 9170 0.429 9162
dbestask 17246 0.268 10820 dbestask 9170 0.420 9053
spread 17246 0.048 22397 spread 9170 -0.054 10076
QD1 17246 0.447 15675 QD1 9170 0.666 22032
QD2 17246 0.266 8024 QD2 9170 0.473 11124
QD3 17246 0.260 7321 QD3 9170 0.681 21191
QD4 17246 0.245 7678 QD4 9170 0.423 10667
QD5 17246 0.289 8357 QD5 9170 0.603 18521
Q1 17246 0.572 26639 Q1 9170 0.679 21028
Q2 17246 0.480 18663 Q2 9170 0.577 16173
Q3 17246 0.394 12626 Q3 9170 0.740 28729
Q4 17246 0.472 19341 Q4 9170 0.523 12286
Q5 17246 0.424 14265 Q5 9170 0.690 21344
ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z ind. Var Coef. Std. Error Z
dbestbid dbestbid
buyinit 0.003808 0.000638 5.967 buyinit 0.001615 0.000222 7.276
qatask 0.005050 0.000884 5.711 qatask 0.002377 0.000316 7.520
qatbid -0.001656 0.000923 -1.795 qatbid -0.002632 0.000339 -7.775
qatask2 -0.000749 0.000221 -3.387 qatask2 -0.000191 0.000048 -3.978
qatbid2 -0.000192 0.000218 -0.880 qatbid2 0.000159 0.000047 3.415
askshock 0.000939 0.000863 1.089 askshock 0.000324 0.000309 1.048
bidshock -0.002718 0.000897 -3.029 bidshock -0.000346 0.000333 -1.040
sigmarun 0.000396 0.000220 1.801 sigmarun 0.000014 0.000049 0.283
dbestbid dbestbid
L1 -0.290263 0.005407 -53.681 L1 -0.347843 0.006924 -50.236
L2 -0.007581 0.005654 -1.341 L2 -0.113487 0.007374 -15.390
L3 -0.060384 0.005633 -10.721 L3 -0.099497 0.007299 -13.631
L4 0.008748 0.005657 1.546 L4 -0.013253 0.007309 -1.813
L5 -0.019794 0.005547 -3.568 L5 -0.034374 0.007094 -4.846
L6 0.008886 0.004356 2.040 L6 -0.004107 0.005232 -0.785
_cons -0.000972 0.000438 -2.219 _cons -0.000881 0.000151 -5.852
dbestask dbestask
buyinit 0.003229 0.000636 5.075 buyinit 0.001341 0.000218 6.141
qatask 0.004185 0.000885 4.728 qatask 0.002791 0.000312 8.954
qatbid -0.002359 0.000923 -2.556 qatbid -0.002538 0.000334 -7.593
qatask2 -0.000935 0.000221 -4.233 qatask2 -0.000199 0.000047 -4.199
qatbid2 -0.000384 0.000218 -1.762 qatbid2 0.000148 0.000046 3.229
askshock 0.002115 0.000863 2.449 askshock -0.000066 0.000305 -0.217
bidshock -0.001518 0.000898 -1.691 bidshock -0.000419 0.000329 -1.275
sigmarun 0.000579 0.000220 2.631 sigmarun 0.000024 0.000048 0.494
dbestask dbestask
L1 -0.290067 0.005386 -53.855 L1 -0.347429 0.006945 -50.023
L2 -0.008424 0.005633 -1.495 L2 -0.114113 0.007394 -15.434
L3 -0.059413 0.005611 -10.590 L3 -0.100241 0.007319 -13.696
L4 0.008435 0.005637 1.496 L4 -0.013444 0.007332 -1.834
L5 -0.019527 0.005521 -3.537 L5 -0.034508 0.007114 -4.851
L6 0.009351 0.004341 2.154 L6 -0.004392 0.005278 -0.832
_cons -0.001132 0.000438 -2.584 _cons -0.000654 0.000148 -4.423
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spread spread
buyinit -0.000566 0.000195 -2.903 buyinit -0.000254 0.000054 -4.694
qatask -0.000591 0.000277 -2.138 qatask 0.000303 0.000080 3.799
qatbid -0.000528 0.000287 -1.842 qatbid 0.000048 0.000085 0.570
qatask2 -0.000189 0.000069 -2.728 qatask2 -0.000003 0.000012 -0.238
qatbid2 -0.000196 0.000068 -2.870 qatbid2 -0.000006 0.000012 -0.518
askshock 0.000885 0.000270 3.278 askshock -0.000287 0.000078 -3.676
bidshock 0.001033 0.000278 3.716 bidshock -0.000033 0.000083 -0.392
sigmarun 0.000187 0.000069 2.705 sigmarun 0.000005 0.000012 0.421
spread spread
L1 0.523688 0.005674 92.296 L1 0.527442 0.007514 70.192
L2 0.259990 0.006262 41.516 L2 0.175063 0.008217 21.305
L3 -0.034033 0.006386 -5.329 L3 0.022044 0.008252 2.671
L4 0.069318 0.006396 10.838 L4 0.072551 0.008215 8.832
L5 -0.012219 0.006263 -1.951 L5 -0.007392 0.008186 -0.903
L6 0.033272 0.005848 5.690 L6 0.015845 0.007562 2.095
_cons 0.001754 0.000155 11.327 _cons 0.002168 0.000113 19.248
QD1 QD1
buyinit -0.203157 0.032675 -6.217 buyinit -0.080084 0.022002 -3.640
qatask -0.074314 0.046616 -1.594 qatask -0.045181 0.033107 -1.365
qatbid 0.191897 0.048383 3.966 qatbid 0.289071 0.034769 8.314
qatask2 0.010555 0.011577 0.912 qatask2 0.022244 0.004966 4.479
qatbid2 -0.008872 0.011404 -0.778 qatbid2 0.006517 0.004814 1.354
askshock -0.013096 0.045434 -0.288 askshock -0.109269 0.032351 -3.378
bidshock -0.221885 0.046906 -4.730 bidshock -0.304040 0.034245 -8.878
sigmarun -0.002246 0.011523 -0.195 sigmarun -0.019825 0.005042 -3.932
QD1 QD1
L1 0.403418 0.007308 55.205 L1 0.453421 0.009428 48.094
L2 0.227509 0.007808 29.137 L2 0.329532 0.010145 32.481
L3 0.003243 0.007903 0.410 L3 0.004874 0.010512 0.464
L4 0.122669 0.007900 15.528 L4 0.089605 0.010444 8.580
L5 -0.007564 0.007804 -0.969 L5 -0.028366 0.010059 -2.820
L6 0.078395 0.007304 10.733 L6 0.060085 0.009312 6.453
_cons 0.156701 0.022683 6.908 _cons 0.121629 0.015087 8.062
QD2 QD2
buyinit -0.033699 0.037354 -0.902 buyinit 0.028914 0.027405 1.055
qatask 0.203503 0.053289 3.819 qatask -0.033769 0.040462 -0.835
qatbid 0.120217 0.055256 2.176 qatbid -0.000222 0.043064 -0.005
qatask2 -0.008574 0.013317 -0.644 qatask2 0.018177 0.006203 2.930
qatbid2 -0.012679 0.013121 -0.966 qatbid2 0.011012 0.006009 1.833
askshock -0.172137 0.051963 -3.313 askshock 0.033677 0.039550 0.851
bidshock -0.108146 0.053547 -2.020 bidshock -0.026945 0.042407 -0.635
sigmarun 0.005941 0.013255 0.448 sigmarun -0.008496 0.006295 -1.350
QD2 QD2
L1 0.302453 0.007292 41.480 L1 0.379907 0.009347 40.645
L2 0.251922 0.007522 33.490 L2 0.367247 0.009867 37.220
L3 0.023921 0.007707 3.104 L3 -0.053936 0.010369 -5.202
L4 0.075533 0.007709 9.798 L4 0.093562 0.010368 9.024
L5 0.025385 0.007526 3.373 L5 -0.024446 0.009862 -2.479
L6 0.063882 0.007282 8.772 L6 0.069263 0.009355 7.404
_cons 0.093780 0.026022 3.604 _cons -0.031040 0.018780 -1.653
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QD3 QD3
buyinit -0.104610 0.037547 -2.786 buyinit -0.005949 0.021378 -0.278
qatask 0.122132 0.053320 2.291 qatask 0.097144 0.031665 3.068
qatbid -0.050235 0.055267 -0.909 qatbid 0.017907 0.033584 0.533
qatask2 -0.029090 0.013386 -2.173 qatask2 -0.008086 0.004831 -1.674
qatbid2 -0.028436 0.013189 -2.156 qatbid2 -0.006024 0.004680 -1.287
askshock -0.056931 0.052027 -1.094 askshock -0.096239 0.030951 -3.109
bidshock 0.066810 0.053578 1.247 bidshock -0.061896 0.033088 -1.871
sigmarun 0.027756 0.013324 2.083 sigmarun 0.008436 0.004902 1.721
QD3 QD3
L1 0.274956 0.007295 37.690 L1 0.374147 0.010125 36.951
L2 0.260593 0.007532 34.598 L2 0.396546 0.010763 36.844
L3 0.020331 0.007722 2.633 L3 -0.018751 0.011448 -1.638
L4 0.097541 0.007722 12.631 L4 0.086125 0.011447 7.524
L5 0.019302 0.007531 2.563 L5 0.035536 0.010761 3.302
L6 0.042118 0.007297 5.772 L6 0.040185 0.010122 3.970
_cons 0.065205 0.026080 2.500 _cons 0.033484 0.014691 2.279
QD4 QD4
buyinit 0.058057 0.037854 1.534 buyinit 0.030173 0.028651 1.053
qatask 0.015342 0.053683 0.286 qatask 0.013729 0.042269 0.325
qatbid 0.160089 0.055722 2.873 qatbid 0.118278 0.044974 2.630
qatask2 0.026749 0.013509 1.980 qatask2 0.003452 0.006489 0.532
qatbid2 0.024023 0.013309 1.805 qatbid2 0.004934 0.006288 0.785
askshock -0.058070 0.052369 -1.109 askshock 0.051202 0.041319 1.239
bidshock -0.181664 0.054021 -3.363 bidshock -0.126664 0.044303 -2.859
sigmarun -0.024822 0.013446 -1.846 sigmarun -0.007598 0.006587 -1.154
QD4 QD4
L1 0.285354 0.007128 40.031 L1 0.420099 0.008993 46.715
L2 0.293731 0.007351 39.957 L2 0.342515 0.009620 35.604
L3 -0.012165 0.007606 -1.599 L3 -0.068779 0.010036 -6.853
L4 0.075536 0.007598 9.942 L4 0.132643 0.010012 13.249
L5 0.043101 0.007357 5.859 L5 -0.061367 0.009606 -6.388
L6 0.033071 0.007127 4.640 L6 0.048927 0.008994 5.440
_cons 0.013316 0.026267 0.507 _cons 0.002807 0.019638 0.143
QD5 QD5
buyinit 0.027763 0.036772 0.755 buyinit -0.008610 0.023768 -0.362
qatask -0.020762 0.052149 -0.398 qatask 0.060990 0.035280 1.729
qatbid -0.013029 0.054096 -0.241 qatbid 0.001851 0.037412 0.049
qatask2 0.020256 0.013121 1.544 qatask2 0.013595 0.005376 2.529
qatbid2 0.019531 0.012927 1.511 qatbid2 0.010512 0.005207 2.019
askshock -0.002056 0.050884 -0.040 askshock -0.059602 0.034500 -1.728
bidshock -0.008429 0.052450 -0.161 bidshock -0.033401 0.036858 -0.906
sigmarun -0.021628 0.013060 -1.656 sigmarun -0.009637 0.005456 -1.766
QD5 QD5
L1 0.289997 0.007356 39.425 L1 0.412429 0.009434 43.716
L2 0.277653 0.007618 36.447 L2 0.342644 0.010159 33.730
L3 -0.008351 0.007830 -1.067 L3 0.012484 0.010623 1.175
L4 0.104014 0.007830 13.283 L4 0.098336 0.010635 9.246
L5 0.033169 0.007619 4.353 L5 -0.042809 0.010159 -4.214
L6 0.048016 0.007356 6.528 L6 0.084129 0.009429 8.922
_cons -0.017872 0.025518 -0.700 _cons 0.014172 0.016348 0.867
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Q1 Q1
buyinit 0.049202 0.028654 1.717 buyinit 0.030597 0.021617 1.415
qatask 0.044240 0.041064 1.077 qatask 0.157221 0.031882 4.931
qatbid 0.023447 0.042229 0.555 qatbid 0.058869 0.033745 1.745
qatask2 -0.020227 0.010175 -1.988 qatask2 -0.010215 0.004850 -2.106
qatbid2 -0.017065 0.010026 -1.702 qatbid2 0.002578 0.004698 0.549
askshock -0.025652 0.040027 -0.641 askshock -0.133044 0.031193 -4.265
bidshock -0.067757 0.040908 -1.656 bidshock -0.169218 0.033232 -5.092
sigmarun 0.022087 0.010128 2.181 sigmarun 0.004307 0.004923 0.875
Q1 Q1
L1 0.392677 0.007240 54.237 L1 0.454439 0.009988 45.498
L2 0.348111 0.007722 45.082 L2 0.375861 0.010917 34.430
L3 -0.019296 0.008110 -2.379 L3 -0.029894 0.011471 -2.606
L4 0.082408 0.008101 10.172 L4 0.088812 0.011465 7.746
L5 -0.041280 0.007722 -5.346 L5 -0.041605 0.010911 -3.813
L6 0.132355 0.007231 18.304 L6 0.036683 0.009940 3.691
_cons 0.000002 0.020071 0.000 _cons 0.042395 0.014864 2.852
Q2 Q2
buyinit 0.026340 0.031453 0.837 buyinit 0.003481 0.024548 0.142
qatask 0.110827 0.044764 2.476 qatask 0.044637 0.036145 1.235
qatbid 0.107808 0.046401 2.323 qatbid 0.021253 0.038543 0.551
qatask2 -0.054930 0.011216 -4.898 qatask2 0.004765 0.005556 0.858
qatbid2 -0.050310 0.011050 -4.553 qatbid2 0.000234 0.005382 0.044
askshock -0.063326 0.043674 -1.450 askshock -0.084838 0.035343 -2.400
bidshock -0.063924 0.044982 -1.421 bidshock -0.016099 0.037961 -0.424
sigmarun 0.054435 0.011164 4.876 sigmarun -0.000856 0.005638 -0.152
Q2 Q2
L1 0.361827 0.007245 49.942 L1 0.380684 0.009462 40.231
L2 0.360836 0.007648 47.183 L2 0.388470 0.010019 38.772
L3 -0.057785 0.008056 -7.173 L3 -0.035677 0.010619 -3.360
L4 0.105287 0.008051 13.077 L4 0.113364 0.010622 10.673
L5 0.006917 0.007649 0.904 L5 -0.019450 0.010020 -1.941
L6 0.066741 0.007244 9.214 L6 0.051906 0.009459 5.488
_cons 0.037426 0.021884 1.710 _cons 0.013741 0.016806 0.818
Q3 Q3
buyinit 0.002372 0.033970 0.070 buyinit 0.042895 0.019279 2.225
qatask 0.034134 0.048288 0.707 qatask 0.023548 0.028525 0.826
qatbid 0.023639 0.050034 0.472 qatbid 0.158414 0.030473 5.198
qatask2 0.002632 0.012123 0.217 qatask2 0.006952 0.004360 1.595
qatbid2 0.002017 0.011944 0.169 qatbid2 0.002215 0.004223 0.525
askshock -0.046386 0.047120 -0.984 askshock -0.075590 0.027892 -2.710
bidshock -0.011215 0.048506 -0.231 bidshock -0.107118 0.030002 -3.570
sigmarun -0.004929 0.012066 -0.408 sigmarun -0.005468 0.004424 -1.236
Q3 Q3
L1 0.225544 0.007361 30.639 L1 0.404846 0.009991 40.519
L2 0.376275 0.007519 50.043 L2 0.437121 0.010732 40.732
L3 -0.011899 0.007976 -1.492 L3 -0.061244 0.011569 -5.294
L4 0.089070 0.007974 11.170 L4 0.109461 0.011557 9.472
L5 0.050126 0.007521 6.665 L5 -0.030935 0.010699 -2.892
L6 0.086581 0.007363 11.759 L6 0.070038 0.009986 7.014
_cons 0.015220 0.023614 0.645 _cons 0.013167 0.013220 0.996
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Q4 Q4
buyinit 0.022373 0.031652 0.707 buyinit 0.018836 0.026137 0.721
qatask 0.001600 0.044999 0.036 qatask 0.035846 0.038466 0.932
qatbid 0.064847 0.046705 1.388 qatbid 0.177491 0.041040 4.325
qatask2 0.000079 0.011294 0.007 qatask2 0.008916 0.005914 1.508
qatbid2 -0.001535 0.011128 -0.138 qatbid2 -0.000433 0.005730 -0.075
askshock -0.042245 0.043900 -0.962 askshock -0.076680 0.037601 -2.039
bidshock -0.069870 0.045260 -1.544 bidshock -0.127828 0.040421 -3.162
sigmarun 0.004973 0.011241 0.442 sigmarun -0.006657 0.006002 -1.109
Q4 Q4
L1 0.334513 0.007152 46.774 L1 0.378950 0.009589 39.518
L2 0.350351 0.007501 46.706 L2 0.367157 0.010177 36.076
L3 0.023886 0.007839 3.047 L3 -0.032753 0.010719 -3.056
L4 0.062452 0.007842 7.964 L4 0.108789 0.010714 10.154
L5 -0.001572 0.007505 -0.209 L5 -0.047216 0.010160 -4.647
L6 0.097653 0.007155 13.648 L6 0.062224 0.009582 6.494
_cons 0.008365 0.021999 0.380 _cons 0.031463 0.017889 1.759
Q5 Q5
buyinit 0.083069 0.033137 2.507 buyinit -0.005874 0.021044 -0.279
qatask 0.036842 0.047071 0.783 qatask 0.081009 0.031112 2.604
qatbid 0.220401 0.049005 4.498 qatbid 0.093371 0.033243 2.809
qatask2 0.001169 0.011816 0.099 qatask2 -0.015316 0.004761 -3.217
qatbid2 -0.007207 0.011642 -0.619 qatbid2 -0.013858 0.004612 -3.005
askshock -0.055729 0.045917 -1.214 askshock -0.081925 0.030381 -2.697
bidshock -0.162412 0.047515 -3.418 bidshock -0.056269 0.032740 -1.719
sigmarun 0.000542 0.011761 0.046 sigmarun 0.016659 0.004830 3.449
Q5 Q5
L1 0.350078 0.007354 47.602 L1 0.422392 0.010211 41.367
L2 0.321644 0.007766 41.417 L2 0.384229 0.011066 34.721
L3 -0.014371 0.008079 -1.779 L3 -0.047619 0.011678 -4.078
L4 0.071292 0.008082 8.821 L4 0.106531 0.011680 9.121
L5 -0.009737 0.007759 -1.255 L5 -0.001246 0.011052 -0.113
L6 0.086292 0.007349 11.742 L6 0.032746 0.010207 3.208
_cons 0.013587 0.023017 0.590 _cons 0.031119 0.014439 2.155  
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ANZ WPL
Equation Obs R-sq Chi2 Equation Obs Parms
dbestbid 28626 0.446 29215 dbestbid 30254 0.274
dbestask 28626 0.401 25914 dbestask 30254 0.191
spread 28626 0.017 41394 spread 30254 0.143
QD1 28626 0.236 10573 QD1 30254 0.190
QD2 28626 0.177 8419 QD2 30254 0.126
QD3 28626 0.243 11657 QD3 30254 0.151
QD4 28626 0.187 7917 QD4 30254 0.159
QD5 28626 0.048 1586 QD5 30254 0.138
Q1 28626 0.409 21260 Q1 30254 0.204
Q2 28626 0.331 16869 Q2 30254 0.171
Q3 28626 0.393 20121 Q3 30254 0.177
Q4 28626 0.331 16301 Q4 30254 0.207
Q5 28626 0.361 19144 Q5 30254 0.189
ind. Var Coef. Std. Err. ind. Var Coef. Std.
dbestbid dbestbid
buyinit 0.006122 0.000403 15.177 buyinit 0.002358 0.001550
qatask 0.003182 0.000573 5.551 qatask 0.025823 0.002186
qatbid -0.003632 0.000543 -6.686 qatbid -0.005328 0.002261
qatask2 -0.000066 0.000107 -0.613 qatask2 0.000032 0.000408
qatbid2 0.000461 0.000110 4.173 qatbid2 0.000870 0.000397
askshock 0.002236 0.000561 3.985 askshock -0.014536 0.002155
bidshock -0.002360 0.000538 -4.389 bidshock -0.006517 0.002200
sigmarun -0.000197 0.000110 -1.794 sigmarun -0.000398 0.000409
dbestbid dbestbid
L1 -0.297148 0.004079 -72.847 L1 -0.282713 0.004129
L2 -0.055950 0.004278 -13.077 L2 -0.010760 0.004286
L3 -0.072293 0.004238 -17.060 L3 -0.055788 0.004247
L4 -0.010917 0.004254 -2.566 L4 0.008580 0.004256
L5 -0.032828 0.004163 -7.886 L5 -0.026001 0.004174
L6 0.003601 0.003128 1.151 L6 0.008784 0.003099
_cons -0.002957 0.000289 -10.221 _cons 0.003791 0.001085
dbestask dbestask
buyinit 0.004834 0.000384 12.582 buyinit 0.001103 0.001515
qatask 0.003296 0.000551 5.979 qatask 0.013931 0.002146
qatbid -0.003289 0.000523 -6.293 qatbid -0.011032 0.002217
qatask2 -0.000067 0.000103 -0.653 qatask2 0.000151 0.000399
qatbid2 0.000413 0.000106 3.894 qatbid2 0.000898 0.000388
askshock 0.002293 0.000540 4.249 askshock -0.002646 0.002116
bidshock -0.001953 0.000517 -3.776 bidshock 0.000897 0.002158
sigmarun -0.000193 0.000106 -1.830 sigmarun -0.000497 0.000400
dbestask dbestask
L1 -0.292097 0.004111 -71.055 L1 -0.277552 0.004165
L2 -0.054352 0.004304 -12.629 L2 -0.014178 0.004293
L3 -0.070104 0.004260 -16.455 L3 -0.054731 0.004254
L4 -0.010239 0.004279 -2.393 L4 0.006618 0.004265
L5 -0.032744 0.004188 -7.818 L5 -0.022113 0.004182
L6 0.003364 0.003188 1.055 L6 0.010063 0.003133
_cons -0.002376 0.000277 -8.579 _cons -0.000140 0.001069
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spread spread
buyinit -0.001301 0.000188 -6.923 buyinit -0.001332 0.000685
qatask 0.000049 0.000278 0.176 qatask -0.007663 0.000987
qatbid 0.000207 0.000264 0.783 qatbid -0.001578 0.001012
qatask2 -0.000002 0.000052 -0.047 qatask2 0.000078 0.000183
qatbid2 -0.000047 0.000054 -0.868 qatbid2 -0.000001 0.000178
askshock 0.000091 0.000272 0.334 askshock 0.007723 0.000973
bidshock 0.000525 0.000261 2.010 bidshock 0.003258 0.000983
sigmarun 0.000006 0.000054 0.116 sigmarun -0.000061 0.000184
spread spread
L1 0.564138 0.004278 131.863 L1 0.572843 0.004324
L2 0.211298 0.004797 44.047 L2 0.257392 0.004790
L3 -0.008436 0.004853 -1.738 L3 -0.028437 0.004855
L4 0.055737 0.004848 11.497 L4 0.067684 0.004852
L5 -0.011817 0.004796 -2.464 L5 -0.019044 0.004747
L6 0.034144 0.004389 7.779 L6 0.037418 0.004331
_cons 0.002505 0.000154 16.317 _cons 0.000568 0.000494
QD1 QD1
buyinit -0.293060 0.026737 -10.961 buyinit -0.264064 0.035726
qatask 0.002117 0.039891 0.053 qatask 0.007727 0.050729
qatbid 0.344397 0.038310 8.990 qatbid 0.289494 0.052760
qatask2 0.018677 0.007399 2.524 qatask2 0.010534 0.009514
qatbid2 0.020510 0.007638 2.685 qatbid2 0.012456 0.009246
askshock -0.036778 0.038958 -0.944 askshock -0.022782 0.049972
bidshock -0.441444 0.037757 -11.692 bidshock -0.346921 0.051208
sigmarun -0.016939 0.007597 -2.230 sigmarun -0.011143 0.009525
QD1 QD1
L1 0.325600 0.005757 56.557 L1 0.343932 0.005650
L2 0.203915 0.005980 34.099 L2 0.128431 0.005944
L3 -0.028567 0.006047 -4.724 L3 -0.016891 0.005944
L4 0.083497 0.006051 13.800 L4 0.070513 0.005948
L5 -0.020683 0.005977 -3.461 L5 -0.002332 0.005922
L6 0.065754 0.005767 11.402 L6 0.048382 0.005652
_cons 0.242646 0.019850 12.224 _cons 0.212654 0.025055
QD2 QD2
buyinit -0.047655 0.027458 -1.736 buyinit -0.051081 0.036882
qatask 0.118141 0.040871 2.891 qatask -0.044852 0.052490
qatbid 0.084306 0.038931 2.166 qatbid -0.012555 0.054332
qatask2 0.017590 0.007672 2.293 qatask2 0.011719 0.009881
qatbid2 0.016267 0.007919 2.054 qatbid2 0.010064 0.009602
askshock -0.127336 0.039966 -3.186 askshock 0.035440 0.051731
bidshock -0.133369 0.038502 -3.464 bidshock -0.006251 0.052768
sigmarun -0.017990 0.007877 -2.284 sigmarun -0.011675 0.009893
QD2 QD2
L1 0.277870 0.005563 49.948 L1 0.313129 0.005627
L2 0.222464 0.005717 38.916 L2 0.109702 0.005848
L3 0.006462 0.005827 1.109 L3 -0.011272 0.005871
L4 0.067260 0.005821 11.554 L4 0.051615 0.005869
L5 0.005838 0.005724 1.020 L5 0.041636 0.005851
L6 0.064348 0.005565 11.564 L6 0.031466 0.005626
_cons 0.076403 0.020367 3.751 _cons 0.014692 0.025889
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QD3 QD3
buyinit -0.016894 0.026336 -0.641 buyinit -0.024508 0.036341
qatask 0.151285 0.039220 3.857 qatask 0.011062 0.051705
qatbid 0.081878 0.037283 2.196 qatbid 0.017032 0.053499
qatask2 0.008066 0.007361 1.096 qatask2 0.008352 0.009737
qatbid2 0.009061 0.007599 1.192 qatbid2 0.009202 0.009463
askshock -0.124546 0.038354 -3.247 askshock -0.021540 0.050966
bidshock -0.094573 0.036882 -2.564 bidshock -0.062543 0.051973
sigmarun -0.010031 0.007557 -1.327 sigmarun -0.008880 0.009749
QD3 QD3
L1 0.267948 0.005678 47.187 L1 0.302702 0.005625
L2 0.278962 0.005838 47.786 L2 0.132811 0.005849
L3 0.042768 0.006026 7.097 L3 0.016427 0.005873
L4 0.056315 0.006029 9.341 L4 0.078134 0.005872
L5 0.008507 0.005838 1.457 L5 0.003170 0.005852
L6 0.057800 0.005682 10.173 L6 0.048295 0.005626
_cons 0.055916 0.019544 2.861 _cons 0.028103 0.025503
QD4 QD4
buyinit -0.031401 0.027305 -1.150 buyinit -0.060798 0.036203
qatask 0.155738 0.040582 3.838 qatask -0.023056 0.051496
qatbid 0.041766 0.038617 1.082 qatbid -0.093865 0.053264
qatask2 -0.014114 0.007631 -1.849 qatask2 -0.009874 0.009695
qatbid2 -0.016097 0.007878 -2.043 qatbid2 -0.013549 0.009422
askshock -0.136713 0.039699 -3.444 askshock 0.022193 0.050760
bidshock -0.049285 0.038220 -1.289 bidshock 0.075401 0.051747
sigmarun 0.017081 0.007835 2.180 sigmarun 0.014394 0.009707
QD4 QD4
L1 0.246900 0.005718 43.183 L1 0.266689 0.005687
L2 0.237779 0.005862 40.560 L2 0.164981 0.005871
L3 0.023482 0.005992 3.919 L3 -0.012057 0.005916
L4 0.070091 0.005990 11.701 L4 0.093701 0.005916
L5 0.011759 0.005864 2.005 L5 0.025291 0.005873
L6 0.048133 0.005716 8.421 L6 0.060346 0.005688
_cons 0.060452 0.020233 2.988 _cons 0.008876 0.025402
QD5 QD5
buyinit -0.019657 0.029562 -0.665 buyinit 0.007186 0.036633
qatask 0.128983 0.043907 2.938 qatask 0.022498 0.052136
qatbid 0.040355 0.041734 0.967 qatbid 0.030018 0.053899
qatask2 -0.007064 0.008262 -0.855 qatask2 -0.004331 0.009814
qatbid2 -0.007852 0.008529 -0.921 qatbid2 -0.003788 0.009538
askshock -0.113583 0.042943 -2.645 askshock -0.000815 0.051390
bidshock -0.043211 0.041303 -1.046 bidshock -0.035612 0.052360
sigmarun 0.008603 0.008482 1.014 sigmarun 0.002650 0.009826
QD5 QD5
L1 0.112121 0.005867 19.110 L1 0.275900 0.005689
L2 0.111507 0.005897 18.909 L2 0.155155 0.005885
L3 0.047562 0.005921 8.033 L3 0.012619 0.005945
L4 0.055903 0.005922 9.440 L4 0.044058 0.005944
L5 0.038370 0.005896 6.508 L5 0.017367 0.005886
L6 0.047486 0.005867 8.094 L6 0.034885 0.005689
_cons 0.046083 0.021892 2.105 _cons 0.009026 0.025715
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Q1 Q1
buyinit 0.036316 0.023369 1.554 buyinit 0.018595 0.035506
qatask 0.185908 0.034972 5.316 qatask 0.230543 0.051006
qatbid 0.052636 0.033176 1.587 qatbid 0.099447 0.051992
qatask2 -0.028746 0.006509 -4.417 qatask2 -0.038872 0.009431
qatbid2 -0.024909 0.006719 -3.707 qatbid2 -0.030555 0.009165
askshock -0.121589 0.034182 -3.557 askshock -0.160433 0.050201
bidshock -0.046846 0.032814 -1.428 bidshock -0.030756 0.050516
sigmarun 0.026841 0.006683 4.017 sigmarun 0.038518 0.009442
Q1 Q1
L1 0.275530 0.005812 47.404 L1 0.251248 0.005650
L2 0.343917 0.006008 57.243 L2 0.247195 0.005772
L3 0.030405 0.006313 4.817 L3 0.033889 0.005922
L4 0.068138 0.006311 10.796 L4 0.058470 0.005912
L5 0.014775 0.006006 2.460 L5 -0.008673 0.005773
L6 0.061940 0.005800 10.679 L6 0.055029 0.005618
_cons 0.030918 0.017442 1.773 _cons 0.046493 0.025150
Q2 Q2
buyinit 0.000677 0.024782 0.027 buyinit -0.025904 0.035990
qatask 0.122276 0.036839 3.319 qatask 0.121492 0.051269
qatbid 0.098138 0.035066 2.799 qatbid 0.000188 0.052819
qatask2 -0.016154 0.006927 -2.332 qatask2 -0.010771 0.009617
qatbid2 -0.012418 0.007150 -1.737 qatbid2 -0.005885 0.009347
askshock -0.117573 0.036038 -3.262 askshock -0.107969 0.050534
bidshock -0.109032 0.034689 -3.143 bidshock -0.025699 0.051314
sigmarun 0.015757 0.007112 2.216 sigmarun 0.008263 0.009629
Q2 Q2
L1 0.270469 0.005579 48.482 L1 0.273103 0.005594
L2 0.302672 0.005739 52.737 L2 0.196892 0.005760
L3 0.024926 0.005955 4.186 L3 0.013090 0.005839
L4 0.087874 0.005950 14.768 L4 0.074743 0.005834
L5 0.013385 0.005742 2.331 L5 0.017428 0.005760
L6 0.065391 0.005579 11.721 L6 0.064231 0.005585
_cons 0.054293 0.018368 2.956 _cons 0.048650 0.025296
Q3 Q3
buyinit -0.020276 0.023589 -0.860 buyinit 0.022069 0.035798
qatask 0.116366 0.035105 3.315 qatask 0.034566 0.050916
qatbid 0.068977 0.033432 2.063 qatbid 0.001764 0.052620
qatask2 -0.001374 0.006594 -0.208 qatask2 -0.011116 0.009581
qatbid2 0.000669 0.006807 0.098 qatbid2 -0.007542 0.009311
askshock -0.104870 0.034330 -3.055 askshock -0.015888 0.050191
bidshock -0.077579 0.033072 -2.346 bidshock -0.005063 0.051122
sigmarun -0.000723 0.006770 -0.107 sigmarun 0.009152 0.009592
Q3 Q3
L1 0.286324 0.005744 49.846 L1 0.299617 0.005619
L2 0.311107 0.005949 52.297 L2 0.186668 0.005833
L3 0.004385 0.006168 0.711 L3 0.016139 0.005881
L4 0.105820 0.006168 17.157 L4 0.107945 0.005880
L5 0.038837 0.005949 6.528 L5 -0.016849 0.005834
L6 0.043509 0.005745 7.574 L6 0.035585 0.005618
_cons 0.052684 0.017500 3.011 _cons -0.001430 0.025123
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Q4 Q4
buyinit 0.005499 0.024773 0.222 buyinit -0.077951 0.035143
qatask 0.076617 0.036812 2.081 qatask -0.008152 0.050021
qatbid 0.094253 0.035046 2.689 qatbid -0.186877 0.051711
qatask2 -0.004867 0.006924 -0.703 qatask2 0.005216 0.009415
qatbid2 -0.004728 0.007147 -0.661 qatbid2 0.009882 0.009150
askshock -0.075115 0.036009 -2.086 askshock 0.019283 0.049313
bidshock -0.088275 0.034683 -2.545 bidshock 0.157216 0.050241
sigmarun 0.004142 0.007109 0.583 sigmarun -0.009478 0.009426
Q4 Q4
L1 0.319379 0.005649 56.541 L1 0.284928 0.005682
L2 0.240933 0.005892 40.892 L2 0.207718 0.005883
L3 0.015742 0.006022 2.614 L3 0.050345 0.005993
L4 0.081482 0.006020 13.535 L4 0.018880 0.005994
L5 0.035537 0.005893 6.031 L5 0.032275 0.005880
L6 0.069880 0.005646 12.376 L6 0.058785 0.005680
_cons 0.037036 0.018356 2.018 _cons -0.002845 0.024673
Q5 Q5
buyinit 0.034492 0.024207 1.425 buyinit -0.053070 0.035527
qatask 0.004816 0.035963 0.134 qatask 0.071203 0.050589
qatbid 0.089347 0.034243 2.609 qatbid -0.079679 0.052262
qatask2 0.001596 0.006765 0.236 qatask2 0.012341 0.009516
qatbid2 0.004287 0.006983 0.614 qatbid2 0.014438 0.009248
askshock -0.001394 0.035180 -0.040 askshock -0.062746 0.049867
bidshock -0.109356 0.033890 -3.227 bidshock 0.065349 0.050772
sigmarun -0.003184 0.006945 -0.458 sigmarun -0.014803 0.009528
Q5 Q5
L1 0.312783 0.005627 55.587 L1 0.263806 0.005684
L2 0.247611 0.005859 42.260 L2 0.230668 0.005868
L3 0.035825 0.005973 5.998 L3 0.004291 0.006010
L4 0.114475 0.005973 19.166 L4 0.023543 0.006011
L5 0.013626 0.005860 2.326 L5 0.033152 0.005868
L6 0.072760 0.005627 12.930 L6 0.060308 0.005685
_cons 0.007138 0.017932 0.398 _cons 0.022122 0.024949
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6.2 Appendices from Chapter 2 
6.2.1 Instructions for Random Arrival Experiments 
 
Instructions 
  
**If you have questions that these instructions do not answer, please call or email us to 
get answers. You should have been given the appropriate TEL# and E-mail address with 
your initial instructions.  
 
IMPORTANT TEL#s, EMail addresses, and URLs  
If you have any questions or comments for us, please contact us via  
      eeps@hss.caltech.edu  
      (626) 395-4876 or (626)395-4063  
Important announcements will be posted to the following WEB Page during the 
experiment.  
      http://hss.caltech.edu/~eeps/news.html  
 
 
I. HOW THE MARKET WORKS 
In the experiment there will be a public market X and in addition each person will have a 
private market PX###, where ### is the person’s ID number. Each of these has a 
different function but both are important. 
In market X, all participants can trade good X. X is traded in a fictitious currency called 
francs. At the end of the experiment, francs will be worth real money (the exchange rate, 
which can differ across participants, will be given to you at the time of the experiment) , 
but units of X will be worth nothing.  
You will also have a private market PX###, where ### is your ID number. At random 
times, you will receive orders from the experimenter that show up in your private market. 
Only you see the orders in your private market and you choose whether to take advantage 
of them. These orders have a price and a time tag indicating when the order expires. 
The orders in your private market will be either BUY or SELL orders.  
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BUY orders in your private market mean the experimenter is willing to buy units from 
you at the prices and quantities listed on the orders. IMPORTANT: In order to make 
money on BUY orders in your private market you will buy units from the public market 
and then sell them for higher prices in your private market by filling the experimenter’s 
BUY orders. 
SELL orders in your private market mean the experimenter is willing to sell units to you 
at the prices and quantities listed on the orders. IMPORTANT: If you have SELL orders 
in your private market you will also be loaned two units of X at the begining of the 
experiment. When you sell X in the public market, you should replenish your supply by 
buying X in your private market. The units of X you are loaned will have to be paid 
back at the end of the experiment, so make sure to keeps units of X in your 
inventory. IMPORTANT: In order to make money on SELL orders in your private 
market you will have to buy units from the experimenter in your private market and sell 
them to other subjects in the public market at higher prices than you paid for them. 
If you don’t have any orders you can profit from immediately, don’t worry. New orders 
will be periodically sent to your private market as the experiment progresses. Each 
private order is available only for a fixed amount of time, so watch the time tag on each 
order and act on profitable orders before they expire. 
II. HOW YOU MAKE MONEY 
THE BEST (AND EASIEST) THING YOU CAN DO TO MAKE MONEY is simply to 
stay for the whole experiment. The amount of money you can expect to make on each 
individual trade is relatively small, but if you stay for the whole experiment you will 
make many trades and the small amounts you make on each trade will quickly add up to 
large sums. 
You will make most of your money by either buying in the public market and reselling in 
your private market or by buying in your private market and reselling in the public 
market. You can buy and resell (speculate) in the public market but remember that the X 
have no value at all. You hold inventories of X only with a risk and be prepared to sell at 
a loss if you have an inventory and the prices fall. You should not let profitable orders in 
your private order book expire while holding inventory of X. 
EXAMPLE #1  
Suppose the best offer in your PRIVATE BUY ORDER BOOK is 200 and the best offer 
in the PUBLIC SELL ORDER BOOK is 100. If you purchase a unit at the best offer in 
the public market and resell at the best offer in the private market, you make a profit.  
Sale in Private Market 200 francs 
(You take the experimenter’s 
buy order.)  
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Purchase in Public Market 100 francs 
(You place a buy order.) 
__________ 
Profit (added to cash) 100 francs 
EXAMPLE #2  
Suppose the best offer in the PUBLIC BUY ORDER BOOK is 200 and the best offer in 
the PRIVATE SELL ORDER BOOK is 100. If you purchase a unit at the best offer price 
in your private market and resell at the best offer price in the public market, you make a 
profit.  
Sale in Public Market 200 francs 
(You enter a sell order.) 
Purchase in Private Market 100 francs 
(You take the experimenter’s 
sell order.) 
__________ 
Profit (added to cash) 100 francs 
The profits you make are yours to keep. 
  
WARNING!  
YOUR WEB PAGE DOES NOT UPDATE AUTOMATICALLY.  
REMEMBER THAT THE INFORMATION DISPLAYED BY YOUR WEB 
BROWSER MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE. So when you see a good offer posted in the 
book and rush to send in a limit order to take it, there is the possibility that someone may 
beat you to it and that your limit order will either be unfilled or be filled by the next best 
available offer.  
HINTS FOR MAKING MORE MONEY 
 Refresh often. 
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 Be sure to take advantage of offers in your private market before they expire. 
Periodically checking your private market will help you know what offers are still 
available.  
 Take advantage of profitable trades in your private market before they expire.  
 Watch your inventory. Goods are worth nothing outside the experiment; only 
francs can be exchanged for cash at the end of the experiment.  
 The limit orders in your private market need not be acted upon unless you think 
it is in your interest to do so. In your private market you can select the order that 
you wish to fill. Since the orders have different expiration time you may want to 
consider your actions base on both the expiration and the price of the order.  
  
MARKET ORGANIZATION  
The market screens should be self-explanatory. You will be free to send buy or sell orders 
to the public market. Limit orders received will be placed in the public market BOOK 
unless you choose otherwise. The limit sell orders are arranged from high to low at the 
top of the page. The limit buy orders will be arranged from low to high starting at the 
bottom of the page. In the middle of the page, you will see the best (lowest) sell order that 
is in the book and the best (highest) buy order that is in the book. These orders are 
displayed publicly for everyone to see.  
  
CASH LOAN In these markets, initially, you will be loaned some amount of cash. There 
is a good reason for the loan. Without cash the computer would let you do nothing since 
you are not allowed to have negative cash. However, you must repay the loan before the 
en d of the experiment. You need not worry about the technology of repaying the loan; 
the computer will simply take cash away from you at some pre-determined time. The 
cash will be taken away from you in such a way as not to affect your overall trading 
capacity.  
PERSONAL STATUS PAGE contains the following items. 
 
(1) CASH ON HAND Your cash on hand is the running total of your revenue from all 
sources minus purchases from all sources. (Market sales purchases) At the end of the 
market, the cash on hand is your profit.  
(2) UNITS- This is the number of units you have on hand at the moment. Units 
themselves are worth nothing to you after the market closes.  
(3)OUTSTANDING ORDERS This is a listing of all orders that you have posted in the 
market order book. If you want to CANCEL the orders you can do so from this page. 
You will want to cancel orders that you have posted when you do not want these orders 
to be taken by other people in the market.  
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(4) PERSONAL TRADING RECORDS Your personal trading record page informs 
you of trades that you have transacted.  
  
MARKET HISTORY page is a listing of all transactions made by all people. It is a 
complete account of all trading activity.  
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6.3 Appendices from Chapter 4 
6.3.1 Help Information Given to All Traders 
 
Overview: How to make money as a buyer 
 
 
 
The Public Market: Where to buy goods 
 
Buy units of Z here (The public market) 
Sell them here (Your private Market) 
You keep the difference as profit! 
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Your Private Market: Where to sell for profit 
 
You can view the public Z 
market by clicking here 
View prices at which people are willing to 
buy 
View prices at which people are willing to 
sell 
Place orders in the Z market using the order 
form. You will use the same form to place 
orders in the X or Y market if present in the 
experiment. 
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6.3.2 Hand Outs for Insiders and Uninformed Subjects 
6.3.2a Introduction Given to All Subjects 
 
About Insiders’ Information: 
  
Insiders will know the rate of arrival and distribution of incentives. 
  
Using this information, insiders can compute Supply and Demand curves 
and hence computer equilibrium prices. For example, if private offers to 
buy and sell arrived to the market at a rate of 4 offers per minute, and the 
offers were distributed uniformly between 0 and 200 for the first half of the 
experiment and uniformly between 200 and 400 for the second half. The 
supply and demand curves for the first and second half of the experiment 
would look like this: 
  
Click here to go to your Private Z market 
Select the order(s) you want to 
fill 
Click ACCEPT to sell your units for profit.  
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The equilibrium prices would be 100 francs and 300 francs respectively, and 
trade would occur at a rate of 2 trades per minute. 
 
The problem informed traders face is the following: 
Since insiders know that prices will be higher in the second half of the 
experiment, they would like to “speculate.” That is, buy cheap units at the 
beginning of the experiment and sell them for more money during the 
second half. Unfortunately, this type of speculation shifts the demand 
curve to the right during the first half of the experiment, and shifts the 
supply curve to the right during the second half as seen below: 
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This raises prices in the beginning of the experiment, and lowers prices 
during the second half of the experiment (cutting into insiders’ profits.) If 
the insiders compete so aggressively that they drive prices up to 200 francs 
in the first half, and down to 200 francs in the second half, they won’t make 
any profit off their information. In this example, 200 francs is the insiders’ 
“break even point.” Every experiment will have a constant break even 
point, and insiders will know what that price is. 
  
Another problem for informed traders is that uninformed traders may also 
be watching the trading behavior of informed subjects. These uniformed 
traders may try to learn about the parameters of the market from the 
insiders’ actions and begin to speculate themselves (cutting into insiders’ 
profits even further.) 
  
Insiders’ only goal in this experiment is to make as much money as they 
can. 
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Sample insider information: 
  
There will be 4 Buyers and 4 Sellers.  
  
2 of the buyers will be informed, and 2 of the sellers will also be informed. All other 
buyers and sellers will be uninformed. 
  
Private offers to buyers will arrive at a rate of 16/min for the whole experiment 
Private offers to sellers will arrive at a rate of 16/min for the whole experiment 
  
For the first 30 minutes, prices of private offers will be uniform between 153 and 353 
For the second 30 minutes, prices of private offers will be uniform between 353 and 553 
  
The supply and demand equilibrium for the first and second 30 minutes of period 1 are: 
250 francs with 8 trades per minute and 450 francs with 8 trades per minute. 
  
The break even point is 350 francs. 
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Information for Practice Period: 
 
 
There will be ____ Buyers and ____ Sellers.  
  
In the practice period, all traders have private markets, and all traders are informed of 
what the supply and demand equilibrium is. This period is for practice only and earnings 
earned during this period will not be exchanged for cash. 
 
At the end of the practice period, your loans of cash and inventory will be reset. 
  
Private offers to buyers will arrive at a rate of 4*____ /min= ____ /min for the whole 
experiment 
Private offers to sellers will arrive at a rate of 4*____ /min= ____ /min for the whole 
experiment 
  
Pprices of private offers will be uniform between 1 and 101 
  
The supply and demand equilibrium for the practice period is: 51 francs with 2*____ 
/min= ____ /min trades per minute.  
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6.3.2b Sample of Information Sheet Given to Insiders Only 
 
Information for Period 1: 
 
  
There will be ____ Buyers and ____ Sellers.  
  
3 of the buyers will be informed, and 3 of the sellers will also be informed. All other 
buyers and sellers will be uninformed. 
  
Private offers to buyers will arrive at a rate of 4*____ /min= ____ /min for the whole 
experiment 
Private offers to sellers will arrive at a rate of 4*____ /min= ____ /min for the whole 
experiment 
  
For the first 10 minutes, prices of private offers will be uniform between 450 and 650 
For the second 10 minutes, prices of private offers will be uniform between 50 and 250 
For the third 10 minutes, prices of private offers will be uniform between 250 and 450 
  
The supply and demand equilibrium are: 
First ten minutes: 550 francs with 2*____ /min= ____ /min trades per minute 
Second ten minutes: 150 francs with 2*____ /min= ____ /min trades per minute. 
Third ten minutes: 350 francs with 2*____ /min= ____ /min trades per minute. 
  
The break even point is 350 francs. 
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6.3.2c Sample of Information Sheet Given to Non-Insiders 
 
Information for Period 1: 
 
You are not an insider for Period 1. Check your private market for private offers from 
the experimenter.  
 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU MANAGE YOUR INVENTORY PROPERLY. 
 
 
 
